344
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
on this subject disregard the intrinsic characteristics of supply chains that corroborate for creating risk (consequences of failure) and only take into consideration the
hazard as a probability of failure, where risk is just defined as the likelihood of hazard
and excludes the vulnerability dimension. The exclusion of such concept reinforces
the gap from the vulnerability paradigm for supply chain CI. In this perspective,
Peck (2005) draws from systems and network theory to propose a supply chain
management framework approach that is close to the current SETS approach. The
author argues that an integrated supply management should consider four levels
of analysis: the value of stream or process; the asset and infrastructure dependencies; the organizations and inter-organizational networks; and social and natural
environments.
As reliability and disaster risk management heavily depend on the coordination of
this complex web of organizations or stakeholders, it is important to map the shared
states between physical and social dimensions of CI. This approach is expected
to correct misalignments between the structure of organizational and collaborative
networks and the environmental constraints derived from risk landscapes (Bodin
2017).
Using the example of the TES, this means that for understanding this CI’s vulnerability we need to link its functional importance to the user level. In the context of
climate change and weather hazards, the TES functionality is even more relevant
because of its role as main provider of energy commodity for emergency services.
As we have seen in the context of Hurricanes Sandy and Maria, the TES and emergency services are interdependent, which means that not only the emergency services
rely on the TES but the TES also relies on the emergency services. By framing
the TES according to Haimes’ (2011) overview of CI as systems of system, we
argue that understanding the connections between three of TES subsystems (physical TES, organizational TES, and interdependencies with emergency services) we
will be able to understand its vulnerability and resilience and thus measure the consequences associated with each hazard as a function of vulnerability and resilience.
Identifying these shared states among subsystems under hazardous threats provides
a significant contribution to strategic planning. It enables assessing the spatial and
temporal probability and the severity of consequences, facilitates timely and effective planning for operation, and ensures effective execution of prevention, response,
and recovery. Ultimately, identifying and acknowledging these shared states of the
subsystems creates platforms for the required collaboration and partnership among a
large number of stakeholders and organizations that have stakes (goods and services)
in common subsystems. Understanding the shared states between the TES exposure
to current and projected hazards is key to measure the criticality of this infrastructure
from the user’s perspective.
S. Lindbergh and J. Radke
on this subject disregard the intrinsic characteristics of supply chains that corroborate for creating risk (consequences of failure) and only take into consideration the
hazard as a probability of failure, where risk is just defined as the likelihood of hazard
and excludes the vulnerability dimension. The exclusion of such concept reinforces
the gap from the vulnerability paradigm for supply chain CI. In this perspective,
Peck (2005) draws from systems and network theory to propose a supply chain
management framework approach that is close to the current SETS approach. The
author argues that an integrated supply management should consider four levels
of analysis: the value of stream or process; the asset and infrastructure dependencies; the organizations and inter-organizational networks; and social and natural
environments.
As reliability and disaster risk management heavily depend on the coordination of
this complex web of organizations or stakeholders, it is important to map the shared
states between physical and social dimensions of CI. This approach is expected
to correct misalignments between the structure of organizational and collaborative
networks and the environmental constraints derived from risk landscapes (Bodin
2017).
Using the example of the TES, this means that for understanding this CI’s vulnerability we need to link its functional importance to the user level. In the context of
climate change and weather hazards, the TES functionality is even more relevant
because of its role as main provider of energy commodity for emergency services.
As we have seen in the context of Hurricanes Sandy and Maria, the TES and emergency services are interdependent, which means that not only the emergency services
rely on the TES but the TES also relies on the emergency services. By framing
the TES according to Haimes’ (2011) overview of CI as systems of system, we
argue that understanding the connections between three of TES subsystems (physical TES, organizational TES, and interdependencies with emergency services) we
will be able to understand its vulnerability and resilience and thus measure the consequences associated with each hazard as a function of vulnerability and resilience.
Identifying these shared states among subsystems under hazardous threats provides
a significant contribution to strategic planning. It enables assessing the spatial and
temporal probability and the severity of consequences, facilitates timely and effective planning for operation, and ensures effective execution of prevention, response,
and recovery. Ultimately, identifying and acknowledging these shared states of the
subsystems creates platforms for the required collaboration and partnership among a
large number of stakeholders and organizations that have stakes (goods and services)
in common subsystems. Understanding the shared states between the TES exposure
to current and projected hazards is key to measure the criticality of this infrastructure
from the user’s perspective.