144
regulations at higher levels (IMO and EU requirements on port reception facilities)
one step further. This could in turn serve as a testing ground and inspiration for
similar initiatives at higher levels (e.g. EU). In fact, as has been discussed, a
No-Special-Fee system can be implemented throughout the EU building on the
example provided by HELCOM. Another aspect of regional governance is that an
organisation such as HELCOM can sometimes facilitate subregional collaboration.
We illustrated above that joint aerial surveillance for oil pollution was carried out
under HELCOM’s CEPCO initiative. Although it was also shown that the number
of fl ight hours varies considerably and that not all countries are equally interested in
regional cooperation on this matter, it is clear that subregional cooperation among a
limited number of reasonably like-minded countries could be valuable and possible
for a smaller group. It is typically not the case that participation of all on equal terms
is necessary. Sometimes it could be more effi cient to let a group of proactive countries take the lead, possibly putting some pressure on others to follow suit.
It is often said that political decision-making and regulatory structures always
should be placed at the “appropriate level”, that is, at the level that corresponds to
the scale of the problem at hand. This is true, but easier said than done. The real
challenge is to identify the appropriate level not so much for the sector as such (i.e.
shipping) but more importantly for the detailed aspect that needs to be regulated.
Moreover, fi nding the appropriate scale also means that varying opportunities are
opened up for different regulatory mechanisms that defi ne how effective and effi -
cient they could be. Although the phasing out of single-hull tankers needs global
conventions, unilateral action by dominant powers such as the USA and EU could
speed up things when global regulation drags on for too long.
In contrast to command and control mechanisms involved in the phasing out of
single-hull tankers, changing incentives have been instrumental to the selective Port
State Control and the No-Special-Fee system . The key here has been to look closer
at the incentives facing the main actors and trying to change these incentives to
induce behaviour that results in safer shipping. It should be noted that in all these
cases, there is a global convention at the bottom formalising what has been possible
to reach consensus on. Regulations at lower levels or using other means always have
to be undertaken within the boundaries set by these higher level agreements in order
to avoid inconsistencies. But there are often different ways to improve the enforcement of these regulations and adapt them to regional conditions without threatening
the consistency of the global convention, as shown by especially the Port State
Control and the No-Special-Fee system examples.
Finally, addressing incentives and capability in marine governance is not only
important in relation to operators but also in relation to governments as well. It is no
coincidence that Sweden has so many more fl ight hours than Russia. Sweden and
Finland especially have been proactive in implementing regional environmental
regulation in the Baltic Sea. Likewise, it is not surprising that the Baltic States have
had more problems than the Scandinavian countries in the implementation of the
No-Special-Fee system . It is quite natural that proactive countries such as Sweden
and Finland tend to exaggerate the amount of common interest in addressing threats
to the Baltic Sea environment. The simple reason for this is that it might be in their
B. Hassler
regulations at higher levels (IMO and EU requirements on port reception facilities)
one step further. This could in turn serve as a testing ground and inspiration for
similar initiatives at higher levels (e.g. EU). In fact, as has been discussed, a
No-Special-Fee system can be implemented throughout the EU building on the
example provided by HELCOM. Another aspect of regional governance is that an
organisation such as HELCOM can sometimes facilitate subregional collaboration.
We illustrated above that joint aerial surveillance for oil pollution was carried out
under HELCOM’s CEPCO initiative. Although it was also shown that the number
of fl ight hours varies considerably and that not all countries are equally interested in
regional cooperation on this matter, it is clear that subregional cooperation among a
limited number of reasonably like-minded countries could be valuable and possible
for a smaller group. It is typically not the case that participation of all on equal terms
is necessary. Sometimes it could be more effi cient to let a group of proactive countries take the lead, possibly putting some pressure on others to follow suit.
It is often said that political decision-making and regulatory structures always
should be placed at the “appropriate level”, that is, at the level that corresponds to
the scale of the problem at hand. This is true, but easier said than done. The real
challenge is to identify the appropriate level not so much for the sector as such (i.e.
shipping) but more importantly for the detailed aspect that needs to be regulated.
Moreover, fi nding the appropriate scale also means that varying opportunities are
opened up for different regulatory mechanisms that defi ne how effective and effi -
cient they could be. Although the phasing out of single-hull tankers needs global
conventions, unilateral action by dominant powers such as the USA and EU could
speed up things when global regulation drags on for too long.
In contrast to command and control mechanisms involved in the phasing out of
single-hull tankers, changing incentives have been instrumental to the selective Port
State Control and the No-Special-Fee system . The key here has been to look closer
at the incentives facing the main actors and trying to change these incentives to
induce behaviour that results in safer shipping. It should be noted that in all these
cases, there is a global convention at the bottom formalising what has been possible
to reach consensus on. Regulations at lower levels or using other means always have
to be undertaken within the boundaries set by these higher level agreements in order
to avoid inconsistencies. But there are often different ways to improve the enforcement of these regulations and adapt them to regional conditions without threatening
the consistency of the global convention, as shown by especially the Port State
Control and the No-Special-Fee system examples.
Finally, addressing incentives and capability in marine governance is not only
important in relation to operators but also in relation to governments as well. It is no
coincidence that Sweden has so many more fl ight hours than Russia. Sweden and
Finland especially have been proactive in implementing regional environmental
regulation in the Baltic Sea. Likewise, it is not surprising that the Baltic States have
had more problems than the Scandinavian countries in the implementation of the
No-Special-Fee system . It is quite natural that proactive countries such as Sweden
and Finland tend to exaggerate the amount of common interest in addressing threats
to the Baltic Sea environment. The simple reason for this is that it might be in their
B. Hassler