162 R. M. URIU
still others may have seen the new policy as a way to increase their corporate profits. In essence, the hydrogen vision appealed to many actors, even
if for contradictory reasons.
In sum, in the aftermath of the 3/11 crisis, Japan’s hydrogen and fuel
cell industry basically found itself in the right place at the right time.
The crisis simultaneously weakened the power of existing actors, most
notably the nuclear industry, and forced Japanese policymakers to search
for new energy pathways. At that time, the industry had developed just
enough that it could claim to be on the verge of commercial viability
and that it could help Japan fulfill its climate change obligations. Japanese
leaders saw the promotion of the industry as a potential answer to Japan’s
energy dilemma, and the industry was able to take full advantage of its
opportunities.
As I argue in the second half of this chapter, the exact motivations
behind Japanese policy may be less important than the fact that Japan has
made a national-level and very public commitment to the industry. By
tying its national policy to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, Japan gave itself
a self-imposed deadline to make some real progress. In short, even if
Japan was only motivated by the most selfish and least environmentally
enlightened of reasons, its practical commitment to the industry may have
an enormous impact. Japan’s decision to commit to a hydrogen society,
coming as it did at a time when similar programs in other countries were
stagnating, no doubt helped to resuscitate global interest in the industry.
In the end, this may prove to be the biggest long-term contribution of
Japan’s new policy direction.
Japan’s Prospects for Success:
Obstacles and the Continuing
Role of Green Industrial Policy
For the remainder of this chapter, I assess Japan’s progress in overcoming
the still major cost and technical obstacles that stand in the way of its
hydrogen society. I look at each sub-sector in terms of past policy and
progress toward the goals of the 2014 Road Map. Industrial policy for
two sectors, residential fuel cells and FCEVs, has reached the commercialization phase. Policy for the other sectors, including storage and the
green hydrogen supply chain, is still at the research and product development state. I also note developments in selected foreign markets. This is
still others may have seen the new policy as a way to increase their corporate profits. In essence, the hydrogen vision appealed to many actors, even
if for contradictory reasons.
In sum, in the aftermath of the 3/11 crisis, Japan’s hydrogen and fuel
cell industry basically found itself in the right place at the right time.
The crisis simultaneously weakened the power of existing actors, most
notably the nuclear industry, and forced Japanese policymakers to search
for new energy pathways. At that time, the industry had developed just
enough that it could claim to be on the verge of commercial viability
and that it could help Japan fulfill its climate change obligations. Japanese
leaders saw the promotion of the industry as a potential answer to Japan’s
energy dilemma, and the industry was able to take full advantage of its
opportunities.
As I argue in the second half of this chapter, the exact motivations
behind Japanese policy may be less important than the fact that Japan has
made a national-level and very public commitment to the industry. By
tying its national policy to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, Japan gave itself
a self-imposed deadline to make some real progress. In short, even if
Japan was only motivated by the most selfish and least environmentally
enlightened of reasons, its practical commitment to the industry may have
an enormous impact. Japan’s decision to commit to a hydrogen society,
coming as it did at a time when similar programs in other countries were
stagnating, no doubt helped to resuscitate global interest in the industry.
In the end, this may prove to be the biggest long-term contribution of
Japan’s new policy direction.
Japan’s Prospects for Success:
Obstacles and the Continuing
Role of Green Industrial Policy
For the remainder of this chapter, I assess Japan’s progress in overcoming
the still major cost and technical obstacles that stand in the way of its
hydrogen society. I look at each sub-sector in terms of past policy and
progress toward the goals of the 2014 Road Map. Industrial policy for
two sectors, residential fuel cells and FCEVs, has reached the commercialization phase. Policy for the other sectors, including storage and the
green hydrogen supply chain, is still at the research and product development state. I also note developments in selected foreign markets. This is