31 ibid. Then again, Moots and Forster argue that Locke did not base the social contract
on consent but on ‘deeper philosophical foundation’. Glen Moots and Greg Forster,
‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex: John Locke Versus Contemporary Democratic Theory’
(2010) 39 Perspectives on Political Science 35, 40.
32 Locke (n 30) 357–361.
33 Richard Howard Cox, Locke on War and Peace (Clarendon Press 1960) 178.
34 Cox (n 32).
35 Mutanen (n 11) 34.
36 One of the seminal formulations of the democratic justification is Habermas’ theory on
the Rechtsstaat. For a comprehensive analysis, see K Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism
(Ashgate 2002) 77–117.
37 Castells (n 15) 330–331.
38 ibid 357.
39 Mutanen (n 11) 389–390.
40 ibid 50, 386.
41 Sovereignty as an issue of power and influence is a useful tool for assessing the impact
of social changes to the construction of the nation-state, as Castells demonstrates. See,
Castells (n 15) 303.
42 N Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Fatima Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert
tr, Oxford University Press 2004) 389.
43 On international legal cooperation and territorial jurisdiction see e.g., UA Nissen, Die
Online-Videokonferenz Im Zivilprozess (Peter Lang GmbH 2004)) 124. In the Finnish
context, Risto Koulu describes this combination of cooperation and territorial jurisdiction
as the inherent double standard of international procedural law, which refers to a state’s
aspiration to expand its own jurisdiction as widely as possible while at the same time
maintaining a mistrust of foreign process acts. See, Risto Koulu, Kansainvälinen prosessioikeus pääpiirteittäin (WSOY 2003) 2. However, Koulu states that the development of
both the ECHR and the EU has brought about a change of attitudes in international
procedural law and isolationism is no longer a possibility in international cooperation.
44 This principle is evident in the decision of the European Court of Justice on the
interpretation of the Evidence Regulation (1206/2001). See Lippens and others v
Kortekaas and others [2012] ECJ C-170/11 § 29. Issues arising from cross-border
dispute resolution usually connect with the jurisdiction of the court, choice of law and
enforcement. These three issues are of often depicted as private international law (or
conflict of laws). On private international law in general and in relation to Internet
issues in particular, see Dan Jerker Svantesson, Private International Law and the
Internet (Kluwer Law International 2007) 5–10.
45 See e.g. the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which
includes the Apostille Convention (1961) with 108 signatories, Service Convention
(1965) with 68 signatories, Access to Justice Convention (1980) with 27 signatories,
and Civil Procedure Convention (1954) with 49 signatories. However, the Conventions on choice of court from 1958 and 1965 never entered into force and neither did
the 2005 Convention on choice of court agreements. The Enforcement of Judgments
Convention (1971) is in force but has only five Contracting States, which is to say it
lacks wider applicability. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Status
Chart’, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-charts (accessed 25 June 2018.
46 However, the significance of lex mercatoria as a global regulatory regime has been
questioned. On comparative studies between corporate social responsibility (CSR),
ICANN’s UDRP procedure and lex mercatoria, see G-P Calliess and M Renner,
‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance’ (2009) 22
Ratio Juris 260, 260.
47 However, the traditional Convention-oriented solution for regulating Internet disputes
can be seen jn some instances. For example, UNCITRAL’s work, although unsuccessful,
138 Three quests for justification
on consent but on ‘deeper philosophical foundation’. Glen Moots and Greg Forster,
‘Salus Populi Suprema Lex: John Locke Versus Contemporary Democratic Theory’
(2010) 39 Perspectives on Political Science 35, 40.
32 Locke (n 30) 357–361.
33 Richard Howard Cox, Locke on War and Peace (Clarendon Press 1960) 178.
34 Cox (n 32).
35 Mutanen (n 11) 34.
36 One of the seminal formulations of the democratic justification is Habermas’ theory on
the Rechtsstaat. For a comprehensive analysis, see K Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism
(Ashgate 2002) 77–117.
37 Castells (n 15) 330–331.
38 ibid 357.
39 Mutanen (n 11) 389–390.
40 ibid 50, 386.
41 Sovereignty as an issue of power and influence is a useful tool for assessing the impact
of social changes to the construction of the nation-state, as Castells demonstrates. See,
Castells (n 15) 303.
42 N Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Fatima Kastner and others eds, Klaus A Ziegert
tr, Oxford University Press 2004) 389.
43 On international legal cooperation and territorial jurisdiction see e.g., UA Nissen, Die
Online-Videokonferenz Im Zivilprozess (Peter Lang GmbH 2004)) 124. In the Finnish
context, Risto Koulu describes this combination of cooperation and territorial jurisdiction
as the inherent double standard of international procedural law, which refers to a state’s
aspiration to expand its own jurisdiction as widely as possible while at the same time
maintaining a mistrust of foreign process acts. See, Risto Koulu, Kansainvälinen prosessioikeus pääpiirteittäin (WSOY 2003) 2. However, Koulu states that the development of
both the ECHR and the EU has brought about a change of attitudes in international
procedural law and isolationism is no longer a possibility in international cooperation.
44 This principle is evident in the decision of the European Court of Justice on the
interpretation of the Evidence Regulation (1206/2001). See Lippens and others v
Kortekaas and others [2012] ECJ C-170/11 § 29. Issues arising from cross-border
dispute resolution usually connect with the jurisdiction of the court, choice of law and
enforcement. These three issues are of often depicted as private international law (or
conflict of laws). On private international law in general and in relation to Internet
issues in particular, see Dan Jerker Svantesson, Private International Law and the
Internet (Kluwer Law International 2007) 5–10.
45 See e.g. the work of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which
includes the Apostille Convention (1961) with 108 signatories, Service Convention
(1965) with 68 signatories, Access to Justice Convention (1980) with 27 signatories,
and Civil Procedure Convention (1954) with 49 signatories. However, the Conventions on choice of court from 1958 and 1965 never entered into force and neither did
the 2005 Convention on choice of court agreements. The Enforcement of Judgments
Convention (1971) is in force but has only five Contracting States, which is to say it
lacks wider applicability. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, ‘Status
Chart’, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/status-charts (accessed 25 June 2018.
46 However, the significance of lex mercatoria as a global regulatory regime has been
questioned. On comparative studies between corporate social responsibility (CSR),
ICANN’s UDRP procedure and lex mercatoria, see G-P Calliess and M Renner,
‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance’ (2009) 22
Ratio Juris 260, 260.
47 However, the traditional Convention-oriented solution for regulating Internet disputes
can be seen jn some instances. For example, UNCITRAL’s work, although unsuccessful,
138 Three quests for justification