3 WHY JAPAN IS NO-LONGER A FRONT-RUNNER: DOMESTIC POLITICS …
59
Japan’s Domestic Politics
and Diplomacy on Climate Change
Short-lived Governments, Energy Strategy, and Climate Change Policy.
Japan’s climate change diplomacy became reactive and lackluster, as the
domestic political climate was stormy after the 65-month-long coalition government led by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichir¯ o ended in
September 2006. Subsequent administrations led by Abe Shinz¯ o, Fukuda
Yasuo, As¯ o Tar¯ o, Hatoyama Yukio, and Kan were all short-lived and
unstable, plagued by political scandals, parliamentary impasses, particularly after the loss of the DPJ’s Upper House majority in the July
2010 election, and intraparty conflicts. Except Hatoyama, the remaining
prime ministers, who came to power without a lower house election, also
suffered from a lack of legitimacy and low approval ratings. Noda was the
sixth prime minister during the five years following Koizumi’s resignation.
After the formation of the Abe Cabinet on September 26, 2006, the
government pursued a conservative political agenda, inheriting from the
previous Koizumi Cabinet a more than two-thirds majority in the House
of Representatives (the Lower House) and a majority in the House of
Councilors (the Upper House). However, this administration also showed
interest in the issues of climate change. Abe was called on to create
a new international framework beyond the Kyoto process in which the
entire world would participate in emissions reductions. In May 2007, he
announced a new climate change initiative, called “Cool Earth 50,” which
proposed a long-term target for halving global GHG emissions by 2050
as a common global goal. The proposed solutions included the establishment of innovative technologies, the creation of a “low carbon society,”
and a national campaign for energy conservation (Kantei 2007).
Despite the role that Abe played in getting the statement of “considering seriously . . . at least a halving of global emissions by 2050” into the
communiqué of the Heiligendamm G8 summit, his sudden resignation in
September 2007 left that policy line to drift without a leader. Various cases
of political corruption by Abe’s Cabinet appointees lowered its approval
ratings, and this contributed to the crushing defeat the LDP suffered in
the Upper House election on July 29, 2007. The ruling coalition parties,
namely the LDP and the Clean Government Party (Komeito), lost their
Upper House majority, whereas the DPJ significantly increased its number
of seats to make it the largest party in the Upper House. Although Abe
59
Japan’s Domestic Politics
and Diplomacy on Climate Change
Short-lived Governments, Energy Strategy, and Climate Change Policy.
Japan’s climate change diplomacy became reactive and lackluster, as the
domestic political climate was stormy after the 65-month-long coalition government led by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichir¯ o ended in
September 2006. Subsequent administrations led by Abe Shinz¯ o, Fukuda
Yasuo, As¯ o Tar¯ o, Hatoyama Yukio, and Kan were all short-lived and
unstable, plagued by political scandals, parliamentary impasses, particularly after the loss of the DPJ’s Upper House majority in the July
2010 election, and intraparty conflicts. Except Hatoyama, the remaining
prime ministers, who came to power without a lower house election, also
suffered from a lack of legitimacy and low approval ratings. Noda was the
sixth prime minister during the five years following Koizumi’s resignation.
After the formation of the Abe Cabinet on September 26, 2006, the
government pursued a conservative political agenda, inheriting from the
previous Koizumi Cabinet a more than two-thirds majority in the House
of Representatives (the Lower House) and a majority in the House of
Councilors (the Upper House). However, this administration also showed
interest in the issues of climate change. Abe was called on to create
a new international framework beyond the Kyoto process in which the
entire world would participate in emissions reductions. In May 2007, he
announced a new climate change initiative, called “Cool Earth 50,” which
proposed a long-term target for halving global GHG emissions by 2050
as a common global goal. The proposed solutions included the establishment of innovative technologies, the creation of a “low carbon society,”
and a national campaign for energy conservation (Kantei 2007).
Despite the role that Abe played in getting the statement of “considering seriously . . . at least a halving of global emissions by 2050” into the
communiqué of the Heiligendamm G8 summit, his sudden resignation in
September 2007 left that policy line to drift without a leader. Various cases
of political corruption by Abe’s Cabinet appointees lowered its approval
ratings, and this contributed to the crushing defeat the LDP suffered in
the Upper House election on July 29, 2007. The ruling coalition parties,
namely the LDP and the Clean Government Party (Komeito), lost their
Upper House majority, whereas the DPJ significantly increased its number
of seats to make it the largest party in the Upper House. Although Abe