143
had fully implemented the No-Special-Fee system.
13 According to more recent
sources, there are indications that the full implementation of this system still seems
to be problematic (Jensen 2011 ). One suggested reason for this is that some ports,
because of the competition among them to attract business, have chosen to charge
those using reception facilities more than others. Another factor based on observations is that ports have charged extra fees when pumping sludge outside of regular
offi ce hours (Jensen 2011 ). It is quite clear that the No-Special-Fee system works
better in ports where more effective reception facilities have been installed and
governments and responsible authorities have both the will and capacity to improve
compliance.
6.7 Discussion
Contemporary marine governance is often depicted as comprising multilevel and
multi-actor interactions, competing knowledge claims and evolving patterns of comanagement, where stakeholders and users play increasingly important roles in
overall governance. However, while this is true with regard to fi sheries, eutrophication and protection of biodiversity , Baltic Sea shipping is characterised by hierarchical governing structures where IMO acts as a global regulatory hub, EU as a
stakeholder and enforcer, HELCOM as an important interface between individual
governments and intergovernmental organisations at regional and global scales and
governments as key stakeholders typically promoting issue-specifi c national interests. Despite its globalised nature, modern shipping is to a considerable extent
governed by intergovernmental organisations practising a policy mix comprising
command and control measures as well as mechanisms to reduce gaps between
operators’ economic incentive structures and politically agreed upon regulations .
It has been illustrated in four brief examples that both the EU and HELCOM
have played important roles in Baltic Sea marine governance. However, their roles
have been markedly different from each other. An interesting role that the EU has
played at times is that of an enforcer of global conventions at the EU level. The EU
has used its legal regulatory instruments and directives, for example, to enforce a
faster phasing out of single-hull vessels within the Union and thereby also speed up
the global IMO phasing-out process. Another example was when the EU turned the
recommended 25 % port inspection frequency by IMO into a mandatory requirement in all EU ports. The EU has, in other words, been able to strengthen global
conventions internally and sometimes even infl uence global governance.
In contrast, HELCOM has no other governance mechanisms at its disposal
besides for the Helsinki Convention and the Recommendations which both are built
upon consensual decision-making and do not allow for legal enforcement. Despite
this, the example of the No-Special-Fee system shows that it can be possible to take
13 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had partially implemented the No-Special-Fee system,
whereas Sweden and Russia were not audited.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…
had fully implemented the No-Special-Fee system.
13 According to more recent
sources, there are indications that the full implementation of this system still seems
to be problematic (Jensen 2011 ). One suggested reason for this is that some ports,
because of the competition among them to attract business, have chosen to charge
those using reception facilities more than others. Another factor based on observations is that ports have charged extra fees when pumping sludge outside of regular
offi ce hours (Jensen 2011 ). It is quite clear that the No-Special-Fee system works
better in ports where more effective reception facilities have been installed and
governments and responsible authorities have both the will and capacity to improve
compliance.
6.7 Discussion
Contemporary marine governance is often depicted as comprising multilevel and
multi-actor interactions, competing knowledge claims and evolving patterns of comanagement, where stakeholders and users play increasingly important roles in
overall governance. However, while this is true with regard to fi sheries, eutrophication and protection of biodiversity , Baltic Sea shipping is characterised by hierarchical governing structures where IMO acts as a global regulatory hub, EU as a
stakeholder and enforcer, HELCOM as an important interface between individual
governments and intergovernmental organisations at regional and global scales and
governments as key stakeholders typically promoting issue-specifi c national interests. Despite its globalised nature, modern shipping is to a considerable extent
governed by intergovernmental organisations practising a policy mix comprising
command and control measures as well as mechanisms to reduce gaps between
operators’ economic incentive structures and politically agreed upon regulations .
It has been illustrated in four brief examples that both the EU and HELCOM
have played important roles in Baltic Sea marine governance. However, their roles
have been markedly different from each other. An interesting role that the EU has
played at times is that of an enforcer of global conventions at the EU level. The EU
has used its legal regulatory instruments and directives, for example, to enforce a
faster phasing out of single-hull vessels within the Union and thereby also speed up
the global IMO phasing-out process. Another example was when the EU turned the
recommended 25 % port inspection frequency by IMO into a mandatory requirement in all EU ports. The EU has, in other words, been able to strengthen global
conventions internally and sometimes even infl uence global governance.
In contrast, HELCOM has no other governance mechanisms at its disposal
besides for the Helsinki Convention and the Recommendations which both are built
upon consensual decision-making and do not allow for legal enforcement. Despite
this, the example of the No-Special-Fee system shows that it can be possible to take
13 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland had partially implemented the No-Special-Fee system,
whereas Sweden and Russia were not audited.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…