145
strategic interest to do so in order to induce less interested countries to do more.
However, offi cially recognising differences in national interests and capability might
be important in order to set the stage for negotiations under more realistic preconditions. This could mean that proactive countries will need to contribute more than
others to monitoring , surveillance , training in Port State Control procedures and part
fi nancing of port reception facilities in countries less rich in resources and other initiatives. This might be preferable to negotiation breakdown or severe implementation
gaps. Here, HELCOM as well as EU arenas could prove instrumental in facilitating
the fi nding of workable agreements among the Baltic Sea governments.
Acknowledgements This chapter is based on research undertaken within the research programme
“Environmental Risk Governance of the Baltic Sea” (2009–2015, Michael Gilek programme coordinator). The research involved research teams from Södertörn University in Sweden, Åbo
Akademi University in Finland, Dialogik/Stuttgart University in Germany and Gdansk University
in Poland. The funding came from the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies and the
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (2007–2013) under grant agreement no.
217246 made with the joint Baltic Sea research and development programme BONUS, as well as
from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency, the Swedish Research Council FORMAS, the Polish Ministry of Science and
Higher Education and the Academy of Finland. I wish to express my warm appreciation to these
institutions for enabling me to conduct this research, to all participants in the research programme
that directly or indirectly provided useful input, to all informants for sharing their experiences and
to the two reviewers for their constructive comments on an earlier version of the chapter.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNoncommercial 2.5 License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ ) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
References
Aksu S, Vassalos D, Tuzcu C, Mikelis N, Swift P (2004) A risk based design methodology for
pollution prevention and control. RINA International Conference on Design and Operation of
Double Hull Tankers, London
Bach I, Flinders M (eds) (2004) Multi-level governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Bennet P (2000) Environmental governance and private actors: enrolling insurers in international
maritime regulation. Polit Geogr 19(7):875–899
DeSombre ER (2006) Flagging standards: globalization and environmental, safety, and labor regulations at sea. MIT Press, Cambridge
French-McCay DP (2009) Oil spill impact modeling – development and validation. Environ
Toxicol Chem 23(10):2441–2456
Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859):1243–1248
Hassler B (2003a) Science and politics of foreign aid – Swedish environmental support to the
Baltic States. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
Hassler B (2003b) Protecting the Baltic Sea – the Helsinki convention and national interests. In:
Stokke OS (ed) Yearbook of international co-operation on environment and development.
Earthscan, London
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…
strategic interest to do so in order to induce less interested countries to do more.
However, offi cially recognising differences in national interests and capability might
be important in order to set the stage for negotiations under more realistic preconditions. This could mean that proactive countries will need to contribute more than
others to monitoring , surveillance , training in Port State Control procedures and part
fi nancing of port reception facilities in countries less rich in resources and other initiatives. This might be preferable to negotiation breakdown or severe implementation
gaps. Here, HELCOM as well as EU arenas could prove instrumental in facilitating
the fi nding of workable agreements among the Baltic Sea governments.
Acknowledgements This chapter is based on research undertaken within the research programme
“Environmental Risk Governance of the Baltic Sea” (2009–2015, Michael Gilek programme coordinator). The research involved research teams from Södertörn University in Sweden, Åbo
Akademi University in Finland, Dialogik/Stuttgart University in Germany and Gdansk University
in Poland. The funding came from the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies and the
European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (2007–2013) under grant agreement no.
217246 made with the joint Baltic Sea research and development programme BONUS, as well as
from the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), the Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency, the Swedish Research Council FORMAS, the Polish Ministry of Science and
Higher Education and the Academy of Finland. I wish to express my warm appreciation to these
institutions for enabling me to conduct this research, to all participants in the research programme
that directly or indirectly provided useful input, to all informants for sharing their experiences and
to the two reviewers for their constructive comments on an earlier version of the chapter.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons AttributionNoncommercial 2.5 License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ ) which permits any
noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s)
and source are credited.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included
in the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory
regulation, users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to duplicate, adapt or
reproduce the material.
References
Aksu S, Vassalos D, Tuzcu C, Mikelis N, Swift P (2004) A risk based design methodology for
pollution prevention and control. RINA International Conference on Design and Operation of
Double Hull Tankers, London
Bach I, Flinders M (eds) (2004) Multi-level governance. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Bennet P (2000) Environmental governance and private actors: enrolling insurers in international
maritime regulation. Polit Geogr 19(7):875–899
DeSombre ER (2006) Flagging standards: globalization and environmental, safety, and labor regulations at sea. MIT Press, Cambridge
French-McCay DP (2009) Oil spill impact modeling – development and validation. Environ
Toxicol Chem 23(10):2441–2456
Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859):1243–1248
Hassler B (2003a) Science and politics of foreign aid – Swedish environmental support to the
Baltic States. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
Hassler B (2003b) Protecting the Baltic Sea – the Helsinki convention and national interests. In:
Stokke OS (ed) Yearbook of international co-operation on environment and development.
Earthscan, London
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…