107
Sweden alone, from 1971 to 2018, the costs were estimated to be 380–480 million
euros. Corresponding EU fi gures amounted to 15–75 billion euros (NCM 2004 ).
Looking back, it is clear that the legally stipulated practical measures against
PCB in the 1970s in some Baltic Sea countries were taken years before there was
comprehensive conclusive evidence on causal links between PCB contamination
and the various adverse effects observed in the Baltic Sea environment. In spite of
some but much earlier evidence on certain negative health effects of PCB exposure
(EEA 2001 ), it can therefore still be said that these policies were precautionary.
Moreover, it is clear that HELCOM has been an important body for much of the
policy-making with regard to PCBs . However, forerunner countries (e.g. Sweden and
Germany
8
) acted earlier and to some extent independently of HELCOM. But laggard
countries (e.g. Poland ) did not act until they were applicants to or members of the
EU. The forerunners have foremost used HELCOM to push for measures in other
countries, by insisting on and making use of both recommendations and associated
monitoring and risk assessment activities. Conversely, HELCOM has hardly played a
decisive role for chemicals policy in laggard countries, for instance, in Poland, which
seemingly (although it is important to note that data gaps for Russia give rise to signifi cant uncertainty) stands for most of the PCB emissions (COHIBA 2012 ), and
where the societal debate on chemicals issues is largely absent (Eriksson et al. 2010a ).
Compared with HELCOM, policy measures in the EU came later, but the impact
of EU measures on national policy was signifi cant, including in laggard countries.
Much therefore speaks for the regulatory power of the EU to ultimately have been
of higher importance for the abatement in practise of PCB problems, than what the
power of HELCOM has been. However, HELCOM has been instrumental in acting
early and setting the agenda, in monitoring and assessing environmental quality and
in showing – at least initially – through its various recommendations the importance
of the regulatory way forwards. It is far from sure that the EU would have acted as
it did without this pioneering, catalytic and facilitating role of HELCOM. In addition, HELCOM in contrast to the EU includes Russia, where a number of the otherwise restricted hazardous substances are still permitted (COHIBA 2012 ).
Moreover, HELCOM has taken a leading role in developing environmentoriented approaches. This has been the case with the 1992 Helsinki Convention , the
zero concentration objective adopted in a Recommendation in 1998 and in the joint
HELCOM-OSPAR EAM -statement in 2003. Similarly, the precautionary principle
has defi nitely and for a longer time been playing a more central role in HELCOM
than in the EU. More recently, the EU has also institutionalised EAM, for example,
in MSFD . Considering the links and increasing coordination of implementation
between MSFD and BSAP , it seems plausible that both institutions will strive for a
broader use of EAM, even if the EU at the same time will keep its strongly polluteroriented REACH regulation.
All in all, it seems well motivated to conclude that in this PCB sub-case,
HELCOM and the EU have interplayed in a positive way, the former mainly initiat8 In, e.g. Germany, Monsanto and Bayer stopped PCB production by 1977 and 1983, respectively,
which might have facilitated some of the regulation.
5 Governance of Chemicals in the Baltic Sea Region: A Study of Three Generations…
Sweden alone, from 1971 to 2018, the costs were estimated to be 380–480 million
euros. Corresponding EU fi gures amounted to 15–75 billion euros (NCM 2004 ).
Looking back, it is clear that the legally stipulated practical measures against
PCB in the 1970s in some Baltic Sea countries were taken years before there was
comprehensive conclusive evidence on causal links between PCB contamination
and the various adverse effects observed in the Baltic Sea environment. In spite of
some but much earlier evidence on certain negative health effects of PCB exposure
(EEA 2001 ), it can therefore still be said that these policies were precautionary.
Moreover, it is clear that HELCOM has been an important body for much of the
policy-making with regard to PCBs . However, forerunner countries (e.g. Sweden and
Germany
8
) acted earlier and to some extent independently of HELCOM. But laggard
countries (e.g. Poland ) did not act until they were applicants to or members of the
EU. The forerunners have foremost used HELCOM to push for measures in other
countries, by insisting on and making use of both recommendations and associated
monitoring and risk assessment activities. Conversely, HELCOM has hardly played a
decisive role for chemicals policy in laggard countries, for instance, in Poland, which
seemingly (although it is important to note that data gaps for Russia give rise to signifi cant uncertainty) stands for most of the PCB emissions (COHIBA 2012 ), and
where the societal debate on chemicals issues is largely absent (Eriksson et al. 2010a ).
Compared with HELCOM, policy measures in the EU came later, but the impact
of EU measures on national policy was signifi cant, including in laggard countries.
Much therefore speaks for the regulatory power of the EU to ultimately have been
of higher importance for the abatement in practise of PCB problems, than what the
power of HELCOM has been. However, HELCOM has been instrumental in acting
early and setting the agenda, in monitoring and assessing environmental quality and
in showing – at least initially – through its various recommendations the importance
of the regulatory way forwards. It is far from sure that the EU would have acted as
it did without this pioneering, catalytic and facilitating role of HELCOM. In addition, HELCOM in contrast to the EU includes Russia, where a number of the otherwise restricted hazardous substances are still permitted (COHIBA 2012 ).
Moreover, HELCOM has taken a leading role in developing environmentoriented approaches. This has been the case with the 1992 Helsinki Convention , the
zero concentration objective adopted in a Recommendation in 1998 and in the joint
HELCOM-OSPAR EAM -statement in 2003. Similarly, the precautionary principle
has defi nitely and for a longer time been playing a more central role in HELCOM
than in the EU. More recently, the EU has also institutionalised EAM, for example,
in MSFD . Considering the links and increasing coordination of implementation
between MSFD and BSAP , it seems plausible that both institutions will strive for a
broader use of EAM, even if the EU at the same time will keep its strongly polluteroriented REACH regulation.
All in all, it seems well motivated to conclude that in this PCB sub-case,
HELCOM and the EU have interplayed in a positive way, the former mainly initiat8 In, e.g. Germany, Monsanto and Bayer stopped PCB production by 1977 and 1983, respectively,
which might have facilitated some of the regulation.
5 Governance of Chemicals in the Baltic Sea Region: A Study of Three Generations…