58 H. OHTA
However, in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and
sensing a shift in public opinion on nuclear energy policy, Prime Minister
Kan, who had barely avoided a non-confidence motion by his last-minute
promise of resignation after the enactment of legislation on renewable
energy, began advocating denuclearization. However, later he toned it
down to a policy of pursuing a “nuclear power reduction.” He pushed
a bill to promote renewable energy through the Diet. On August 26,
2011, the Special Measures Law on Procurement of Renewable Energy
Sources Electricity by Electric Utilities (the FIT law), a Japanese version
of Germany’s Renewable Energy Law, was passed through Diet and went
into effect on July 1, 2012. According to this law, the power companies
have to purchase electricity generated by solar for 10 to 20 years at a
fixed price, from geothermal for 15 years and wind, small-scale hydro,
and biomass for 20 years. According to the Renewable Energy Institute, renewable energy sources of electricity generation have been steadily
increasing under the FIT law. For instance, as of November 25, 2019,
the generation of electricity by renewable energy occupied 16.9% of the
total (hydro 7.7%, solar 6.0%, wind 0.7%, bioenergy 2.3%, and geothermal
0.2%). In passing, natural gas was 38.4%, coal 31.2%, petroleum and waste
7.3%, and nuclear 6.2% (REI 2019).
We now can identify a set of plausible explanations for why the
Japanese government has recently been inflexible and tenacious in maintaining its fixed position in international negotiations on climate change
by refusing to accept a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol.
This Japanese governmental position stems from the institutional inertia
or the vested interests that cling to nuclear energy, its half-heartedness
about the promotion of renewable energy (Moe 2012, 2015; Tsunekawa
2010), and the strong opposition of Keidanren to the introduction of a
“cap-and-trade” system. However, neither the government nor economic
interest groups are dominant in policymaking decisions: Rather, the
“reciprocal consent” between them is still a norm in Japanese public
policymaking, particularly in the field of energy policy (Samuels 1987).
Without a dynamic political leadership, we cannot expect Japan’s proactive role in international collective action to mitigate global climate
change, even though Japan could contribute to bilateral mitigation
schemes and aid adaptation efforts.
However, in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and
sensing a shift in public opinion on nuclear energy policy, Prime Minister
Kan, who had barely avoided a non-confidence motion by his last-minute
promise of resignation after the enactment of legislation on renewable
energy, began advocating denuclearization. However, later he toned it
down to a policy of pursuing a “nuclear power reduction.” He pushed
a bill to promote renewable energy through the Diet. On August 26,
2011, the Special Measures Law on Procurement of Renewable Energy
Sources Electricity by Electric Utilities (the FIT law), a Japanese version
of Germany’s Renewable Energy Law, was passed through Diet and went
into effect on July 1, 2012. According to this law, the power companies
have to purchase electricity generated by solar for 10 to 20 years at a
fixed price, from geothermal for 15 years and wind, small-scale hydro,
and biomass for 20 years. According to the Renewable Energy Institute, renewable energy sources of electricity generation have been steadily
increasing under the FIT law. For instance, as of November 25, 2019,
the generation of electricity by renewable energy occupied 16.9% of the
total (hydro 7.7%, solar 6.0%, wind 0.7%, bioenergy 2.3%, and geothermal
0.2%). In passing, natural gas was 38.4%, coal 31.2%, petroleum and waste
7.3%, and nuclear 6.2% (REI 2019).
We now can identify a set of plausible explanations for why the
Japanese government has recently been inflexible and tenacious in maintaining its fixed position in international negotiations on climate change
by refusing to accept a second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol.
This Japanese governmental position stems from the institutional inertia
or the vested interests that cling to nuclear energy, its half-heartedness
about the promotion of renewable energy (Moe 2012, 2015; Tsunekawa
2010), and the strong opposition of Keidanren to the introduction of a
“cap-and-trade” system. However, neither the government nor economic
interest groups are dominant in policymaking decisions: Rather, the
“reciprocal consent” between them is still a norm in Japanese public
policymaking, particularly in the field of energy policy (Samuels 1987).
Without a dynamic political leadership, we cannot expect Japan’s proactive role in international collective action to mitigate global climate
change, even though Japan could contribute to bilateral mitigation
schemes and aid adaptation efforts.