156 R. M. URIU
note that this group has ever since been the driving force behind policy
developments of Japan’s hydrogen and fuel cell policy. 8
The FCCJ was tasked with devising policies to overcome obstacles to
the commercialization and widespread diffusion of fuel cells. The group’s
early recommendations were essentially adopted by METI and became
the basis for Japan’s first long-term plan for the industry, the “Fuel Cell
and Hydrogen Policy Framework” of 2001 (Maeda 2003b, p. 14). This
Framework, also known as Japan’s “New Hydrogen Project,” was an
across-the-board attempt to foster commercialization of the full range
of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies, from production to storage and
transport. It also earmarked a total of US$540 million in funding through
2010.
According to the IEA, the 2001 Framework was a comprehensive
effort to create “self-sustained growth” by integrating “the development
of fuel cell, hydrogen production, and hydrogen transport and storage
technologies, concurrently with demonstration programs, vehicle sales,
construction of refueling infrastructure, establishment of codes and standards, and a general push to enlarge the consumer market for fuel cells
and fuel cell vehicles.” The IEA concluded that Japan’s policy created “a
world leading program focused on early commercialization of fuel cells in
close partnership with the national industry” (OECD/IEA 2004, p. 147).
On the eve of 3/11, the Japanese industry had already established
itself as a leader in fuel cell-related products and was beginning to show
signs of actual commercial viability. In the residential fuel cell sector, the
industry had become the first to market products for home use. In terms
of transportation, the Japanese FCEV sector was deemed to be the most
advanced and developed in the world, with Toyota on the verge of being
the first to bring an FCEV to market.
Policy toward the industry up to the eve of 3/11 was thus a typical
industrial policy story, with public policy encouraging investment, but
with the actual work being done by the industry itself. The list of policies
and projects was a long one, characterized by trial-and-error failures but
also many successes. Although other countries were rated more highly
in terms of research capabilities, Japan’s private sector firms had become
world leaders in terms of commercialization (Behling 2012).
In the context of Japan’s overall energy policy, however, the industry
was still very much on the back burner. Even though the DPJ government, which came to power in September 2009, supported renewable
energy, Japanese policy was still heavily influenced by the nuclear and
note that this group has ever since been the driving force behind policy
developments of Japan’s hydrogen and fuel cell policy. 8
The FCCJ was tasked with devising policies to overcome obstacles to
the commercialization and widespread diffusion of fuel cells. The group’s
early recommendations were essentially adopted by METI and became
the basis for Japan’s first long-term plan for the industry, the “Fuel Cell
and Hydrogen Policy Framework” of 2001 (Maeda 2003b, p. 14). This
Framework, also known as Japan’s “New Hydrogen Project,” was an
across-the-board attempt to foster commercialization of the full range
of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies, from production to storage and
transport. It also earmarked a total of US$540 million in funding through
2010.
According to the IEA, the 2001 Framework was a comprehensive
effort to create “self-sustained growth” by integrating “the development
of fuel cell, hydrogen production, and hydrogen transport and storage
technologies, concurrently with demonstration programs, vehicle sales,
construction of refueling infrastructure, establishment of codes and standards, and a general push to enlarge the consumer market for fuel cells
and fuel cell vehicles.” The IEA concluded that Japan’s policy created “a
world leading program focused on early commercialization of fuel cells in
close partnership with the national industry” (OECD/IEA 2004, p. 147).
On the eve of 3/11, the Japanese industry had already established
itself as a leader in fuel cell-related products and was beginning to show
signs of actual commercial viability. In the residential fuel cell sector, the
industry had become the first to market products for home use. In terms
of transportation, the Japanese FCEV sector was deemed to be the most
advanced and developed in the world, with Toyota on the verge of being
the first to bring an FCEV to market.
Policy toward the industry up to the eve of 3/11 was thus a typical
industrial policy story, with public policy encouraging investment, but
with the actual work being done by the industry itself. The list of policies
and projects was a long one, characterized by trial-and-error failures but
also many successes. Although other countries were rated more highly
in terms of research capabilities, Japan’s private sector firms had become
world leaders in terms of commercialization (Behling 2012).
In the context of Japan’s overall energy policy, however, the industry
was still very much on the back burner. Even though the DPJ government, which came to power in September 2009, supported renewable
energy, Japanese policy was still heavily influenced by the nuclear and