15 CONCLUSIONS
385
consumes and produces more coal now than it did as recently as 2010
(chinadialogue 2019; China Energy Portal 2020; Moe 2017; REN21
2014).
We noted that China’s renewable energy development had many
contradictory and dysfunctional elements. For instance, curtailment of
renewable electricity, especially from wind power, was higher than pretty
much anywhere in the world—a lot of the renewable electricity generation
was simply wasted (Moe 2014b). This problem has continued. As Chen
Gang writes in his chapter, China has most of the power sources located
in its western regions, but its population located primarily along the
eastern seaboard. This has imposed enormous pressures on the transmission network, triggering the construction of a large West-East Electricity
Transmission Project and the building of ultra-high-voltage transmission
lines for long-distance electricity transmission. However, as Chen writes,
“inefficiency in northwest provinces is still astronomically high.” Thus,
when this book focuses on challenges to renewables that primarily have
risen since the previous book, China strikes right at the heart of this.
We wrote about the enormous curtailment problems that China had in
2014. There is no doubt that Chinese authorities are aware of these and
actively sought to remedy them. 1 And yet, Chen writes that China has
overinvested in renewable power in remote locations while having a backward and aging grid system, underinvesting in smart grids and has ended
up with a grid system that is a severe bottleneck. What China is experiencing, is that the first and easy phase of the renewable transition is over.
The more difficult phase is one that requires massive grid investments,
expanding grid capacity and building smart grids. This is something that
we have also seen in other countries. Incentives were provided for renewable energy installations, but not for grid improvements. The inevitable
consequence: at some stage, the grid becomes a major bottleneck, unable
to incorporate ever larger intermittent quantities of renewable electricity.
Also, while China is often perceived as a strong state, local or regional
politics often interfered with the policies of the central government in
Beijing, especially in the most important coal provinces, where coal was
routinely given preference over renewables, very much contrary to the
intentions of Beijing (Moe 2014b; Wang 2014). We still recognize much
of what we noted in 2014. Chen states that “Chinese policymakers
expected local governments to play a very cooperative role in enforcing
those policies, laws and regulations.” There are however many cases where
the interests of local government diverge sharply from those of central
385
consumes and produces more coal now than it did as recently as 2010
(chinadialogue 2019; China Energy Portal 2020; Moe 2017; REN21
2014).
We noted that China’s renewable energy development had many
contradictory and dysfunctional elements. For instance, curtailment of
renewable electricity, especially from wind power, was higher than pretty
much anywhere in the world—a lot of the renewable electricity generation
was simply wasted (Moe 2014b). This problem has continued. As Chen
Gang writes in his chapter, China has most of the power sources located
in its western regions, but its population located primarily along the
eastern seaboard. This has imposed enormous pressures on the transmission network, triggering the construction of a large West-East Electricity
Transmission Project and the building of ultra-high-voltage transmission
lines for long-distance electricity transmission. However, as Chen writes,
“inefficiency in northwest provinces is still astronomically high.” Thus,
when this book focuses on challenges to renewables that primarily have
risen since the previous book, China strikes right at the heart of this.
We wrote about the enormous curtailment problems that China had in
2014. There is no doubt that Chinese authorities are aware of these and
actively sought to remedy them. 1 And yet, Chen writes that China has
overinvested in renewable power in remote locations while having a backward and aging grid system, underinvesting in smart grids and has ended
up with a grid system that is a severe bottleneck. What China is experiencing, is that the first and easy phase of the renewable transition is over.
The more difficult phase is one that requires massive grid investments,
expanding grid capacity and building smart grids. This is something that
we have also seen in other countries. Incentives were provided for renewable energy installations, but not for grid improvements. The inevitable
consequence: at some stage, the grid becomes a major bottleneck, unable
to incorporate ever larger intermittent quantities of renewable electricity.
Also, while China is often perceived as a strong state, local or regional
politics often interfered with the policies of the central government in
Beijing, especially in the most important coal provinces, where coal was
routinely given preference over renewables, very much contrary to the
intentions of Beijing (Moe 2014b; Wang 2014). We still recognize much
of what we noted in 2014. Chen states that “Chinese policymakers
expected local governments to play a very cooperative role in enforcing
those policies, laws and regulations.” There are however many cases where
the interests of local government diverge sharply from those of central