314
M. Svrˇ cek
Returning to the controversy, related to the interpretation of the Meissner effect,
it is true that both camps believe in the universal validity and consequences of Bohr’s
correspondence principle, i.e. that provided ideal conductors are (are not) identical
with superconductors in classical physics, they are (are not) identical in quantum
physics as well, and vice versa. Adding the fact, that superconductivity has a teleonomic component, Bohr’s correspondence principle does not hold in this case, since
quantum physics, at least in its Copenhagen version, is solely causal. This limitation
of the Copenhagen interpretation was confronted by Bohm in his first critical point
discussed in Sect. 4. The consequences of this ignorance are significant. As already
stated, quantum physics cannot deal with teleological phenomena implying that it,
in view of what has been said above, cannot explain superconductivity. It can hence
only describe superconductors and distinguish them from ideal conductors. Taking
the point further, it cannot realize telicity in the superconducting phenomenon, indicating that the only possibility to describe superconductors within quantum physics
would be to regard them as insulators. Of course, the official attitude of physicists
today is different and the majority still believes that superconductivity is essentially
explained within the framework of quantum physics. Nonetheless, such calculations
were not fully logical since they conflated the classical teleological Norton-dome-like
potentials with microscopic quantization procedures.
So we reach a fascinating conclusion: Classical physics does not distinguish superconductors from ideal conductors (it views them as one system with two possible
solutions—one teleological, one causal), whereas quantum physics on the other hand
does not distinguish them from insulators (since the Bohr principle of correspondence cannot be applied to teleological phenomena). We bring forward now three
other confirmations that contemporary quantum physics, based on the Copenhagen
interpretation, cannot really explain superconductivity.
Quantum theory of superconductivity must necessarily explain the Meissner
effect. But it was never done: either in the first officially accepted microscopic BCS
theory [78], or in any of its clones or replacements. The problem is that the electromotive forces described by Faraday’s law of induction are equal to zero in stationary
conditions of the Meissner effect, whereas the existing theories do not suggest any
other electric forces needed to accelerate the electrons until the steady state supercurrent described by the London equation is achieved. Many physicists were inspired
by this problem, and in the last decade we have observed several attempts to solve it,
but such solutions go beyond the boundaries of contemporary classical or quantum
physics. E.g. Kozynchenko [79] proposed a way out that requires an ad hoc reformulation of the laws of classical electrodynamics for superconductors. On the other
hand, Hirsch [80] did submit another solution, transcending ad hoc laws of quantum
physics. As he wrote many notable and significant articles devoted to this topic, we
will quote and discuss some of them below.
In his paper “The origin of the Meissner effect in new and old superconductors”
Hirsch [81] summarizes the position of all contemporary theories of superconductivity particularly regarding their inability to explain the Meissner effect: “In a somewhat
circular argument, a ‘conventional’ superconductor is defined to be a superconductor
described by BCS theory. In addition there are by now at least 10 different classes of
M. Svrˇ cek
Returning to the controversy, related to the interpretation of the Meissner effect,
it is true that both camps believe in the universal validity and consequences of Bohr’s
correspondence principle, i.e. that provided ideal conductors are (are not) identical
with superconductors in classical physics, they are (are not) identical in quantum
physics as well, and vice versa. Adding the fact, that superconductivity has a teleonomic component, Bohr’s correspondence principle does not hold in this case, since
quantum physics, at least in its Copenhagen version, is solely causal. This limitation
of the Copenhagen interpretation was confronted by Bohm in his first critical point
discussed in Sect. 4. The consequences of this ignorance are significant. As already
stated, quantum physics cannot deal with teleological phenomena implying that it,
in view of what has been said above, cannot explain superconductivity. It can hence
only describe superconductors and distinguish them from ideal conductors. Taking
the point further, it cannot realize telicity in the superconducting phenomenon, indicating that the only possibility to describe superconductors within quantum physics
would be to regard them as insulators. Of course, the official attitude of physicists
today is different and the majority still believes that superconductivity is essentially
explained within the framework of quantum physics. Nonetheless, such calculations
were not fully logical since they conflated the classical teleological Norton-dome-like
potentials with microscopic quantization procedures.
So we reach a fascinating conclusion: Classical physics does not distinguish superconductors from ideal conductors (it views them as one system with two possible
solutions—one teleological, one causal), whereas quantum physics on the other hand
does not distinguish them from insulators (since the Bohr principle of correspondence cannot be applied to teleological phenomena). We bring forward now three
other confirmations that contemporary quantum physics, based on the Copenhagen
interpretation, cannot really explain superconductivity.
Quantum theory of superconductivity must necessarily explain the Meissner
effect. But it was never done: either in the first officially accepted microscopic BCS
theory [78], or in any of its clones or replacements. The problem is that the electromotive forces described by Faraday’s law of induction are equal to zero in stationary
conditions of the Meissner effect, whereas the existing theories do not suggest any
other electric forces needed to accelerate the electrons until the steady state supercurrent described by the London equation is achieved. Many physicists were inspired
by this problem, and in the last decade we have observed several attempts to solve it,
but such solutions go beyond the boundaries of contemporary classical or quantum
physics. E.g. Kozynchenko [79] proposed a way out that requires an ad hoc reformulation of the laws of classical electrodynamics for superconductors. On the other
hand, Hirsch [80] did submit another solution, transcending ad hoc laws of quantum
physics. As he wrote many notable and significant articles devoted to this topic, we
will quote and discuss some of them below.
In his paper “The origin of the Meissner effect in new and old superconductors”
Hirsch [81] summarizes the position of all contemporary theories of superconductivity particularly regarding their inability to explain the Meissner effect: “In a somewhat
circular argument, a ‘conventional’ superconductor is defined to be a superconductor
described by BCS theory. In addition there are by now at least 10 different classes of