62 H. OHTA
would be 20% and 50%, respectively. Toward this end, five new nuclear
power plants were to be built by 2020 and another nine by 2030 (METI
2010).
This energy strategy had to be fundamentally revised due to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. As already
mentioned in the previous section, after Prime Minister Kan managed to
enact the renewable energy bill, he stepped down as prime minister. Then,
Noda became prime minister on August 30, 2011. His political style
resonated with the country’s prime-ministerial norm of seeking compromise within his party and with opposition parties. However, Noda soon
faced severe criticism from both pro-nuclear interest groups and antinuclear groups. Still, he maintained the “zero-nuclear reliance goal” by
upholding a new rule limiting the operational life of reactors to 40 years,
despite heavy criticism by pro-nuclear interest groups. Pro-nuclear interest
lobbies consisting of nuclear industry groups, Denjiren (Federation of
Electric Power Companies of Japan: FEPC), Denryokus¯ oren (Federation
of Electric Power Related Industry Worker’s Unions of Japan), and a host
of local governments, were concerned about the “zero-nuclear” goal’s
adverse economic impact. 4
On June 8, 2012, Noda approved the restart of the number 3 and 4
reactors at the ¯
Oi nuclear power plant on the justification that a stable
supply of electricity was imperative and that the operator ensured the
safety of these nuclear reactors. Since the government made this decision before the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission of the National Diet of Japan (NAIIC 2012) published its
official report, Noda’s decision incited furious public opposition. Massive
anti-nuclear rallies, which at their peak reached more than 200,000, 5 were
held every Friday in front of the prime minister’s residence (Aoki 2016). 6
With the hope that citizens would understand the necessity of nuclear
energy use, on June 29, 2012, the Energy and Environment Council
(EEC) (established in June 2011) announced “Options for Energy and
the Environment,” based on proposals from the Japan Atomic Energy
Commission (JAEC), the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy (ACNRE), and the Central Environment Council (CEC).
The EEC presented three scenarios to reduce nuclear dependence while
achieving various policy objectives for ensuring nuclear safety, energy efficiency, cost reduction, as well as reducing CO 2 emissions. The three
nuclear options for the energy mix by the 2030s and CO 2 emission reduction targets below the 1990 level included: (1) a zero nuclear energy
would be 20% and 50%, respectively. Toward this end, five new nuclear
power plants were to be built by 2020 and another nine by 2030 (METI
2010).
This energy strategy had to be fundamentally revised due to the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. As already
mentioned in the previous section, after Prime Minister Kan managed to
enact the renewable energy bill, he stepped down as prime minister. Then,
Noda became prime minister on August 30, 2011. His political style
resonated with the country’s prime-ministerial norm of seeking compromise within his party and with opposition parties. However, Noda soon
faced severe criticism from both pro-nuclear interest groups and antinuclear groups. Still, he maintained the “zero-nuclear reliance goal” by
upholding a new rule limiting the operational life of reactors to 40 years,
despite heavy criticism by pro-nuclear interest groups. Pro-nuclear interest
lobbies consisting of nuclear industry groups, Denjiren (Federation of
Electric Power Companies of Japan: FEPC), Denryokus¯ oren (Federation
of Electric Power Related Industry Worker’s Unions of Japan), and a host
of local governments, were concerned about the “zero-nuclear” goal’s
adverse economic impact. 4
On June 8, 2012, Noda approved the restart of the number 3 and 4
reactors at the ¯
Oi nuclear power plant on the justification that a stable
supply of electricity was imperative and that the operator ensured the
safety of these nuclear reactors. Since the government made this decision before the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation
Commission of the National Diet of Japan (NAIIC 2012) published its
official report, Noda’s decision incited furious public opposition. Massive
anti-nuclear rallies, which at their peak reached more than 200,000, 5 were
held every Friday in front of the prime minister’s residence (Aoki 2016). 6
With the hope that citizens would understand the necessity of nuclear
energy use, on June 29, 2012, the Energy and Environment Council
(EEC) (established in June 2011) announced “Options for Energy and
the Environment,” based on proposals from the Japan Atomic Energy
Commission (JAEC), the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy (ACNRE), and the Central Environment Council (CEC).
The EEC presented three scenarios to reduce nuclear dependence while
achieving various policy objectives for ensuring nuclear safety, energy efficiency, cost reduction, as well as reducing CO 2 emissions. The three
nuclear options for the energy mix by the 2030s and CO 2 emission reduction targets below the 1990 level included: (1) a zero nuclear energy