112
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
The study suggests that the crews’ awareness of potential hazards and their knowledge
of the ship ( i.e. support of sensemaking and controllability) are very important factors
that would determine the outcome.
CONCLUSION
A discussion of human factors consideration in ship design has been presented in this
chapter. Research shows that human factors have increasingly been considered in the
development of ship design, especially in OSV design in Norway. Several standards of
how to address human factors in ship design is available in a bundance – although some
of the standards need to be revised. In maritime industry the implementation of human
factors standards is not compulsory; it is quite different from the petroleum industry
operating in the same area. In some cases, strong initiatives from the cargo owners
( shippers) or the customers were witnessed as a driving factor to address human factors
in the design. The pace of lessons to be learned in maritime industry is different from
many other industries. As an example, it took more than 6 years and three accidents
that were related to autopilot in the Norwegian Sea until the rules were revised.
In traditional ships where most of the equipment is mechanical and hydraulic,
the crew usually understands what is going on the ship. In modern ships where most
systems are digital and computerized, the crew is losing some of their understanding
of what is going on behind the screens and systems. Coupled with imperfect automation and immature technologies, the crew is to some extent left in a difficult situation,
especially when a hazard transpires in extreme or restricted condition. Thus, controllability and safety should be more in focus. There is a need to focus on how sensemaking is taking place and how systems are giving coordinated cues to the users. It
is a systematic weakness that there is poor communication between the users and the
designers and also between the manufacturers and suppliers, and that human factors
still do not have a strong standing in the shipping industry.
It is recommended to consult and involve the users in the process of designing and
improving a ship. Human factors expert involvement in the process is strongly supported. A comprehensive test and user acceptance of safety critical systems on board
is recommended, besides the validations as required by the authorities.
REFERENCES
American Bureau of Shipping. ( 2020). ABS Rules, Guides and Guidance Notes. Retrieved
from https://ww2.eagle.org/en/rules-and-resources/rules-and-guides.html
Andersson, M., & Lützhöft, M. ( 2007). Engine Control Rooms - Human Factors. Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and
Operation, London.
Ashe, G., & Lantz, J. ( 2003). Classification and Regulatory Requirements. In T. Lamb ( Ed.),
Ship Design and Construction ( Vol. I). Jersey City, NJ: The Society of Naval Architects
and Marine Engineers.
Baker, C. C., & Seah, A. K. (2004). Maritime Accidents and Human Performance: The
Statistical Trail. Paper presented at the MARTECH 2004, Singapore.
Blenkey, N. ( 2004). OSV designers eye the future. Marine Log, 109(Compendex), 21–27.
Sensemaking in Safety Critical and Complex Situations
The study suggests that the crews’ awareness of potential hazards and their knowledge
of the ship ( i.e. support of sensemaking and controllability) are very important factors
that would determine the outcome.
CONCLUSION
A discussion of human factors consideration in ship design has been presented in this
chapter. Research shows that human factors have increasingly been considered in the
development of ship design, especially in OSV design in Norway. Several standards of
how to address human factors in ship design is available in a bundance – although some
of the standards need to be revised. In maritime industry the implementation of human
factors standards is not compulsory; it is quite different from the petroleum industry
operating in the same area. In some cases, strong initiatives from the cargo owners
( shippers) or the customers were witnessed as a driving factor to address human factors
in the design. The pace of lessons to be learned in maritime industry is different from
many other industries. As an example, it took more than 6 years and three accidents
that were related to autopilot in the Norwegian Sea until the rules were revised.
In traditional ships where most of the equipment is mechanical and hydraulic,
the crew usually understands what is going on the ship. In modern ships where most
systems are digital and computerized, the crew is losing some of their understanding
of what is going on behind the screens and systems. Coupled with imperfect automation and immature technologies, the crew is to some extent left in a difficult situation,
especially when a hazard transpires in extreme or restricted condition. Thus, controllability and safety should be more in focus. There is a need to focus on how sensemaking is taking place and how systems are giving coordinated cues to the users. It
is a systematic weakness that there is poor communication between the users and the
designers and also between the manufacturers and suppliers, and that human factors
still do not have a strong standing in the shipping industry.
It is recommended to consult and involve the users in the process of designing and
improving a ship. Human factors expert involvement in the process is strongly supported. A comprehensive test and user acceptance of safety critical systems on board
is recommended, besides the validations as required by the authorities.
REFERENCES
American Bureau of Shipping. ( 2020). ABS Rules, Guides and Guidance Notes. Retrieved
from https://ww2.eagle.org/en/rules-and-resources/rules-and-guides.html
Andersson, M., & Lützhöft, M. ( 2007). Engine Control Rooms - Human Factors. Paper presented at the International Conference on Human Factors in Ship Design, Safety and
Operation, London.
Ashe, G., & Lantz, J. ( 2003). Classification and Regulatory Requirements. In T. Lamb ( Ed.),
Ship Design and Construction ( Vol. I). Jersey City, NJ: The Society of Naval Architects
and Marine Engineers.
Baker, C. C., & Seah, A. K. (2004). Maritime Accidents and Human Performance: The
Statistical Trail. Paper presented at the MARTECH 2004, Singapore.
Blenkey, N. ( 2004). OSV designers eye the future. Marine Log, 109(Compendex), 21–27.