18 Beaulac (n 10 25–27.
19 Mutanen (n 11) 29.
20 Dietmar Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Vom Frankenreich Bis Zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (5th edn, Verlag CH Beck 2005) 177–193.
21 Douglas Howland and Luise White, ‘Introduction: Sovereignty and the Study of
States’, The State of Sovereignty. Territories, Laws, Populations (Indiana University
Press 2009) 3.
22 Thomas Hobbes and Ian Shapiro, Leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a
common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill (Rethinking the western tradition. Yale University Press 2010), ch. 28, 186–187. Hobbes continues by investigating, case by case,
situations that fall outside the definition of punishment, such as evil inflicted as
revenge or by a judge who is lacking the sovereign’s authority. Thus, Hobbes defines
punishment as legal, in the sense that it presupposes authority and an established legal
order. This legal definition of punishment is compatible with Nagel’s reading of
Hobbes, emphasising that Hobbes’s concept of individual’s obligation was not moral
but based on self-preservation. See Thomas Nagel, ‘Hobbes’s Concept of Obligation’
(1959) 68(1) Philosophical Review 74, 82–83.
23 Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, ‘The State of Nature and Commercial
Sociability in Early Modern International Legal Thought’ (2010) 31(1) Grotiana 33.
24 According to Tarlton’s reading, what Hobbes meant by acquisition was the fear of the
would-be sovereign, while institution refers to the fear of others. Tarlton criticises later
scholars for disregarding some central themes in Hobbes’s theory, such as the creation
and maintenance of a stable political system. According to Tarlton, for Hobbes it is
essential to examine what constitutes a recognisable process for creating the Commonwealth in order to understand the legitimacy of that order. See Charles D Tarlton.
‘The Creation and Maintenance of Government: a Neglected Dimension of Hobbe’s
Leviathan’ (1978) 26(3) Political Studies 307–327, 316–322, 308.
25 Thomas Hobbes and Ian Shapiro, ‘Leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a
common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill’, Rethinking the western tradition. (Yale University
Press 2010), ch. 18, 109.
26 Nancy A Stanlick, ‘A Hobbesian View of International Sovereignty’ (2006) 37 Journal
of Social Philosophy 552, 558–561.
27 Charles D Tarlton, ‘The Creation and Maintenance of Government: A Neglected
Dimension of Hobbe’s Leviathan’ (1978) 26 Politicial Studies 307, 321. Tarlton bases
his reading on a quotation in Leviathan: ‘To resist the Sword of Common-wealth, in
defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such
Liberty, takes away from the Sovereign, the means of Protecting us: and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government.’ See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Or
The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (Ian
Shapiro ed, Yale University Press 2010) 132 (ch. 21).
28 Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, ‘The State of Nature and Commercial
Sociability in Early Modern International Legal Thought’ (2010) 31 Grotiana 22, 43.
29 See e.g., Francis Edward Devine, ‘Absolute Democracy or Indefeasible Right: Hobbes
Versus Locke’ (1975) 37 Journal of Politics 736, 740. Devine emphasises, in the same
manner as Leo Strauss in his Natural Right and History, that Locke’s theory is in fact
based on Hobbes’ concept with some alterations.
30 ‘Secondly, in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent Judge, with
Authority to determine all differences according to the stablished Law. For every one
in that state being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being
partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with
too much heat, in their own Cases, as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to
make them too remiss, in other Mens.’ See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
(Peter Laslett ed, student edition, Cambridge University Press 1988) 351.
Sovereignty and state agenda 137
19 Mutanen (n 11) 29.
20 Dietmar Willoweit, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte. Vom Frankenreich Bis Zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands (5th edn, Verlag CH Beck 2005) 177–193.
21 Douglas Howland and Luise White, ‘Introduction: Sovereignty and the Study of
States’, The State of Sovereignty. Territories, Laws, Populations (Indiana University
Press 2009) 3.
22 Thomas Hobbes and Ian Shapiro, Leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a
common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill (Rethinking the western tradition. Yale University Press 2010), ch. 28, 186–187. Hobbes continues by investigating, case by case,
situations that fall outside the definition of punishment, such as evil inflicted as
revenge or by a judge who is lacking the sovereign’s authority. Thus, Hobbes defines
punishment as legal, in the sense that it presupposes authority and an established legal
order. This legal definition of punishment is compatible with Nagel’s reading of
Hobbes, emphasising that Hobbes’s concept of individual’s obligation was not moral
but based on self-preservation. See Thomas Nagel, ‘Hobbes’s Concept of Obligation’
(1959) 68(1) Philosophical Review 74, 82–83.
23 Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, ‘The State of Nature and Commercial
Sociability in Early Modern International Legal Thought’ (2010) 31(1) Grotiana 33.
24 According to Tarlton’s reading, what Hobbes meant by acquisition was the fear of the
would-be sovereign, while institution refers to the fear of others. Tarlton criticises later
scholars for disregarding some central themes in Hobbes’s theory, such as the creation
and maintenance of a stable political system. According to Tarlton, for Hobbes it is
essential to examine what constitutes a recognisable process for creating the Commonwealth in order to understand the legitimacy of that order. See Charles D Tarlton.
‘The Creation and Maintenance of Government: a Neglected Dimension of Hobbe’s
Leviathan’ (1978) 26(3) Political Studies 307–327, 316–322, 308.
25 Thomas Hobbes and Ian Shapiro, ‘Leviathan or the matter, forme, & power of a
common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill’, Rethinking the western tradition. (Yale University
Press 2010), ch. 18, 109.
26 Nancy A Stanlick, ‘A Hobbesian View of International Sovereignty’ (2006) 37 Journal
of Social Philosophy 552, 558–561.
27 Charles D Tarlton, ‘The Creation and Maintenance of Government: A Neglected
Dimension of Hobbe’s Leviathan’ (1978) 26 Politicial Studies 307, 321. Tarlton bases
his reading on a quotation in Leviathan: ‘To resist the Sword of Common-wealth, in
defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such
Liberty, takes away from the Sovereign, the means of Protecting us: and is therefore
destructive of the very essence of Government.’ See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Or
The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill (Ian
Shapiro ed, Yale University Press 2010) 132 (ch. 21).
28 Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, ‘The State of Nature and Commercial
Sociability in Early Modern International Legal Thought’ (2010) 31 Grotiana 22, 43.
29 See e.g., Francis Edward Devine, ‘Absolute Democracy or Indefeasible Right: Hobbes
Versus Locke’ (1975) 37 Journal of Politics 736, 740. Devine emphasises, in the same
manner as Leo Strauss in his Natural Right and History, that Locke’s theory is in fact
based on Hobbes’ concept with some alterations.
30 ‘Secondly, in the State of Nature there wants a known and indifferent Judge, with
Authority to determine all differences according to the stablished Law. For every one
in that state being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being
partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with
too much heat, in their own Cases, as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to
make them too remiss, in other Mens.’ See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government
(Peter Laslett ed, student edition, Cambridge University Press 1988) 351.
Sovereignty and state agenda 137