4 JAPAN’S NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION POLICY
93
in case of an emergency. Furthermore, the court ruled that the NRA’s
approach to safety inspections violated Japanese’s citizens constitutionally protected human rights by not adequately taking risks into account
(Asahi Shinbun 2016). In June 2016, the ¯
Otsu District Court rejected an
appeal by KEPCO asking the court to lift the injunction (The Japan Times
2016). After KEPCO filed a lawsuit to the Osaka High Court challenging
the ¯
Otsu District Court’s ruling, the earlier ruling was overturned.
There are several lawsuits against the Ikata nuclear plant, brought
before the Hiroshima and the Matsuyama District Court. The filing of
these lawsuits took place on the grounds of insufficient basic earthquake
ground motion figures used for reactor’s anti-seismic design. While the
Hiroshima District Court rejected a request for an injunction of reactor 3
at the Ikata nuclear power plant (Asahi Shinbun 2017), two more lawsuits
seeking a permanent halt of all three reactors were still pending.
Most lawsuits filed against nuclear power plants were rooted in
concerns about safety measures addressing natural hazards, particularly
earthquakes. Plaintiffs criticised risk assessments that used low earthquake
ground motion figures as insufficient due to their exclusion of possible
earthquake sources. Regardless of the outcome, these time-consuming
lawsuits stalled reactor restarts, causing electricity utilities to lose valuable
time to generate revenues in order to offset the investments necessary to
pass the NRA safety review in the first place. Whether or not these lawsuits
ultimately lead to a shutdown, they certainly stall restarts and add additional costs for electricity utilities already burdened with high refurbishing
costs.
Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to understand why the process of restarting
power plants was not progressing in accordance with nuclear power
targets. To that end, first, it introduced the NRA as an independent safety
agency and, second, took a closer look at revised nuclear safety standards
and their implementation during reactor safety reviews. Finally, it illuminated the response of the nuclear industry and the Japanese public to the
unexpected emergence of an independent regulatory agency.
To begin with, the NRA as an independent regulatory agency was
able to ward off pressure from others, such as the Abe government.
Looking at safety standards the NRA adopted in 2013, they were wider
93
in case of an emergency. Furthermore, the court ruled that the NRA’s
approach to safety inspections violated Japanese’s citizens constitutionally protected human rights by not adequately taking risks into account
(Asahi Shinbun 2016). In June 2016, the ¯
Otsu District Court rejected an
appeal by KEPCO asking the court to lift the injunction (The Japan Times
2016). After KEPCO filed a lawsuit to the Osaka High Court challenging
the ¯
Otsu District Court’s ruling, the earlier ruling was overturned.
There are several lawsuits against the Ikata nuclear plant, brought
before the Hiroshima and the Matsuyama District Court. The filing of
these lawsuits took place on the grounds of insufficient basic earthquake
ground motion figures used for reactor’s anti-seismic design. While the
Hiroshima District Court rejected a request for an injunction of reactor 3
at the Ikata nuclear power plant (Asahi Shinbun 2017), two more lawsuits
seeking a permanent halt of all three reactors were still pending.
Most lawsuits filed against nuclear power plants were rooted in
concerns about safety measures addressing natural hazards, particularly
earthquakes. Plaintiffs criticised risk assessments that used low earthquake
ground motion figures as insufficient due to their exclusion of possible
earthquake sources. Regardless of the outcome, these time-consuming
lawsuits stalled reactor restarts, causing electricity utilities to lose valuable
time to generate revenues in order to offset the investments necessary to
pass the NRA safety review in the first place. Whether or not these lawsuits
ultimately lead to a shutdown, they certainly stall restarts and add additional costs for electricity utilities already burdened with high refurbishing
costs.
Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to understand why the process of restarting
power plants was not progressing in accordance with nuclear power
targets. To that end, first, it introduced the NRA as an independent safety
agency and, second, took a closer look at revised nuclear safety standards
and their implementation during reactor safety reviews. Finally, it illuminated the response of the nuclear industry and the Japanese public to the
unexpected emergence of an independent regulatory agency.
To begin with, the NRA as an independent regulatory agency was
able to ward off pressure from others, such as the Abe government.
Looking at safety standards the NRA adopted in 2013, they were wider