94 F. KOPPENBORG
in scope, covering not only reactor design basis but also accident countermeasures. More importantly, NRA safety regulations were binding for
the electricity utilities. The introduction of a back-fit system prevented
situations where electricity utilities failed to follow recommendations for
better safety measures by the NRA’s predecessor. These two factors alone,
binding regulation and the capacity to force utilities to back-fit, amounted
to a revolution in nuclear safety regulation in Japan.
Nonetheless, independent safety regulation did not necessarily translate into the strictest possible safety standards. For example, the 2013
safety requirements failed to address new threats, such as cyber security.
In its risk assessments, too, the NRA was not as strict as it could be. In
areas of scientific debate, such as which geographic fault lines will affect
a given nuclear power plant or how likely a future volcanic eruption will
be, decisions fell on the more conservative side. The NRA forced utilities to include the scientifically undisputed sources of an earthquake, but
not all theoretically possible ones. On the other hand, in the face of an
undeniable risk, such as an active fault line running underneath a reactor,
and apparent mismanagement, as in the case of Monju, the NRA took
decisive action by refusing an operating licence. Thus, there was decisive
regulatory action. At the same time, there was room for improvement
regarding new threats and, in areas of scientific debate, it turned out to
be less strict than it could have been.
The NRA enforcing new safety standards led to a massive increase in
the additional safety investments electric utilities must make. Thus far,
electric utilities have not moved to refurbish enough nuclear reactors
to reach the Abe government’s current energy policy goals of generating 20–22% of electricity from nuclear power plants by 2030. Rather,
the reactors currently undergoing refurbishments and safety reviews will
amount to a maximum of 15% in Japan’s 2030 electricity mix. This
presents an opportunity for renewable energy development in Japan. If
Japan wants to achieve the climate change mitigation targets it has set
for itself, it is crucial that the gap in nuclear power generation is replaced
with renewable energy as opposed to fossil fuels.
While the NRA’s safety standards were strict enough to render some
nuclear reactors economically unviable, they were not strict enough to
convince the majority of Japanese people that nuclear reactors should
be restarted. In particular, the NRA not taking the toughest stance
possible in scientific grey areas leaves part of the public unsatisfied with
safety assessments. A closer look at lawsuits filed by citizens revealed
in scope, covering not only reactor design basis but also accident countermeasures. More importantly, NRA safety regulations were binding for
the electricity utilities. The introduction of a back-fit system prevented
situations where electricity utilities failed to follow recommendations for
better safety measures by the NRA’s predecessor. These two factors alone,
binding regulation and the capacity to force utilities to back-fit, amounted
to a revolution in nuclear safety regulation in Japan.
Nonetheless, independent safety regulation did not necessarily translate into the strictest possible safety standards. For example, the 2013
safety requirements failed to address new threats, such as cyber security.
In its risk assessments, too, the NRA was not as strict as it could be. In
areas of scientific debate, such as which geographic fault lines will affect
a given nuclear power plant or how likely a future volcanic eruption will
be, decisions fell on the more conservative side. The NRA forced utilities to include the scientifically undisputed sources of an earthquake, but
not all theoretically possible ones. On the other hand, in the face of an
undeniable risk, such as an active fault line running underneath a reactor,
and apparent mismanagement, as in the case of Monju, the NRA took
decisive action by refusing an operating licence. Thus, there was decisive
regulatory action. At the same time, there was room for improvement
regarding new threats and, in areas of scientific debate, it turned out to
be less strict than it could have been.
The NRA enforcing new safety standards led to a massive increase in
the additional safety investments electric utilities must make. Thus far,
electric utilities have not moved to refurbish enough nuclear reactors
to reach the Abe government’s current energy policy goals of generating 20–22% of electricity from nuclear power plants by 2030. Rather,
the reactors currently undergoing refurbishments and safety reviews will
amount to a maximum of 15% in Japan’s 2030 electricity mix. This
presents an opportunity for renewable energy development in Japan. If
Japan wants to achieve the climate change mitigation targets it has set
for itself, it is crucial that the gap in nuclear power generation is replaced
with renewable energy as opposed to fossil fuels.
While the NRA’s safety standards were strict enough to render some
nuclear reactors economically unviable, they were not strict enough to
convince the majority of Japanese people that nuclear reactors should
be restarted. In particular, the NRA not taking the toughest stance
possible in scientific grey areas leaves part of the public unsatisfied with
safety assessments. A closer look at lawsuits filed by citizens revealed