160 R. M. URIU
such faith in the future of the industry? Indeed, many questioned the
wisdom of Japan’s new approach, arguing that it had made a misguided
bet that was doomed to fail. Second, this policy shift flies in the face of the
orthodox view of Japanese energy policy, namely that policy is captured
by strong private sector actors, especially the electric utility sector, represented by the politically powerful EPCOs, and the nuclear industry. These
actors are seen as having outsized influence over policymakers, government regulators, and politicians and have long opposed the promotion
of new energy sources, preferring to protect their existing (fossil fuel and
nuclear) assets. Finally, why did this shift occur under the administration
of Abe Shinz¯ o, a politician who is routinely given low marks in terms of
his commitment to fighting climate change?
One leading scholar of Japan’s hydrogen and fuel cell policies, Noriko
Behling, argues that the Japanese government was driven mostly by
concerns for national energy security and was able to reach such a quick
consensus because it simply saw no other alternative. That is, policymakers
were above all looking for a way to decrease Japan’s reliance on imported
fossil fuels and realized that expanding nuclear energy was not then
feasible. Behling argues that policymakers weighed different alternatives
and concluded that “over the long term there was no other alternative but
to rely on hydrogen energy to power Japan” (Behling 2015, p. 1). My
sense is that while concern for reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels
was certainly a factor in Japan’s policy shift, this was only a partial motivation. Policymaking is rarely that easy, as there are always multiple actors
involved in any decision, and there are almost always different alternatives
that could have been chosen.
Another view holds that the Japanese government was responding to
public opinion, not only in terms of opposition to nuclear energy, but
also the desire to contribute to combatting global climate change. As the
world’s sixth largest emitter of greenhouse gases, Japan has felt considerable pressure to take corrective measures, and successive governments
had made pledges to reduce carbon emissions. Again, this view may be
partially correct in that policymakers and the industry did have high hopes
for hydrogen as a way to fight climate change. Nevertheless, given that
Japan’s energy policy has often been far from green, some scholars of
Japanese energy policy remain highly skeptical (Incerti and Lipscy 2018;
Midford 2014).
An opposite, quite cynical view is that the Japanese government only
wanted to appear to back a new, green technology, but that its real
such faith in the future of the industry? Indeed, many questioned the
wisdom of Japan’s new approach, arguing that it had made a misguided
bet that was doomed to fail. Second, this policy shift flies in the face of the
orthodox view of Japanese energy policy, namely that policy is captured
by strong private sector actors, especially the electric utility sector, represented by the politically powerful EPCOs, and the nuclear industry. These
actors are seen as having outsized influence over policymakers, government regulators, and politicians and have long opposed the promotion
of new energy sources, preferring to protect their existing (fossil fuel and
nuclear) assets. Finally, why did this shift occur under the administration
of Abe Shinz¯ o, a politician who is routinely given low marks in terms of
his commitment to fighting climate change?
One leading scholar of Japan’s hydrogen and fuel cell policies, Noriko
Behling, argues that the Japanese government was driven mostly by
concerns for national energy security and was able to reach such a quick
consensus because it simply saw no other alternative. That is, policymakers
were above all looking for a way to decrease Japan’s reliance on imported
fossil fuels and realized that expanding nuclear energy was not then
feasible. Behling argues that policymakers weighed different alternatives
and concluded that “over the long term there was no other alternative but
to rely on hydrogen energy to power Japan” (Behling 2015, p. 1). My
sense is that while concern for reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels
was certainly a factor in Japan’s policy shift, this was only a partial motivation. Policymaking is rarely that easy, as there are always multiple actors
involved in any decision, and there are almost always different alternatives
that could have been chosen.
Another view holds that the Japanese government was responding to
public opinion, not only in terms of opposition to nuclear energy, but
also the desire to contribute to combatting global climate change. As the
world’s sixth largest emitter of greenhouse gases, Japan has felt considerable pressure to take corrective measures, and successive governments
had made pledges to reduce carbon emissions. Again, this view may be
partially correct in that policymakers and the industry did have high hopes
for hydrogen as a way to fight climate change. Nevertheless, given that
Japan’s energy policy has often been far from green, some scholars of
Japanese energy policy remain highly skeptical (Incerti and Lipscy 2018;
Midford 2014).
An opposite, quite cynical view is that the Japanese government only
wanted to appear to back a new, green technology, but that its real