7 BETTING ON HYDROGEN: JAPAN’S GREEN INDUSTRIAL POLICY …
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electric utility sectors. While the DPJ had mentioned hydrogen in various
statements, other powerful actors in the Japanese energy economy still
had a stranglehold on the policy process. Much of this was about to
change.
The Great East Japan Earthquake: The Role of Crisis and Policy
Change
The role of crisis is crucial in understanding Japan’s decision to adopt
its hydrogen society plan. As is often the case, an external crisis can
be a helpful or even necessary impetus for policy change. Put differently, absent a crisis, institutions often find it difficult to initiate change,
as existing political actors resist new policies that run counter to their
interests, and new policy ideas seem unproven and risky. A crisis can be
useful in upsetting the status quo, forcing actors to rethink objectives and
interests, and focusing attention on new ideas and policy alternatives.
The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident, known as the 3/11 disaster, represented just this sort
of crisis. The most concrete change was that one crucial energy avenue,
nuclear energy, was temporarily closed off. At the time, public opposition
to nuclear power meant that policymakers could no longer rely on an
energy source that had become a mainstay of Japan’s energy economy.
And with the political power of the nuclear industry weakened, a policy
space opened in which new actors could be more active and new ideas
more attractive.
The crisis led to a rethinking of Japan’s overall energy policy direction.
In October 2011, the DPJ had METI and ANRE appoint a 15-member
“Basic Problem Committee” to carry out a comprehensive review of
Japan’s energy policy. The committee called for increasing Japan’s reliance
on renewable energy to above 20% by 2030 and recognized hydrogen as
“an important secondary energy carrier” that would help achieve the goal
of increasing reliance on renewable sources.
After Abe Shinz¯ o recovered the prime minister’s chair in 2012, it was
assumed that his government would seek to revive the nuclear industry. It
was thus a surprise when his administration announced its plan to elevate
the hydrogen and fuel cell industry in terms of national energy policy. The
Abe administration over the next two years gradually came to embrace
the industry, and to eventually champion it. This support became official
in April 2014 when the goal of creating a “Hydrogen Society” was first
157
electric utility sectors. While the DPJ had mentioned hydrogen in various
statements, other powerful actors in the Japanese energy economy still
had a stranglehold on the policy process. Much of this was about to
change.
The Great East Japan Earthquake: The Role of Crisis and Policy
Change
The role of crisis is crucial in understanding Japan’s decision to adopt
its hydrogen society plan. As is often the case, an external crisis can
be a helpful or even necessary impetus for policy change. Put differently, absent a crisis, institutions often find it difficult to initiate change,
as existing political actors resist new policies that run counter to their
interests, and new policy ideas seem unproven and risky. A crisis can be
useful in upsetting the status quo, forcing actors to rethink objectives and
interests, and focusing attention on new ideas and policy alternatives.
The Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami, and the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident, known as the 3/11 disaster, represented just this sort
of crisis. The most concrete change was that one crucial energy avenue,
nuclear energy, was temporarily closed off. At the time, public opposition
to nuclear power meant that policymakers could no longer rely on an
energy source that had become a mainstay of Japan’s energy economy.
And with the political power of the nuclear industry weakened, a policy
space opened in which new actors could be more active and new ideas
more attractive.
The crisis led to a rethinking of Japan’s overall energy policy direction.
In October 2011, the DPJ had METI and ANRE appoint a 15-member
“Basic Problem Committee” to carry out a comprehensive review of
Japan’s energy policy. The committee called for increasing Japan’s reliance
on renewable energy to above 20% by 2030 and recognized hydrogen as
“an important secondary energy carrier” that would help achieve the goal
of increasing reliance on renewable sources.
After Abe Shinz¯ o recovered the prime minister’s chair in 2012, it was
assumed that his government would seek to revive the nuclear industry. It
was thus a surprise when his administration announced its plan to elevate
the hydrogen and fuel cell industry in terms of national energy policy. The
Abe administration over the next two years gradually came to embrace
the industry, and to eventually champion it. This support became official
in April 2014 when the goal of creating a “Hydrogen Society” was first