Fig. 8
Changes in total energy consumption of OECD
and non-OECD countries (1965–2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Fig. 9
World energy consumption in three economic growth
cases (2015, 2030 and 2040) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Fig. 10
Energy consumption by region. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Fig. 11
World energy consumption by industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Fig. 12
UtilityCo’s home energy report provides
energy-efficiency comparisons between households . . . . . . . 310
Fig. 13
Global economic growth versus energy consumption
(1965–2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Fig. 14
Energy intensity, per capita GDP and population growth
in selected regions (2015–40). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Fig. 15
Growth in GDP and primary energy (2015–35) . . . . . . . . . . 312
Fig. 16
UK history demonstrates that new technology can trigger
revolutionary energy system change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Fig. 17
Major energy technologies must develop through the
three stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Fig. 18
Definition of revolutionary energy technology . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Fig. 19
The lag from citations to deployment of a technology . . . . . 317
Fig. 20
Hype does not translate into R&D and deployment
of new technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Fig. 21
Technology requires alignment of supply, demand and
markets if it is to change energy systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Fig. 22
US tight gas illustrates how the sequencing of supply,
demand, markets and technology determines when
revolutionary change is triggered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Fig. 23
G7 energy systems have been stable in the past
four decades. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Fig. 24
Recent G7 energy revolutions have mainly occurred
upstream. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Fig. 25
Most G20 energy revolutions are not driven
by technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Fig. 26
Revolutionary technologies tend to rely on large state
investments and/or require incremental
network investments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Fig. 27
Conventional power grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Fig. 28
Future smart grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
Fig. 29
Pan-European power system 2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Fig. 30
Japan’s smart grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Fig. 31
Typical AMI architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Fig. 32
Configuration and functions of advanced distribution
automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
Fig. 33
Microgrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
xxviii
List of Figures
xxviii
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