15 CONCLUSIONS
383
irreversible impact, even if some of our other chapters describe how the
nuclear village is certainly fighting back.
When it comes to vested interests in general, Japan is still very much
a version of its old self. Koichi Hasegawa and Hiroshi Ohta both lament
the lack of a political core fighting for renewable energy and how the
vested interests of the nuclear power industry and electric utility companies are still obstacles to real reform. This is very much what we pointed
out in 2014 (Moe 2014b), and here, the old vested interests have staged
partially successful comebacks. Granted, Fukushima resulted in a very
generous FIT (especially so for solar PV) (in our previous book, Asano
(2014) even described it as too generous), that in line with developments
everywhere else, and as originally envisaged, has been gradually reduced,
although not yet phased out. The result was that solar PV soared, annual
installation rates increasing from around 250 MW before 2010 to more
than 10 GW in 2015, before slowing down somewhat again, to 7 GW
in 2019. METI’s target of solar accounting for 7% of the power mix by
2030 was surpassed already in 2019 (REN21 2020). Wind power has
however remained stuck at installation rates that for many years have
been even lower than before Fukushima, and the utility companies are
still distinctly lukewarm about accepting renewable energy onto the grid.
There have been several cases of utilities curtailing solar PV access. As
Robert Uriu however points out in his chapter, hydrogen fuel cells could
spell one genuinely new direction, as Japan in 2014 was the first country
in the world that committed to becoming a full-fledged hydrogen society,
very much against the interests of the nuclear industry. Here, energy
and climate policy go together with industrial policy, as Japan for three
decades already has been promoting a hydrogen and fuel cell industry.
This very much increases the chances of sidestepping the existing Japanese
vested energy interests.
We also wondered what would happen to another development that
was very much triggered by the policy response to Fukushima, namely the
unbundling of the utilities. This was completely in its infancy in 2014,
and something that the utilities strongly opposed. Ohta’s chapter goes
through the changes that have happened in this area, and while they may
not be as revolutionary as they were once portrayed as, they have been
carried out, in the face of resistance from the utilities, and by a METI
and an LDP that were once seen as their staunch allies. Thus, while Japan
still has the same vested interests fighting for the same goals as before,
383
irreversible impact, even if some of our other chapters describe how the
nuclear village is certainly fighting back.
When it comes to vested interests in general, Japan is still very much
a version of its old self. Koichi Hasegawa and Hiroshi Ohta both lament
the lack of a political core fighting for renewable energy and how the
vested interests of the nuclear power industry and electric utility companies are still obstacles to real reform. This is very much what we pointed
out in 2014 (Moe 2014b), and here, the old vested interests have staged
partially successful comebacks. Granted, Fukushima resulted in a very
generous FIT (especially so for solar PV) (in our previous book, Asano
(2014) even described it as too generous), that in line with developments
everywhere else, and as originally envisaged, has been gradually reduced,
although not yet phased out. The result was that solar PV soared, annual
installation rates increasing from around 250 MW before 2010 to more
than 10 GW in 2015, before slowing down somewhat again, to 7 GW
in 2019. METI’s target of solar accounting for 7% of the power mix by
2030 was surpassed already in 2019 (REN21 2020). Wind power has
however remained stuck at installation rates that for many years have
been even lower than before Fukushima, and the utility companies are
still distinctly lukewarm about accepting renewable energy onto the grid.
There have been several cases of utilities curtailing solar PV access. As
Robert Uriu however points out in his chapter, hydrogen fuel cells could
spell one genuinely new direction, as Japan in 2014 was the first country
in the world that committed to becoming a full-fledged hydrogen society,
very much against the interests of the nuclear industry. Here, energy
and climate policy go together with industrial policy, as Japan for three
decades already has been promoting a hydrogen and fuel cell industry.
This very much increases the chances of sidestepping the existing Japanese
vested energy interests.
We also wondered what would happen to another development that
was very much triggered by the policy response to Fukushima, namely the
unbundling of the utilities. This was completely in its infancy in 2014,
and something that the utilities strongly opposed. Ohta’s chapter goes
through the changes that have happened in this area, and while they may
not be as revolutionary as they were once portrayed as, they have been
carried out, in the face of resistance from the utilities, and by a METI
and an LDP that were once seen as their staunch allies. Thus, while Japan
still has the same vested interests fighting for the same goals as before,