382 E. MOE
The Norwegian discourse is instead framed in national terms. Thus, when
we talk about new challenges to renewable energy, these are very much
both at the national and the international level.
Japan has been a central focus to both our edited volumes. It accounts
for six out of 15 chapters, whereas back in 2014, we had four chapters
dealing in part or exclusively with Japan (Asano 2014; Midford 2014;
Moe 2014b; Umbach 2014). A recurring theme in all those was that the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was still recent, that Japan was still
dealing with its aftermath, but that, disastrous as it was, Fukushima also
presented Japan with a window of opportunity to break with the past and
find new energy trajectories for the future. Thus, the potential for change,
identifying numerous early signs of change, but with the caveat that it was
still too early to draw any firm conclusions, was central to these chapters.
Among the problems that we addressed was how Japanese energy policy
for almost half a century had been unchanged because of the strength
of vested interests and an iron triangle protecting the utilities and the
nuclear village from energy challengers. It was a system that thoroughly
sheltered its vested interests, but where following Fukushima a weakening
of the nuclear village, the growth of solar PV and the possible unbundling
of energy transmission and distribution pointed toward a potentially new
Japanese energy future.
This volume is an excellent opportunity for us to take stock of what
has happened since Fukushima. Has Japan changed? The answer seems
to be yes, while at the same time staying very much the same. From
an energy point of view, the biggest loser from Fukushima was nuclear
power. In 2014, we wondered if there was a way back for nuclear
(Midford 2014; Moe 2014b; Umbach 2014). We still do not have the
conclusive answer. The former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration of Abe Shinz¯ o was certainly a greater friend of nuclear than the
preceding Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations. However,
what Paul Midford stresses in his chapter is that while Abe had a goal
of phasing nuclear back in (20–22% of the power mix by 2030), for
practical purposes, compared to the DPJ administration, his government
was merely slowing down the nuclear phaseout. Thus, the outcome is an
almost inevitable end to nuclear, even if it will take longer than the DPJ
once advocated. As Florentine Koppenborg points out in her chapter,
nuclear is now subject to a much stronger regulatory regime than preFukushima. Thus, this is an area where Fukushima has had a potentially
The Norwegian discourse is instead framed in national terms. Thus, when
we talk about new challenges to renewable energy, these are very much
both at the national and the international level.
Japan has been a central focus to both our edited volumes. It accounts
for six out of 15 chapters, whereas back in 2014, we had four chapters
dealing in part or exclusively with Japan (Asano 2014; Midford 2014;
Moe 2014b; Umbach 2014). A recurring theme in all those was that the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was still recent, that Japan was still
dealing with its aftermath, but that, disastrous as it was, Fukushima also
presented Japan with a window of opportunity to break with the past and
find new energy trajectories for the future. Thus, the potential for change,
identifying numerous early signs of change, but with the caveat that it was
still too early to draw any firm conclusions, was central to these chapters.
Among the problems that we addressed was how Japanese energy policy
for almost half a century had been unchanged because of the strength
of vested interests and an iron triangle protecting the utilities and the
nuclear village from energy challengers. It was a system that thoroughly
sheltered its vested interests, but where following Fukushima a weakening
of the nuclear village, the growth of solar PV and the possible unbundling
of energy transmission and distribution pointed toward a potentially new
Japanese energy future.
This volume is an excellent opportunity for us to take stock of what
has happened since Fukushima. Has Japan changed? The answer seems
to be yes, while at the same time staying very much the same. From
an energy point of view, the biggest loser from Fukushima was nuclear
power. In 2014, we wondered if there was a way back for nuclear
(Midford 2014; Moe 2014b; Umbach 2014). We still do not have the
conclusive answer. The former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration of Abe Shinz¯ o was certainly a greater friend of nuclear than the
preceding Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administrations. However,
what Paul Midford stresses in his chapter is that while Abe had a goal
of phasing nuclear back in (20–22% of the power mix by 2030), for
practical purposes, compared to the DPJ administration, his government
was merely slowing down the nuclear phaseout. Thus, the outcome is an
almost inevitable end to nuclear, even if it will take longer than the DPJ
once advocated. As Florentine Koppenborg points out in her chapter,
nuclear is now subject to a much stronger regulatory regime than preFukushima. Thus, this is an area where Fukushima has had a potentially