137
6.6 Intentional Spills
6.6.1 Command and Control: Aerial Surveillance
and Monitoring of Baltic Sea Waters
Whereas IMO has moved from vessel monitoring at sea towards focusing on vessel
construction and maintenance, the situation is slightly different with regard to
regional management of intentional oil spills in the Baltic Sea. All relevant IMO
regulations are also valid in the Baltic Sea region, and many of them moreover have
been incorporated into the Helsinki Convention . Due to the smallish size of the
Baltic Sea, serious attempts have been made to monitor ship movements in order to
detect oil spills. There are mainly three reasons why this form of monitoring could
be important at regional and subregional levels but less effective in the large open
seas of the world. First, the number of countries that need to cooperate on monitoring schemes is limited which facilitates joint action. In the case of the Baltic Sea
region, the longstanding record of HELCOM being a key regional intergovernmental organisation facilitates reaching of agreements (Hassler 2003b ). Second, the fact
that most of the major Baltic Sea shipping lanes are within individual countries’
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and territorial waters means that these countries
may fi nd themselves to be in vulnerable positions in case of oil spills. This creates
incentives for individual countries to deter operators from polluting nearby but still
in international waters (Hassler 2008 ). Third, and fi nally, the limited size of the
Baltic Sea makes aerial surveillance in collaboration with coastguard patrols effective enough to be worthwhile. Since April 2007, monitoring has been given more
muscle through the EMSA CleanSeaNet satellite surveillance. However, even
though satellite surveillance may seem like a powerful tool, HELCOM data from
2012 shows that from the 185 satellite detections of suspected spills, only 13 were
later confi rmed as mineral oil spills, while more than half (93) were never checked
at all (HELCOM 2012 ).
The main responsibility of aerial surveillance rests with individual countries.
Agreements have thus been reached within HELCOM that air surveillance should
be undertaken by all member countries and that statistics of the number of fl ight
hours, detected oil spills, confi rmed oil spills and similar kinds of data should be
reported to HELCOM. HELCOM thereafter compiles reports and makes these
available to member countries as well as to the general public. In addition to this,
intensifi ed, joint surveillance efforts are undertaken once or twice a year under the
programme Coordinated Extended Pollution Control Operation (CEPCO). During
CEPCO operations, a 24-h surveillance scheme is carried out. On some occasions
so-called Super-CEPCO operations have also been undertaken that last for 6–10
days in an attempt to improve data on pollution and reduce the number of spills. The
details of these operations remain classifi ed until after the surveillance has been carried out in order to avoid strategic actions by operators.
It is clear that ambition levels among different HELCOM member countries have
varied considerably despite the fact that HELCOM Recommendation 12/8 adopted
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…
6.6 Intentional Spills
6.6.1 Command and Control: Aerial Surveillance
and Monitoring of Baltic Sea Waters
Whereas IMO has moved from vessel monitoring at sea towards focusing on vessel
construction and maintenance, the situation is slightly different with regard to
regional management of intentional oil spills in the Baltic Sea. All relevant IMO
regulations are also valid in the Baltic Sea region, and many of them moreover have
been incorporated into the Helsinki Convention . Due to the smallish size of the
Baltic Sea, serious attempts have been made to monitor ship movements in order to
detect oil spills. There are mainly three reasons why this form of monitoring could
be important at regional and subregional levels but less effective in the large open
seas of the world. First, the number of countries that need to cooperate on monitoring schemes is limited which facilitates joint action. In the case of the Baltic Sea
region, the longstanding record of HELCOM being a key regional intergovernmental organisation facilitates reaching of agreements (Hassler 2003b ). Second, the fact
that most of the major Baltic Sea shipping lanes are within individual countries’
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and territorial waters means that these countries
may fi nd themselves to be in vulnerable positions in case of oil spills. This creates
incentives for individual countries to deter operators from polluting nearby but still
in international waters (Hassler 2008 ). Third, and fi nally, the limited size of the
Baltic Sea makes aerial surveillance in collaboration with coastguard patrols effective enough to be worthwhile. Since April 2007, monitoring has been given more
muscle through the EMSA CleanSeaNet satellite surveillance. However, even
though satellite surveillance may seem like a powerful tool, HELCOM data from
2012 shows that from the 185 satellite detections of suspected spills, only 13 were
later confi rmed as mineral oil spills, while more than half (93) were never checked
at all (HELCOM 2012 ).
The main responsibility of aerial surveillance rests with individual countries.
Agreements have thus been reached within HELCOM that air surveillance should
be undertaken by all member countries and that statistics of the number of fl ight
hours, detected oil spills, confi rmed oil spills and similar kinds of data should be
reported to HELCOM. HELCOM thereafter compiles reports and makes these
available to member countries as well as to the general public. In addition to this,
intensifi ed, joint surveillance efforts are undertaken once or twice a year under the
programme Coordinated Extended Pollution Control Operation (CEPCO). During
CEPCO operations, a 24-h surveillance scheme is carried out. On some occasions
so-called Super-CEPCO operations have also been undertaken that last for 6–10
days in an attempt to improve data on pollution and reduce the number of spills. The
details of these operations remain classifi ed until after the surveillance has been carried out in order to avoid strategic actions by operators.
It is clear that ambition levels among different HELCOM member countries have
varied considerably despite the fact that HELCOM Recommendation 12/8 adopted
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…