60 H. OHTA
did not immediately resign, taking responsibility for this historic electoral
defeat, he later gave up his post after reshuffling his cabinet.
After a brief political vacuum, the LDP chose Fukuda as the new party
leader (and prime minister), a politician who had not previously placed
the issue of climate change at the top of his political agenda. Thus, under
the Fukuda government Japan could hardly be expected to play a significant role in the negotiations at COP13 in Bali in 2007. During the Bali
Conference, one of the Japanese government side events demonstrated
the apparent influence of established and energy-intensive Japanese industries such as steel, cement, transportation, and electric power, the leading
industries of Keidanren. 3
The predominance of the policy alliance between METI and energyintensive industries also permeated Japanese policy at the G8 T¯ oyako
Summit in July 2008. The Japanese government did not press G8 leaders
to negotiate numerical targets for a mid-term scheme, while arguing
for a sectoral approach to emission reductions as a viable policy option.
Critics and environmental NGOs considered the G8 T¯ oyako Summit a
failure since it did not result in agreement on establishing mid- and longterm numerical targets. The outcome of the G8 T¯ oyako Summit did not
generate the desired tailwind for the international community, especially
for COP15 in December 2009 in Copenhagen, where the parties were to
devise an international framework beyond the Kyoto process.
Within a year, on September 1, 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda, who
suffered from low approval ratings, gridlock in the Diet, and economic
recession, abruptly resigned his position. Then, As¯ o filled this power
vacuum by becoming prime minister on September 24, 2008. As¯ o’s
primary mission was to win the next general election within a year.
However, soon after taking office, mainly because of various political
gaffes, inconsistency, as well as halting and incoherent responses to
the global economic recession, As¯ o also suffered from chronically low
approval ratings. He did not manage to dissolve the Diet while the LDP
had the upper hand over the DPJ before his term as prime minister
expired in September 2009. He was forced instead to plunge into a
“suicidal” Lower House election on August 30, 2009, in the wake of a
major LDP defeat in July 12, 2009, Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, which often functions as a barometer for predicting the outcome of
national elections.
Political change finally came to Japan and with it a new dynamic on
climate policy. Following the DPJ’s historic victory over the LDP in the
did not immediately resign, taking responsibility for this historic electoral
defeat, he later gave up his post after reshuffling his cabinet.
After a brief political vacuum, the LDP chose Fukuda as the new party
leader (and prime minister), a politician who had not previously placed
the issue of climate change at the top of his political agenda. Thus, under
the Fukuda government Japan could hardly be expected to play a significant role in the negotiations at COP13 in Bali in 2007. During the Bali
Conference, one of the Japanese government side events demonstrated
the apparent influence of established and energy-intensive Japanese industries such as steel, cement, transportation, and electric power, the leading
industries of Keidanren. 3
The predominance of the policy alliance between METI and energyintensive industries also permeated Japanese policy at the G8 T¯ oyako
Summit in July 2008. The Japanese government did not press G8 leaders
to negotiate numerical targets for a mid-term scheme, while arguing
for a sectoral approach to emission reductions as a viable policy option.
Critics and environmental NGOs considered the G8 T¯ oyako Summit a
failure since it did not result in agreement on establishing mid- and longterm numerical targets. The outcome of the G8 T¯ oyako Summit did not
generate the desired tailwind for the international community, especially
for COP15 in December 2009 in Copenhagen, where the parties were to
devise an international framework beyond the Kyoto process.
Within a year, on September 1, 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda, who
suffered from low approval ratings, gridlock in the Diet, and economic
recession, abruptly resigned his position. Then, As¯ o filled this power
vacuum by becoming prime minister on September 24, 2008. As¯ o’s
primary mission was to win the next general election within a year.
However, soon after taking office, mainly because of various political
gaffes, inconsistency, as well as halting and incoherent responses to
the global economic recession, As¯ o also suffered from chronically low
approval ratings. He did not manage to dissolve the Diet while the LDP
had the upper hand over the DPJ before his term as prime minister
expired in September 2009. He was forced instead to plunge into a
“suicidal” Lower House election on August 30, 2009, in the wake of a
major LDP defeat in July 12, 2009, Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, which often functions as a barometer for predicting the outcome of
national elections.
Political change finally came to Japan and with it a new dynamic on
climate policy. Following the DPJ’s historic victory over the LDP in the