386 E. MOE
planners, local authorities helping local fossil fuel companies to bypass
energy directives and curbing competition from renewables. Thus, the
institutional weaknesses in enforcing national policies that we pointed out
in 2014 still exist.
However, we also noted how steadfastly the central government had
supported renewable energy, singling out renewable energy industries as
industries of the future and creating a support system that was both broad
and comprehensive, with renewables having priority access to the grid
from as early as 2005 (even if the utility companies often simply ignored
this) (Guo et al. 2014; Moe 2014b; Wang 2014). Government support
has been an important factor behind China’s extremely rapid developments in renewables. Yet, the problems that we recognized in 2014 are
still there for everyone to see. It is not as if Chinese authorities are
unaware or unwilling to seek solutions to these problems. However, the
sheer amount of Chinese renewable installations since 2014 makes it ever
harder to find permanent solutions, as the target keeps rapidly moving.
After all, at the end of 2013, China had installed 111 GW of solar and
wind power. At the end of 2019, the number was 430 GW.
Of the other countries that figure heavily in both books, Norway has
also seen interesting changes since 2014. Some of these are very specific
to Norway’s very peculiar energy structure: Norway is a major petroleum
exporter, but where 91% of the electricity that is produced domestically
derives from hydropower in addition to approximately 7% from wind
power. However, other developments are very suggestive of the changes
that the entire field is undergoing.
Thus, in the previous volume we talked about how Norwegian
renewable energy policy had been deadlocked for decades, abundant in
hydropower as well as strongly influenced by the needs of the country’s
mainly state-owned petroleum company, Equinor (then Statoil), and with
a Ministry of Petroleum and Energy that insisted that any other energy
interests would have to be cost-competitive from day one, something
that wind power was decidedly not. Consequently, Norway had one of
the least favorable support systems for wind in Europe, and very little
wind power (Moe 2014b). Two major developments since then however
changed the country significantly and put the focus on what we highlight in this book, namely future challenges. First, the EU Renewable
Energy Directive was one of the main reasons why Norway introduced
a green certificate system for renewable energy, committing the country
to financing the generation of an extra 13.2 TWh of renewable electricity
planners, local authorities helping local fossil fuel companies to bypass
energy directives and curbing competition from renewables. Thus, the
institutional weaknesses in enforcing national policies that we pointed out
in 2014 still exist.
However, we also noted how steadfastly the central government had
supported renewable energy, singling out renewable energy industries as
industries of the future and creating a support system that was both broad
and comprehensive, with renewables having priority access to the grid
from as early as 2005 (even if the utility companies often simply ignored
this) (Guo et al. 2014; Moe 2014b; Wang 2014). Government support
has been an important factor behind China’s extremely rapid developments in renewables. Yet, the problems that we recognized in 2014 are
still there for everyone to see. It is not as if Chinese authorities are
unaware or unwilling to seek solutions to these problems. However, the
sheer amount of Chinese renewable installations since 2014 makes it ever
harder to find permanent solutions, as the target keeps rapidly moving.
After all, at the end of 2013, China had installed 111 GW of solar and
wind power. At the end of 2019, the number was 430 GW.
Of the other countries that figure heavily in both books, Norway has
also seen interesting changes since 2014. Some of these are very specific
to Norway’s very peculiar energy structure: Norway is a major petroleum
exporter, but where 91% of the electricity that is produced domestically
derives from hydropower in addition to approximately 7% from wind
power. However, other developments are very suggestive of the changes
that the entire field is undergoing.
Thus, in the previous volume we talked about how Norwegian
renewable energy policy had been deadlocked for decades, abundant in
hydropower as well as strongly influenced by the needs of the country’s
mainly state-owned petroleum company, Equinor (then Statoil), and with
a Ministry of Petroleum and Energy that insisted that any other energy
interests would have to be cost-competitive from day one, something
that wind power was decidedly not. Consequently, Norway had one of
the least favorable support systems for wind in Europe, and very little
wind power (Moe 2014b). Two major developments since then however
changed the country significantly and put the focus on what we highlight in this book, namely future challenges. First, the EU Renewable
Energy Directive was one of the main reasons why Norway introduced
a green certificate system for renewable energy, committing the country
to financing the generation of an extra 13.2 TWh of renewable electricity