15 CONCLUSIONS
387
before the end of 2021; second, a dramatic drop in costs for wind power,
resulting in wind power becoming competitive on price, at least in the
windier parts of the country. One consequence was far more rapid installations of wind power. Another consequence was a power surplus and a
(still ongoing) discussion about what to do with this surplus. One possibility is the construction of subsea cables to other European countries,
for the export of Norwegian renewable electricity. The more renewable
energy that is phased in globally, the greater the need for interconnectors
between countries.
As mentioned earlier, Europe already has some cross-border interconnectors, but where it can be difficult just to strengthen the grid
infrastructure within a country, it is far harder to do so between countries. Thus, part of what the Norway chapter does is analyze the political
processes behind the construction of two subsea cables to Germany and
to Great Britain. Among other things, it shows that there are very few
Norwegian actors who think in terms of global solutions. Instead, the
discussion about subsea cables occurs at the domestic level, using arguments that belong to the state level of analysis, and not the system,
arguments that have to do with renewable energy installations vs. nature
conservation (i.e., Otte et al. 2018), or with Norwegian industrial interests and sovereignty concerns (i.e., Hansen and Moe 2021). Thus,
the authors argue that Norway is a long way from becoming a green
battery for Europe and probably never will be, despite the fact that
the climate problem is a supranational problem where one of the main
solutions, namely a European-wide grid-net, is also supranational (or at
least international). Part of this discussion is highly Norway-specific, and
interconnectors were discussed in 2013 as well (e.g., Gullberg 2013).
However, then they were discussed very much as developments of the
future, as opposed to today, when it is something that is clearly happening
now, with concrete implications for Norwegian politicians, households,
industrial and environmental actors. The fact that interconnectors (i.e.,
subsea cables) are these days at the core of Norway’s renewable energy
discourse is indicative of how renewable energy politics has changed since
the publication of the previous volume.
In the previous volume, Denmark was an example of a country that
had seemingly already made the leap to the next stage (Moe 2014b).
Here, the share of wind in the power mix was so high (27%) that this was
only attainable because of interconnectors to other countries—Norway,
Sweden and Germany. Thus, Denmark was already in a situation where
387
before the end of 2021; second, a dramatic drop in costs for wind power,
resulting in wind power becoming competitive on price, at least in the
windier parts of the country. One consequence was far more rapid installations of wind power. Another consequence was a power surplus and a
(still ongoing) discussion about what to do with this surplus. One possibility is the construction of subsea cables to other European countries,
for the export of Norwegian renewable electricity. The more renewable
energy that is phased in globally, the greater the need for interconnectors
between countries.
As mentioned earlier, Europe already has some cross-border interconnectors, but where it can be difficult just to strengthen the grid
infrastructure within a country, it is far harder to do so between countries. Thus, part of what the Norway chapter does is analyze the political
processes behind the construction of two subsea cables to Germany and
to Great Britain. Among other things, it shows that there are very few
Norwegian actors who think in terms of global solutions. Instead, the
discussion about subsea cables occurs at the domestic level, using arguments that belong to the state level of analysis, and not the system,
arguments that have to do with renewable energy installations vs. nature
conservation (i.e., Otte et al. 2018), or with Norwegian industrial interests and sovereignty concerns (i.e., Hansen and Moe 2021). Thus,
the authors argue that Norway is a long way from becoming a green
battery for Europe and probably never will be, despite the fact that
the climate problem is a supranational problem where one of the main
solutions, namely a European-wide grid-net, is also supranational (or at
least international). Part of this discussion is highly Norway-specific, and
interconnectors were discussed in 2013 as well (e.g., Gullberg 2013).
However, then they were discussed very much as developments of the
future, as opposed to today, when it is something that is clearly happening
now, with concrete implications for Norwegian politicians, households,
industrial and environmental actors. The fact that interconnectors (i.e.,
subsea cables) are these days at the core of Norway’s renewable energy
discourse is indicative of how renewable energy politics has changed since
the publication of the previous volume.
In the previous volume, Denmark was an example of a country that
had seemingly already made the leap to the next stage (Moe 2014b).
Here, the share of wind in the power mix was so high (27%) that this was
only attainable because of interconnectors to other countries—Norway,
Sweden and Germany. Thus, Denmark was already in a situation where