130
improved hydrographical measurements and navigation charts, not only in domestic
waters but also in collaboration with neighbouring countries, have been successfully undertaken (Hassler 2011 ). The global features of marine oil transportation are
not what is important, but rather the fact that the country carrying the costs is also
the prime benefi ciary of the undertaken project. Whether to make this investment or
not thus becomes an issue of domestic cost-benefi t analysis which does not need to
turn into a tragedy of the commons. Basically, it then becomes a question for the
authorities in that country to decide how to fi nance this investment.
Second, different countries will benefi t disproportionally from most kinds of
pollution control. Countries with extended coastlines close to major marine traffi c
lanes, for example, are typically more vulnerable to oil spills. It could be expected
that these countries would be more proactive vis-à-vis stricter regulations , everything else being equal. Not only would these countries be expected to undertake
measures having primarily local effects as described above, but proactive positions
in relation to international regulation would also be anticipated. Considering that
lobbying for stricter international regulation is typically not costly in relation to
what could be gained in case of successful interventions, there is no reason to expect
barriers for collective action in these cases, given that domestic interests are suffi -
ciently strong. This is most likely one important reason why Sweden and Finland
have been strong proponents of stricter international regulations with regard to environmental hazards in the Baltic Sea, not only when it comes to marine oil transportation but to most other threats to the integrity of Baltic Sea ecosystems as well. In
a similar manner, but conversely, countries with large stakes in marine oil transportation could be more hesitant to accept costly measures to reduce risks of oil spills.
This would, according to the logic of collective action rationality, especially apply
to stricter international regulations since these might threaten economic interests.
On the other hand, local improvement in, for example, port facilities or hydrographical charts could be more appealing for countries in geographically vulnerable
situations.
Third, and fi nally, not only interests matter, but capability as well. Countries with
more resources, know-how and experience could be expected to be more proactive
in relation to risk prevention as well as the build-up of impact reduction and cleaning up capability compared with countries that have less resources and experience
with these issues. This aspect has considerable relevance in the Baltic Sea region as
there is a marked difference in resource availability and administrative experience
between the former Soviet Union states on the one hand and the Nordic states and
Germany on the other. This has had signifi cant implications not only for national
environmental management , transposition of EU regulations and implementation of
international agreements but also in a wider, regional sense. It has been shown,
especially during the fi rst decade of independence in the 1990s, that the Nordic
states infl uenced the Baltic States by giving targeted support to strengthen their
administrative capability and assisting them in their preparation for becoming EU
members (Hassler 2003a ).
It is clear in summary that perceiving environmental governance of marine transportation as globalised and therefore uniformly prone to collective action problems
B. Hassler
improved hydrographical measurements and navigation charts, not only in domestic
waters but also in collaboration with neighbouring countries, have been successfully undertaken (Hassler 2011 ). The global features of marine oil transportation are
not what is important, but rather the fact that the country carrying the costs is also
the prime benefi ciary of the undertaken project. Whether to make this investment or
not thus becomes an issue of domestic cost-benefi t analysis which does not need to
turn into a tragedy of the commons. Basically, it then becomes a question for the
authorities in that country to decide how to fi nance this investment.
Second, different countries will benefi t disproportionally from most kinds of
pollution control. Countries with extended coastlines close to major marine traffi c
lanes, for example, are typically more vulnerable to oil spills. It could be expected
that these countries would be more proactive vis-à-vis stricter regulations , everything else being equal. Not only would these countries be expected to undertake
measures having primarily local effects as described above, but proactive positions
in relation to international regulation would also be anticipated. Considering that
lobbying for stricter international regulation is typically not costly in relation to
what could be gained in case of successful interventions, there is no reason to expect
barriers for collective action in these cases, given that domestic interests are suffi -
ciently strong. This is most likely one important reason why Sweden and Finland
have been strong proponents of stricter international regulations with regard to environmental hazards in the Baltic Sea, not only when it comes to marine oil transportation but to most other threats to the integrity of Baltic Sea ecosystems as well. In
a similar manner, but conversely, countries with large stakes in marine oil transportation could be more hesitant to accept costly measures to reduce risks of oil spills.
This would, according to the logic of collective action rationality, especially apply
to stricter international regulations since these might threaten economic interests.
On the other hand, local improvement in, for example, port facilities or hydrographical charts could be more appealing for countries in geographically vulnerable
situations.
Third, and fi nally, not only interests matter, but capability as well. Countries with
more resources, know-how and experience could be expected to be more proactive
in relation to risk prevention as well as the build-up of impact reduction and cleaning up capability compared with countries that have less resources and experience
with these issues. This aspect has considerable relevance in the Baltic Sea region as
there is a marked difference in resource availability and administrative experience
between the former Soviet Union states on the one hand and the Nordic states and
Germany on the other. This has had signifi cant implications not only for national
environmental management , transposition of EU regulations and implementation of
international agreements but also in a wider, regional sense. It has been shown,
especially during the fi rst decade of independence in the 1990s, that the Nordic
states infl uenced the Baltic States by giving targeted support to strengthen their
administrative capability and assisting them in their preparation for becoming EU
members (Hassler 2003a ).
It is clear in summary that perceiving environmental governance of marine transportation as globalised and therefore uniformly prone to collective action problems
B. Hassler