4 JAPAN’S NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATION POLICY
79
This raises the question: Why is Japan unable to meet the nuclear power
targets it set for itself?
This chapter argues that this development is due to the creation of an
independent nuclear safety agency after 3/11, called the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). The findings here challenge earlier assessments of
the NRA, published not long after the nuclear safety reforms following
the March 2011 nuclear accident. The question many scholars asked was
whether the new safety agency would be independent and able to impose
stricter safety standards.
This question emerged from Japan’s history of collusion between regulator, the regulated, and the government, which was at the root of the
problems leading to nuclear disaster. In its July 2012 report, the Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Committee (NAIIC) stated:
The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of
collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the
lack of governance by said parties. … We believe the root causes were the
organisational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for
decisions and actions … (NAIIC 2012, p. 16)
Such collusion is also referred to as “regulatory capture”, a situation
where the regulator decides in favour of the industry it was supposed
to regulate (Wilson 1980) as opposed to imposing the safety measures
necessary to protect the people from harm.
Since the power of the NRA’s predecessor was severely constrained
by regulatory capture, many scholars expected the same fate to befall
the NRA—particularly in the face of pro-nuclear actors dominating
energy policy. Centred on the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), the nuclear industry, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
the group of pro-nuclear actors was characterised by vested interests,
wielded considerable power, and had a propensity for keeping critics out
of the decision-making process (Cotton 2014; Kingston 2013; Vivoda
and Graetz 2014). Critics termed these pro-nuclear actors the “nuclear
village” 4 to express the proximity of relations between actors within.
Defying expectations, the NRA began to exhibit signs of independent
regulatory behaviour (Hymans 2015; Shiroyama 2015). The premise of
this book chapter is that more attention needs to be paid to the NRA as
an independent regulatory agency.
79
This raises the question: Why is Japan unable to meet the nuclear power
targets it set for itself?
This chapter argues that this development is due to the creation of an
independent nuclear safety agency after 3/11, called the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). The findings here challenge earlier assessments of
the NRA, published not long after the nuclear safety reforms following
the March 2011 nuclear accident. The question many scholars asked was
whether the new safety agency would be independent and able to impose
stricter safety standards.
This question emerged from Japan’s history of collusion between regulator, the regulated, and the government, which was at the root of the
problems leading to nuclear disaster. In its July 2012 report, the Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Committee (NAIIC) stated:
The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of
collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the
lack of governance by said parties. … We believe the root causes were the
organisational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for
decisions and actions … (NAIIC 2012, p. 16)
Such collusion is also referred to as “regulatory capture”, a situation
where the regulator decides in favour of the industry it was supposed
to regulate (Wilson 1980) as opposed to imposing the safety measures
necessary to protect the people from harm.
Since the power of the NRA’s predecessor was severely constrained
by regulatory capture, many scholars expected the same fate to befall
the NRA—particularly in the face of pro-nuclear actors dominating
energy policy. Centred on the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
(METI), the nuclear industry, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
the group of pro-nuclear actors was characterised by vested interests,
wielded considerable power, and had a propensity for keeping critics out
of the decision-making process (Cotton 2014; Kingston 2013; Vivoda
and Graetz 2014). Critics termed these pro-nuclear actors the “nuclear
village” 4 to express the proximity of relations between actors within.
Defying expectations, the NRA began to exhibit signs of independent
regulatory behaviour (Hymans 2015; Shiroyama 2015). The premise of
this book chapter is that more attention needs to be paid to the NRA as
an independent regulatory agency.