304 E. MOE ET AL.
Wilhelmsen (2018, interview) stated that an analysis by Zero showed
major industry lobbying toward the Labor Party, which was in power
at the time, resulting in the two-cable compromise. While there was
consensus in the parliament that this was a good solution, Wilhelmsen
states that political decision-makers really had no clear plan. Rather,
projects were initiated bottom-up. Statnett, while not actively part of the
compromise, had for instance already initiated talks with Germany over
cables. NorthConnect was another driver for cables. Lund of the Trekking
Association (2018, interview) states that the power sector was also actively
and successfully lobbying politicians.
The compromise meant that in some ways there was less lobbying pressure on politicians than would otherwise have been the case. The two
main vested interests had already forged an agreement, and this removed a
lot of pressure especially from the Labor Party, which could now approve
subsea cables with the official backing of the industry. Thus, in one way,
politicians did not experience major vested interest pressure, as confirmed
by several of our interviewees. Instead, they had the necessary autonomy
to make the decision they wanted with respect to cables. Another reading
of the situation is however that little pressure was felt because the main
vested interests had already practically made the decision on behalf of
elected politicians. One of the politicians we interviewed was clear that
any alliance between LO and NHO carries a lot of weight on both the
left and the right, and that the compromise between the industry and
the power sector made it far easier for politicians—especially those on the
left—to accept cables.
Has this changed? With NorthConnect, there was no similar compromise. Odd Øygarden of NorthConnect (2018, interview) was already in
2018 worried that while the government seemed in favor, the Labor Party
was under severe pressure from the unions to reject NorthConnect. While
the power sector has lobbied for the cable, far more interests, including a
practically unanimous LO, opposed its construction, arguing that NorthConnect will produce higher electricity prices, harming households and
industry, while only marginally improving Norway’s security of supply.
Parts of NHO, i.e., Norsk Industri, are also opposed, and aluminum giant
Norsk Hydro—one of the largest companies of the Norwegian energyintensive industry—favors postponing the cable, as does Statnett (E24
2020; FriFagbevegelse 2019, 2020; VG 2019d). Thus, instead of any
vested interest compromise, with NorthConnect, industry interests are
clearly stronger. Consequently, it has been put on hold by MOPE.
Wilhelmsen (2018, interview) stated that an analysis by Zero showed
major industry lobbying toward the Labor Party, which was in power
at the time, resulting in the two-cable compromise. While there was
consensus in the parliament that this was a good solution, Wilhelmsen
states that political decision-makers really had no clear plan. Rather,
projects were initiated bottom-up. Statnett, while not actively part of the
compromise, had for instance already initiated talks with Germany over
cables. NorthConnect was another driver for cables. Lund of the Trekking
Association (2018, interview) states that the power sector was also actively
and successfully lobbying politicians.
The compromise meant that in some ways there was less lobbying pressure on politicians than would otherwise have been the case. The two
main vested interests had already forged an agreement, and this removed a
lot of pressure especially from the Labor Party, which could now approve
subsea cables with the official backing of the industry. Thus, in one way,
politicians did not experience major vested interest pressure, as confirmed
by several of our interviewees. Instead, they had the necessary autonomy
to make the decision they wanted with respect to cables. Another reading
of the situation is however that little pressure was felt because the main
vested interests had already practically made the decision on behalf of
elected politicians. One of the politicians we interviewed was clear that
any alliance between LO and NHO carries a lot of weight on both the
left and the right, and that the compromise between the industry and
the power sector made it far easier for politicians—especially those on the
left—to accept cables.
Has this changed? With NorthConnect, there was no similar compromise. Odd Øygarden of NorthConnect (2018, interview) was already in
2018 worried that while the government seemed in favor, the Labor Party
was under severe pressure from the unions to reject NorthConnect. While
the power sector has lobbied for the cable, far more interests, including a
practically unanimous LO, opposed its construction, arguing that NorthConnect will produce higher electricity prices, harming households and
industry, while only marginally improving Norway’s security of supply.
Parts of NHO, i.e., Norsk Industri, are also opposed, and aluminum giant
Norsk Hydro—one of the largest companies of the Norwegian energyintensive industry—favors postponing the cable, as does Statnett (E24
2020; FriFagbevegelse 2019, 2020; VG 2019d). Thus, instead of any
vested interest compromise, with NorthConnect, industry interests are
clearly stronger. Consequently, it has been put on hold by MOPE.