4 JAPAN’S NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION POLICY
95
that a common reason for legal action has been the NRA’s relative
lenience regarding the risk posed by earthquakes and volcanoes. Lawsuits
challenging the NRA’s safety assessments can add to the already high
additional costs of nuclear safety by prolonging the restart process. Even
if only successful in a first instance, they shorten the remaining operating
time, and thereby possible revenues to be earned by electric utilities.
In conclusion, three aspects coming together explains why restarting
power plants is not progressing in accordance with nuclear power targets.
First, the NRA as an independent regulatory agency has defied industry
influence and made independent decisions. Second, increased technical
refurbishing costs mean that the maximum feasible share of nuclear power
by 2030 will be about 15%. Third, the NRA had yet to regain public trust
in nuclear safety as evident from the lawsuits against its restart decision.
These lawsuits have the potential to lower the share of feasible nuclear
power generation even further.
The findings here point to three areas where further research seems in
order. These are the role of scientific debates in safety regulation, how the
addition of the NRA as an independent safety regulator has altered the
political economy of nuclear power in Japan, and how remaining public
safety concerns can be an additional hurdle for nuclear reactor restarts.
Notes
1. This chapter avoids the term “Fukushima nuclear accident” due to the
negative image this creates for the prefecture Fukushima. Rather this
chapter speaks of “March 2011 nuclear accident” or simply “3/11”.
2. Public demonstrations began in April 2011 with about 15,000 people
demonstrating in Koenji, Tokyo, and reached their zenith on 19 September
2011 with 60,000 people gathering in Meiji Park, Tokyo, according to the
organisers. Protests targeted the government and TEPCO for the way they
handled the crisis response and for not preventing a severe nuclear accident
in the first place.
3. A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s daily newspaper with
the widest circulation, from April 2011 (before the full scale of the nuclear
disaster had become apparent to the wider public) through November
2011, showed a shift in public opinion towards a more critical stance on
nuclear power. In the poll, participants were asked about the future role
of nuclear energy for Japan’s energy supply. They were given four possible
answers: (1) increase, (2) maintain, (3) decrease, and (4) phase out. In
April, 10% favoured an increase of nuclear power, a number that went
95
that a common reason for legal action has been the NRA’s relative
lenience regarding the risk posed by earthquakes and volcanoes. Lawsuits
challenging the NRA’s safety assessments can add to the already high
additional costs of nuclear safety by prolonging the restart process. Even
if only successful in a first instance, they shorten the remaining operating
time, and thereby possible revenues to be earned by electric utilities.
In conclusion, three aspects coming together explains why restarting
power plants is not progressing in accordance with nuclear power targets.
First, the NRA as an independent regulatory agency has defied industry
influence and made independent decisions. Second, increased technical
refurbishing costs mean that the maximum feasible share of nuclear power
by 2030 will be about 15%. Third, the NRA had yet to regain public trust
in nuclear safety as evident from the lawsuits against its restart decision.
These lawsuits have the potential to lower the share of feasible nuclear
power generation even further.
The findings here point to three areas where further research seems in
order. These are the role of scientific debates in safety regulation, how the
addition of the NRA as an independent safety regulator has altered the
political economy of nuclear power in Japan, and how remaining public
safety concerns can be an additional hurdle for nuclear reactor restarts.
Notes
1. This chapter avoids the term “Fukushima nuclear accident” due to the
negative image this creates for the prefecture Fukushima. Rather this
chapter speaks of “March 2011 nuclear accident” or simply “3/11”.
2. Public demonstrations began in April 2011 with about 15,000 people
demonstrating in Koenji, Tokyo, and reached their zenith on 19 September
2011 with 60,000 people gathering in Meiji Park, Tokyo, according to the
organisers. Protests targeted the government and TEPCO for the way they
handled the crisis response and for not preventing a severe nuclear accident
in the first place.
3. A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s daily newspaper with
the widest circulation, from April 2011 (before the full scale of the nuclear
disaster had become apparent to the wider public) through November
2011, showed a shift in public opinion towards a more critical stance on
nuclear power. In the poll, participants were asked about the future role
of nuclear energy for Japan’s energy supply. They were given four possible
answers: (1) increase, (2) maintain, (3) decrease, and (4) phase out. In
April, 10% favoured an increase of nuclear power, a number that went