7 BETTING ON HYDROGEN: JAPAN’S GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY …
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purpose was to gain enough good publicity so that it could avoid making
painful changes in its energy economy. This process has been labeled
“green washing,” in this case an attempt to draw attention away from
Japan’s status as a laggard in fighting climate change and to achieve the
LDP goal of reviving the nuclear or coal industry. If this view is correct,
the promotion of renewables and the hydrogen industry was just a splashy
sideshow, or a smokescreen.
A final explanation understands the hydrogen society idea as simply
corporate welfare for certain Japanese industries. As Incerti and Lipscy
argue, the hydrogen society idea was no more than an extension of
Abenomics and the overriding goal of economic growth. As such the
support for the hydrogen sector is described as “industrial policy under
the guise of environmentalism” and in particular “in support of Japanese
automakers” (Incerti and Lipscy 2018, p. 619).
My own view focuses on the unique situation Japan’s hydrogen and
fuel cell industry found itself in, in the aftermath of 3/11. First, the
industry could argue that it was on the verge of commercial success, and
that continued policy support would allow it to achieve true commercial viability. Many Japanese firms stood to benefit from the promotion
of hydrogen—not just the automakers but also a wide range of manufacturers of fuel cells, large stationary fuel cell units, hydrogen filling stations,
the gas utilities, and others. These firms represented some of Japan’s
largest manufacturers, and their voice was amplified by the industry association, the FCCJ. The industry could thus argue that its promotion
would spur economic growth and employment, an important motivation
for both political as well as bureaucratic leaders. 10 And from the government’s point of view, given the resources that it had already put into the
sector over the preceding decades, it was natural for it to want to double
down on the commitment to hydrogen.
In addition, the hydrogen and fuel cell industry could paint a
compelling picture of itself as a possible solution to climate change. As
proponents argued, this new industry, if successful, could help to decarbonize important parts of the energy economy. This green potential no
doubt had great appeal to multiple actors, although perhaps for different
reasons. That is, environmental motivations could have been both sincere
and a smokescreen, depending on the actor in question. Some were no
doubt sincerely motivated by environmental concerns, but it is also easy
to imagine that others saw the promotion of this industry as a way to
simply show that Japan was doing something on climate change, while
161
purpose was to gain enough good publicity so that it could avoid making
painful changes in its energy economy. This process has been labeled
“green washing,” in this case an attempt to draw attention away from
Japan’s status as a laggard in fighting climate change and to achieve the
LDP goal of reviving the nuclear or coal industry. If this view is correct,
the promotion of renewables and the hydrogen industry was just a splashy
sideshow, or a smokescreen.
A final explanation understands the hydrogen society idea as simply
corporate welfare for certain Japanese industries. As Incerti and Lipscy
argue, the hydrogen society idea was no more than an extension of
Abenomics and the overriding goal of economic growth. As such the
support for the hydrogen sector is described as “industrial policy under
the guise of environmentalism” and in particular “in support of Japanese
automakers” (Incerti and Lipscy 2018, p. 619).
My own view focuses on the unique situation Japan’s hydrogen and
fuel cell industry found itself in, in the aftermath of 3/11. First, the
industry could argue that it was on the verge of commercial success, and
that continued policy support would allow it to achieve true commercial viability. Many Japanese firms stood to benefit from the promotion
of hydrogen—not just the automakers but also a wide range of manufacturers of fuel cells, large stationary fuel cell units, hydrogen filling stations,
the gas utilities, and others. These firms represented some of Japan’s
largest manufacturers, and their voice was amplified by the industry association, the FCCJ. The industry could thus argue that its promotion
would spur economic growth and employment, an important motivation
for both political as well as bureaucratic leaders. 10 And from the government’s point of view, given the resources that it had already put into the
sector over the preceding decades, it was natural for it to want to double
down on the commitment to hydrogen.
In addition, the hydrogen and fuel cell industry could paint a
compelling picture of itself as a possible solution to climate change. As
proponents argued, this new industry, if successful, could help to decarbonize important parts of the energy economy. This green potential no
doubt had great appeal to multiple actors, although perhaps for different
reasons. That is, environmental motivations could have been both sincere
and a smokescreen, depending on the actor in question. Some were no
doubt sincerely motivated by environmental concerns, but it is also easy
to imagine that others saw the promotion of this industry as a way to
simply show that Japan was doing something on climate change, while