12 WHY NORWAY AS A GREEN BATTERY …
305
While we cannot positively confirm that vested interests swung the
decision against approving NorthConnect, the industry arguments advocated by LO (and others) were very much used by all the parties that
demanded the rejection of the cable (Red Party, Socialist Left Party,
Center Party, Progress Party). However, LO has also argued that it is
important to gain experiences from NordLink and North Sea Link before
considering new cables. This is the compromise stance of the Labor Party,
quite conceivably a consequence of the cross-pressure the party is under
on this matter (ABC Nyheter 2019; E24 2020; FriFagbevegelse 2020).
However, unlike with NordLink and North Sea Link, the grand compromise here is not a vested interest compromise, but a political compromise,
between the Labor Party (and the Green Party) and the government. It
ensures that the Labor Party has the continued backing of LO by for
now closing the door on new cables, while simultaneously—together with
the government parties—keeping the door for future cables open (ABC
Nyheter 2019; Arbeiderpartiet 2018). A plausible interpretation is that
while politicians often bow to vested interest pressure, they are also actors
in their own right. The political compromise appears to be an example
that illustrates this.
While industry interests weighed heavily with NorthConnect, Terje
Aasland (2018, interview) suggests the existence of a counteracting,
embedded institutional bias. Energy policy sorts under MOPE, which is
inclined toward exports. If instead it had sorted under the Ministry of
Trade, Industry and Fisheries, greater weight would have been put on
industry, both as in protecting existing energy-intensive industries, and in
promoting new industries like floating offshore wind. Thus, the institutional structure arguably pulls in the direction of the power sector over
industry. While this will not make Norway into a green battery, it is likely
that the result is a slow long-term increase in power exports. For now,
however, for the cable prerequisite for the green battery, the situation
is less promising than in 2013. The cables under construction will be
completed, but in the short term, no new cables will be built.
Regarding wind power, it is not equally clear that vested interests
were influential. Vested interests obviously had no influence on costs
dropping by 70% over a decade (Lazard 2019). The other main development was the introduction of green certificates. Prominent among those
lobbying hard for certificates, believing this would provide cheap electricity for industry, was Norsk Hydro, backed by both LO and NHO,
and Labor Party mayors from industrial municipalities. They were also
305
While we cannot positively confirm that vested interests swung the
decision against approving NorthConnect, the industry arguments advocated by LO (and others) were very much used by all the parties that
demanded the rejection of the cable (Red Party, Socialist Left Party,
Center Party, Progress Party). However, LO has also argued that it is
important to gain experiences from NordLink and North Sea Link before
considering new cables. This is the compromise stance of the Labor Party,
quite conceivably a consequence of the cross-pressure the party is under
on this matter (ABC Nyheter 2019; E24 2020; FriFagbevegelse 2020).
However, unlike with NordLink and North Sea Link, the grand compromise here is not a vested interest compromise, but a political compromise,
between the Labor Party (and the Green Party) and the government. It
ensures that the Labor Party has the continued backing of LO by for
now closing the door on new cables, while simultaneously—together with
the government parties—keeping the door for future cables open (ABC
Nyheter 2019; Arbeiderpartiet 2018). A plausible interpretation is that
while politicians often bow to vested interest pressure, they are also actors
in their own right. The political compromise appears to be an example
that illustrates this.
While industry interests weighed heavily with NorthConnect, Terje
Aasland (2018, interview) suggests the existence of a counteracting,
embedded institutional bias. Energy policy sorts under MOPE, which is
inclined toward exports. If instead it had sorted under the Ministry of
Trade, Industry and Fisheries, greater weight would have been put on
industry, both as in protecting existing energy-intensive industries, and in
promoting new industries like floating offshore wind. Thus, the institutional structure arguably pulls in the direction of the power sector over
industry. While this will not make Norway into a green battery, it is likely
that the result is a slow long-term increase in power exports. For now,
however, for the cable prerequisite for the green battery, the situation
is less promising than in 2013. The cables under construction will be
completed, but in the short term, no new cables will be built.
Regarding wind power, it is not equally clear that vested interests
were influential. Vested interests obviously had no influence on costs
dropping by 70% over a decade (Lazard 2019). The other main development was the introduction of green certificates. Prominent among those
lobbying hard for certificates, believing this would provide cheap electricity for industry, was Norsk Hydro, backed by both LO and NHO,
and Labor Party mayors from industrial municipalities. They were also