136
as previous history of detected defi ciencies, age and company performance.
8 All
vessels that have been classifi ed as high-risk ships have to make a port call at least
72 h before planned arrival in order to facilitate expanded inspections by the port
authorities. Failure to report notifi cations as is required for all visiting ships may
result in selection for inspection, irrespective of prior ship profi le. It may also
result in fi nes depending on national regulations in the Port State. The ports where
these ships are heading will then carry out an inspection according to criteria
stipulated in IMO regulations (Paris MoU 2012a ). If the inspectors fi nd major
defi ciencies, the vessel may be detained until these have been corrected. Repeated
detentions may in turn result in banning from all Paris MoU member countries’
ports for a specifi ed period of time.
Inspections take time and therefore create direct costs for companies. Being
classifi ed as a high-risk ship may moreover result in indirect costs for the companies as this may impact upon insurance costs as well as the willingness of cargo
owners to do business with these vessel owners. The switch from the earlier procedure of random controls to targeted controls of vessels has thus resulted in
strengthened incentives for operators to achieve a low-risk profi le. The only way
vessel owners can achieve this is to improve their record by reducing the probability of being found to have defi ciencies. According to preliminary data from Paris
MoU , more detentions took place, despite fewer inspections, in 2011 as compared
to previous years, which seems to indicate a higher degree of inspection effectiveness (Paris MoU 2012b ).
The Paris MoU has in different ways given the port inspection mechanism
increased potency. This has to a signifi cant extent been possible due to the capacities of Member States and their ability to collaborate. This form of regional cooperation is of crucial importance in international governance since formal enforcement
mechanisms are lacking. One way to give these incentive-based mechanisms more
clout is to make sure that the information on ship defi ciencies and detentions not
only are made public but are also made as easily accessible and widespread as possible. Paris MoU is primarily doing this through its homepage ( http://www.parismou.org ), where statistics as well as individual vessel records, risk profi les and
other data are published. Finally, statistics on Flag State and Classifi cation Society
performance are published as well. Depending on the number of inspections and
detentions, Flag States and Classifi cation Societies are classifi ed in white/grey/
black lists easily accessible to all stakeholders.
8 The company performance indicator measures the frequency of found defi ciencies among a company’s complete fl eet of vessels and may result in rankings from very low to high performance.
B. Hassler
as previous history of detected defi ciencies, age and company performance.
8 All
vessels that have been classifi ed as high-risk ships have to make a port call at least
72 h before planned arrival in order to facilitate expanded inspections by the port
authorities. Failure to report notifi cations as is required for all visiting ships may
result in selection for inspection, irrespective of prior ship profi le. It may also
result in fi nes depending on national regulations in the Port State. The ports where
these ships are heading will then carry out an inspection according to criteria
stipulated in IMO regulations (Paris MoU 2012a ). If the inspectors fi nd major
defi ciencies, the vessel may be detained until these have been corrected. Repeated
detentions may in turn result in banning from all Paris MoU member countries’
ports for a specifi ed period of time.
Inspections take time and therefore create direct costs for companies. Being
classifi ed as a high-risk ship may moreover result in indirect costs for the companies as this may impact upon insurance costs as well as the willingness of cargo
owners to do business with these vessel owners. The switch from the earlier procedure of random controls to targeted controls of vessels has thus resulted in
strengthened incentives for operators to achieve a low-risk profi le. The only way
vessel owners can achieve this is to improve their record by reducing the probability of being found to have defi ciencies. According to preliminary data from Paris
MoU , more detentions took place, despite fewer inspections, in 2011 as compared
to previous years, which seems to indicate a higher degree of inspection effectiveness (Paris MoU 2012b ).
The Paris MoU has in different ways given the port inspection mechanism
increased potency. This has to a signifi cant extent been possible due to the capacities of Member States and their ability to collaborate. This form of regional cooperation is of crucial importance in international governance since formal enforcement
mechanisms are lacking. One way to give these incentive-based mechanisms more
clout is to make sure that the information on ship defi ciencies and detentions not
only are made public but are also made as easily accessible and widespread as possible. Paris MoU is primarily doing this through its homepage ( http://www.parismou.org ), where statistics as well as individual vessel records, risk profi les and
other data are published. Finally, statistics on Flag State and Classifi cation Society
performance are published as well. Depending on the number of inspections and
detentions, Flag States and Classifi cation Societies are classifi ed in white/grey/
black lists easily accessible to all stakeholders.
8 The company performance indicator measures the frequency of found defi ciencies among a company’s complete fl eet of vessels and may result in rankings from very low to high performance.
B. Hassler