131
is overly simplistic. To understand what would be the main drivers in effective
marine governance, it is necessary to disentangle individual actors’ – governments’,
sector organisations’, operators’, NGOs’ and others’ – interests in specifi c cases and
analyse how these interests contribute to collective outcomes. In some cases, notably where costs and benefi ts from an undertaking fall upon a single actor, problems
related to collective action should not be expected.
2
6.4 Undertaken Measures to Reduce Oil Spills
in the Baltic Sea
Turning now to the type of measures that have been taken to reduce risks related to
marine oil transportation, it is clear that large-scale accidental oil spills and intentional limited spills are similar in the sense that management suffers from signifi -
cant amounts of uncertainty. However, different types of uncertainty in these areas
mean that different types of measures need to be taken to reduce oil pollution in the
Baltic Sea. For example, regarding accidental spills vessel construction is of crucial
importance. Since most vessels are sailing in waters in different parts of the world,
uniform rules are typically required to induce compliance. When it comes to intentional spills, on the other hand, most spills are operational in nature, implying that
monitoring and surveillance is required. In addition to the distinction between
accidental and intentional spills, it is helpful to distinguish between command and
control measures (binding regulations ) and various incentive schemes aimed at
altering actors’ behaviour in more environmentally friendly directions (to reduce
accidental risks and intentional spills). The latter are predominantly based on
economic incentives (e.g. differentiated tariffs) but could also comprise other forms
of incentives, such as benchmarking and environmental labelling. The distinction
between command and control mechanisms and incentive schemes is important
since it directly ties to the above discussion on actors’ varying interests. Aspects
that need uniform, global regulation typically call for global command and control
mechanisms, mainly because of the diffi culties of administrating a global incentive
scheme, such as a uniform environmental tax on fuels. The main problem with command and control regulation is low levels of implementation and compliance.
3
Whereas the key rationale of command and control measures is uniform application,
the opposite could be said to hold for incentive-based schemes. Although the
2 It could be argued that problems related to collective action may re-emerge at the national level,
since various actors at the domestic level can be assumed primarily to promote particular rather
than joint interests. However, since the hierarchical structure is much stronger at the national level
compared to the international, collective action aspects are in most cases not as serious at the
national level.
3 That some members refrain from being members of IMO, which is the most important global
authority on marine affairs, is not a major problem as the number of members now has reached 170
(IMO 2011a ). While not all member countries have signed and ratifi ed all individual conventions,
the even bigger problem is the lack of implementation and compliance of ratifi ed conventions.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…
is overly simplistic. To understand what would be the main drivers in effective
marine governance, it is necessary to disentangle individual actors’ – governments’,
sector organisations’, operators’, NGOs’ and others’ – interests in specifi c cases and
analyse how these interests contribute to collective outcomes. In some cases, notably where costs and benefi ts from an undertaking fall upon a single actor, problems
related to collective action should not be expected.
2
6.4 Undertaken Measures to Reduce Oil Spills
in the Baltic Sea
Turning now to the type of measures that have been taken to reduce risks related to
marine oil transportation, it is clear that large-scale accidental oil spills and intentional limited spills are similar in the sense that management suffers from signifi -
cant amounts of uncertainty. However, different types of uncertainty in these areas
mean that different types of measures need to be taken to reduce oil pollution in the
Baltic Sea. For example, regarding accidental spills vessel construction is of crucial
importance. Since most vessels are sailing in waters in different parts of the world,
uniform rules are typically required to induce compliance. When it comes to intentional spills, on the other hand, most spills are operational in nature, implying that
monitoring and surveillance is required. In addition to the distinction between
accidental and intentional spills, it is helpful to distinguish between command and
control measures (binding regulations ) and various incentive schemes aimed at
altering actors’ behaviour in more environmentally friendly directions (to reduce
accidental risks and intentional spills). The latter are predominantly based on
economic incentives (e.g. differentiated tariffs) but could also comprise other forms
of incentives, such as benchmarking and environmental labelling. The distinction
between command and control mechanisms and incentive schemes is important
since it directly ties to the above discussion on actors’ varying interests. Aspects
that need uniform, global regulation typically call for global command and control
mechanisms, mainly because of the diffi culties of administrating a global incentive
scheme, such as a uniform environmental tax on fuels. The main problem with command and control regulation is low levels of implementation and compliance.
3
Whereas the key rationale of command and control measures is uniform application,
the opposite could be said to hold for incentive-based schemes. Although the
2 It could be argued that problems related to collective action may re-emerge at the national level,
since various actors at the domestic level can be assumed primarily to promote particular rather
than joint interests. However, since the hierarchical structure is much stronger at the national level
compared to the international, collective action aspects are in most cases not as serious at the
national level.
3 That some members refrain from being members of IMO, which is the most important global
authority on marine affairs, is not a major problem as the number of members now has reached 170
(IMO 2011a ). While not all member countries have signed and ratifi ed all individual conventions,
the even bigger problem is the lack of implementation and compliance of ratifi ed conventions.
6 Oil Spills from Shipping: A Case Study of the Governance of Accidental Hazards…