3 WHY JAPAN IS NO-LONGER A FRONT-RUNNER: DOMESTIC POLITICS …
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2009 Lower House election, Japan began to play a leading role in international climate change negotiations. Prime Minister Hatoyama, at the UN
Summit on Climate Change on September 22, 2009, pledged that Japan
would reduce GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels if all
significant emitters also commit to ambitious reduction targets. In order
to promote broader cooperation, he proposed the “Hatoyama Initiative,”
an international scheme for the provision of additional technological and
financial support to developing countries while ensuring developing countries’ “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” emission reduction targets
(MOFA 2009). However, there were already loud voices of dissent raised
within Japan against Hatoyama’s 25% reduction target. One such voice
attacked the premise of DPJ leadership in promoting international cooperation by proclaiming an ambitious mid-term target, since developing
countries were demanding that developed countries assume a 40% midterm reduction, and that the prospect for passing legislation similar to the
Waxman-Markey Bill in the US Senate on climate change was not bright
(Sawa 2009).
On March 12, 2010, the Hatoyama Cabinet approved “Chikyu
ondanka-taisaku kihon h¯ oan” (the Basic Global Warming Bill). The bill
set a mid-term target of reducing GHG emissions by 25% below the level
of 1990 by 2020. The policy proposals to achieve this goal included:
(1) establishing a domestic emissions trading system; (2) implementing
a global warming tax in fiscal year 2011; (3) introducing a system for
purchasing all electricity generated by renewable energy sources at a fixed
price; (4) nuclear energy promotion with due consideration for safety; (5)
further improvements in energy efficiency; and (6) promotion of R&D
for innovative technologies (Shugiin 2010). Although the Lower House
passed this bill, the Upper House did not pass it during the ordinary Diet
session through June 2010, and the bill was dropped.
The Hatoyama government stumbled over a controversy surrounding
a US military base and the money scandals that struck him and Ozawa
Ichir¯ o, the DPJ Secretary-General. Above all, Hatoyama’s failure to fulfill
a campaign promise to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station at
Futenma outside Okinawa prefecture was a fatal blow (Allen and Sumida
2010; The Japan Times 2010). After the resignation of Hatoyama, Kan
became the new prime minister on June 8, 2010. The Kan Cabinet soon
adopted the 2010 Basic Energy Plan, which specified that 70% of electricity would be generated from non-fossil-fuel or “zero emission” sources
by 2030, of which the share of renewable energy and nuclear energy
61
2009 Lower House election, Japan began to play a leading role in international climate change negotiations. Prime Minister Hatoyama, at the UN
Summit on Climate Change on September 22, 2009, pledged that Japan
would reduce GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 from 1990 levels if all
significant emitters also commit to ambitious reduction targets. In order
to promote broader cooperation, he proposed the “Hatoyama Initiative,”
an international scheme for the provision of additional technological and
financial support to developing countries while ensuring developing countries’ “measurable, reportable, and verifiable” emission reduction targets
(MOFA 2009). However, there were already loud voices of dissent raised
within Japan against Hatoyama’s 25% reduction target. One such voice
attacked the premise of DPJ leadership in promoting international cooperation by proclaiming an ambitious mid-term target, since developing
countries were demanding that developed countries assume a 40% midterm reduction, and that the prospect for passing legislation similar to the
Waxman-Markey Bill in the US Senate on climate change was not bright
(Sawa 2009).
On March 12, 2010, the Hatoyama Cabinet approved “Chikyu
ondanka-taisaku kihon h¯ oan” (the Basic Global Warming Bill). The bill
set a mid-term target of reducing GHG emissions by 25% below the level
of 1990 by 2020. The policy proposals to achieve this goal included:
(1) establishing a domestic emissions trading system; (2) implementing
a global warming tax in fiscal year 2011; (3) introducing a system for
purchasing all electricity generated by renewable energy sources at a fixed
price; (4) nuclear energy promotion with due consideration for safety; (5)
further improvements in energy efficiency; and (6) promotion of R&D
for innovative technologies (Shugiin 2010). Although the Lower House
passed this bill, the Upper House did not pass it during the ordinary Diet
session through June 2010, and the bill was dropped.
The Hatoyama government stumbled over a controversy surrounding
a US military base and the money scandals that struck him and Ozawa
Ichir¯ o, the DPJ Secretary-General. Above all, Hatoyama’s failure to fulfill
a campaign promise to relocate the US Marine Corps Air Station at
Futenma outside Okinawa prefecture was a fatal blow (Allen and Sumida
2010; The Japan Times 2010). After the resignation of Hatoyama, Kan
became the new prime minister on June 8, 2010. The Kan Cabinet soon
adopted the 2010 Basic Energy Plan, which specified that 70% of electricity would be generated from non-fossil-fuel or “zero emission” sources
by 2030, of which the share of renewable energy and nuclear energy