388 E. MOE
the grid on very windy days was unable to incorporate all this energy. But
instead of curtailments, as in the case of China, the solution has been a
(compared to most others) well-developed network of interconnectors to
other countries, allowing for seamless electricity exports and imports.
What Boscan et al. discuss in their chapter also suggests that to some
extent Denmark is still ahead of the curve and has moved on to challenges that for most other countries still lie in the future: the greening of
the transportation sector (an area where Norway is however significantly
ahead of Denmark), the greening of district heating, and the removal of
cost barriers for end users to adopt electric transportation and heating.
However, as Denmark moves ahead with renewable energy, a familiar
final point also pops up, namely dwindling domestic backup capacity.
Thus, while being connected through interconnectors to other countries, the almost doubling in wind power’s share of the power mix since
2014 (to 47% and a clear world record among any country bigger than
a microstate) has made the country more dependent on others and thus
more vulnerable. In the authors’ words, it has increased the Danish flexibility requirements. This could be thought of as a natural development
on the path towards a fully carbon-free energy system, the only difference
between Denmark and most others being that Denmark has progressed
further. It does however also bring legitimate concerns—concerns that
other countries may eventually also have to deal with. Thus, in the past,
Denmark had enough surplus capacity to always be able to meet peak
demand. The authors however state that this may soon no longer be the
case, as Denmark is phasing out domestic thermal capacity—the traditional backup power—and substituting this with more wind power, which
is intermittent. It makes it evident that a renewable energy transition
entails a clear tradeoff between a traditional understanding of energy security anchored in the state’s ability to produce enough energy to cater to
its own needs, and a networked grid-world, where the intermittencies
of renewables imply that a global (or for that matter European) energy
transition will not happen unless countries are able to rely on each other
and supply each other with energy through a vastly expanded mesh of
cross-border interconnectors.
In nine out of the past 10 years (2008–2017), Denmark was a net
importer—typically exporting in the winter but importing in the summer.
Thus, the security of supply concern is real. Part of the response has been
to try to make the system more efficient, among other things by a rollout
the grid on very windy days was unable to incorporate all this energy. But
instead of curtailments, as in the case of China, the solution has been a
(compared to most others) well-developed network of interconnectors to
other countries, allowing for seamless electricity exports and imports.
What Boscan et al. discuss in their chapter also suggests that to some
extent Denmark is still ahead of the curve and has moved on to challenges that for most other countries still lie in the future: the greening of
the transportation sector (an area where Norway is however significantly
ahead of Denmark), the greening of district heating, and the removal of
cost barriers for end users to adopt electric transportation and heating.
However, as Denmark moves ahead with renewable energy, a familiar
final point also pops up, namely dwindling domestic backup capacity.
Thus, while being connected through interconnectors to other countries, the almost doubling in wind power’s share of the power mix since
2014 (to 47% and a clear world record among any country bigger than
a microstate) has made the country more dependent on others and thus
more vulnerable. In the authors’ words, it has increased the Danish flexibility requirements. This could be thought of as a natural development
on the path towards a fully carbon-free energy system, the only difference
between Denmark and most others being that Denmark has progressed
further. It does however also bring legitimate concerns—concerns that
other countries may eventually also have to deal with. Thus, in the past,
Denmark had enough surplus capacity to always be able to meet peak
demand. The authors however state that this may soon no longer be the
case, as Denmark is phasing out domestic thermal capacity—the traditional backup power—and substituting this with more wind power, which
is intermittent. It makes it evident that a renewable energy transition
entails a clear tradeoff between a traditional understanding of energy security anchored in the state’s ability to produce enough energy to cater to
its own needs, and a networked grid-world, where the intermittencies
of renewables imply that a global (or for that matter European) energy
transition will not happen unless countries are able to rely on each other
and supply each other with energy through a vastly expanded mesh of
cross-border interconnectors.
In nine out of the past 10 years (2008–2017), Denmark was a net
importer—typically exporting in the winter but importing in the summer.
Thus, the security of supply concern is real. Part of the response has been
to try to make the system more efficient, among other things by a rollout