18 Bridging the Vulnerability Paradigm to Critical Infrastructure …
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18.6.2 The Tohoku Earthquake Disaster Case Study
Pioneering Approach to CI Vulnerability
The Tohoku earthquake, 7.2 on the Richter scale, affected Kobe, one of the largest
metropolitan areas of Kansai, Japan, on January 17, 1995. This disaster is considered one of the first real cases of a strong earthquake affecting a large and densely
populated area in the twentieth century (Menoni 2001). Over 6,000 people died,
hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless from house collapse and burned
residences due to fires that ignited because of pipeline gas leakage. The damage to the
industrial shoreline facilities at the Port of Kobe escalated to many years of regional
economic devaluation with severe consequences to freight transportation systems
(Chang 2000). The aftermath of this event induced (Menoni 2001) case study of the
disaster which proposes an important Avant-guard concept of chains of damages
and systemic vulnerability that captures the effect of CI failure in highly urbanized
areas. These chains of damage go beyond the traditional engineering perception of
physical intra-and interconnectivity. Systemic vulnerability is defined as “how prone
a system is to be damaged or to fail not as a consequence of some kind of physical
rupture occurring to one of its components, but rather as the indirect effect of some
physical, organizational or functional failure…”.
The pioneering aspect behind this concept is that physical and organizational
vulnerabilities of lifeline systems are equally crucial to understand the propagation
and intensification of disasters at different levels of exposed assets and systems.
Menoni criticizes the technological mindset and lack of integration of the vulnerability paradigm when this was just starting to take shape in DRR premises. In the
lessons learned from the Kobe 1995 disaster, there was no referral to social and organizational shortcomings, also named “soft” approaches. The focus was exclusively
made on technical countermeasures added to harden or increase redundancy of the
physical lifeline systems or components. Menoni presents a conceptual framework
where a hazard triggers physical damage to vulnerable infrastructures, which in turn
will also reveal organizational failures and characteristics that make system prone to
systemic damage.
Taking into consideration the organizational complexities of such infrastructures
can enhance governance and coordinating efforts specifically in emergency response
activities. In the recovery phase of a disaster organizational topological structures can
illuminate questions such as how many companies distribute the same service, and
what is the possibility to reach any broken node with resources for quick rebound.
Mapping the interconnectedness and interdependencies of organizations at a supply
and demand scale for a commodity or a service can also improve coordination among
various organizations managing CI, and between these companies and emergency
management agencies. Understanding intra-and interorganizational relations also
promotes awareness of collective and indirect exposure which in turn can illuminate
priorities for improving system performance and reliability. This coordination can
be expanded from the emergency response context to planned adaptive governance.
345
18.6.2 The Tohoku Earthquake Disaster Case Study
Pioneering Approach to CI Vulnerability
The Tohoku earthquake, 7.2 on the Richter scale, affected Kobe, one of the largest
metropolitan areas of Kansai, Japan, on January 17, 1995. This disaster is considered one of the first real cases of a strong earthquake affecting a large and densely
populated area in the twentieth century (Menoni 2001). Over 6,000 people died,
hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless from house collapse and burned
residences due to fires that ignited because of pipeline gas leakage. The damage to the
industrial shoreline facilities at the Port of Kobe escalated to many years of regional
economic devaluation with severe consequences to freight transportation systems
(Chang 2000). The aftermath of this event induced (Menoni 2001) case study of the
disaster which proposes an important Avant-guard concept of chains of damages
and systemic vulnerability that captures the effect of CI failure in highly urbanized
areas. These chains of damage go beyond the traditional engineering perception of
physical intra-and interconnectivity. Systemic vulnerability is defined as “how prone
a system is to be damaged or to fail not as a consequence of some kind of physical
rupture occurring to one of its components, but rather as the indirect effect of some
physical, organizational or functional failure…”.
The pioneering aspect behind this concept is that physical and organizational
vulnerabilities of lifeline systems are equally crucial to understand the propagation
and intensification of disasters at different levels of exposed assets and systems.
Menoni criticizes the technological mindset and lack of integration of the vulnerability paradigm when this was just starting to take shape in DRR premises. In the
lessons learned from the Kobe 1995 disaster, there was no referral to social and organizational shortcomings, also named “soft” approaches. The focus was exclusively
made on technical countermeasures added to harden or increase redundancy of the
physical lifeline systems or components. Menoni presents a conceptual framework
where a hazard triggers physical damage to vulnerable infrastructures, which in turn
will also reveal organizational failures and characteristics that make system prone to
systemic damage.
Taking into consideration the organizational complexities of such infrastructures
can enhance governance and coordinating efforts specifically in emergency response
activities. In the recovery phase of a disaster organizational topological structures can
illuminate questions such as how many companies distribute the same service, and
what is the possibility to reach any broken node with resources for quick rebound.
Mapping the interconnectedness and interdependencies of organizations at a supply
and demand scale for a commodity or a service can also improve coordination among
various organizations managing CI, and between these companies and emergency
management agencies. Understanding intra-and interorganizational relations also
promotes awareness of collective and indirect exposure which in turn can illuminate
priorities for improving system performance and reliability. This coordination can
be expanded from the emergency response context to planned adaptive governance.