78 F. KOPPENBORG
same time, the government embarked on a reform of the nuclear safety
administration in order to improve nuclear safety. Another measure was to
shut down all nuclear power plants for a stress test, causing a considerable
electricity gap. Nuclear power plants provided almost 30% of Japan’s electricity supply just before the nuclear accident. To address this electricity
gap, immediate energy savings measures were introduced and the use of
fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal increased. The move to fossil fuels
led to higher greenhouse gas emissions (ANRE 2018), posing a challenge
to Japan’s emissions reductions pledge under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Koppenborg 2017).
Against this background, energy policy deliberations commenced early in
2011.
The role of nuclear power took centre stage in discussions about
Japan’s future energy policy. It was an essential means to achieve the triad
of energy policy goals, namely energy security, environmental friendliness, and economic efficiency, the “3Es” of nuclear energy policy. While
the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan resolved to retain nuclear power as
a “baseload” power source, it also pledged to reduce dependence on
nuclear power “as much as possible”. At the same time, it added safety
as a fourth aspect to the existing three energy policy goals and pledged
to mitigate the risks posed by nuclear power plants. It also stressed
expanding renewable energy sources (METI 2014). Thus, the 2014
Strategic Energy Plan added “S” for safety to the existing three “3Es” in
order to enable the continued use of nuclear power. An energy mix with
numerical targets was published one year later in Japan’s 2015 Long-term
Energy Supply and Demand Outlook. It envisioned a share of 20–22% for
nuclear power and 22–24% for renewable energy (METI 2015). These
targets were confirmed once again in the most recent Strategic Energy
Plan published in 2018 (METI 2018).
Powerful pro-nuclear actors were pushing for swift restarts to achieve
the share of 20–22% as soon as possible. For example, Prime Minister Abe
Shinz¯ o called for a restart of all reactors within three years in his first New
Year’s address in 2013 (Cabinet Office Japan 2013). However, despite
pressure for a swift return to nuclear power as an important “baseload”
power source and a means to lower Japan’s greenhouse gas emission, in
2016, nuclear power accounted for only 2% of Japan’s electricity supply
(ANRE 2018). Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly clear that nuclear
power will provide, at the most, 15% of the electricity generated by 2030
(Koppenborg 2016), and perhaps as little as 10% (Izadi-Najafabadi 2015).
same time, the government embarked on a reform of the nuclear safety
administration in order to improve nuclear safety. Another measure was to
shut down all nuclear power plants for a stress test, causing a considerable
electricity gap. Nuclear power plants provided almost 30% of Japan’s electricity supply just before the nuclear accident. To address this electricity
gap, immediate energy savings measures were introduced and the use of
fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal increased. The move to fossil fuels
led to higher greenhouse gas emissions (ANRE 2018), posing a challenge
to Japan’s emissions reductions pledge under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Koppenborg 2017).
Against this background, energy policy deliberations commenced early in
2011.
The role of nuclear power took centre stage in discussions about
Japan’s future energy policy. It was an essential means to achieve the triad
of energy policy goals, namely energy security, environmental friendliness, and economic efficiency, the “3Es” of nuclear energy policy. While
the 2014 Strategic Energy Plan resolved to retain nuclear power as
a “baseload” power source, it also pledged to reduce dependence on
nuclear power “as much as possible”. At the same time, it added safety
as a fourth aspect to the existing three energy policy goals and pledged
to mitigate the risks posed by nuclear power plants. It also stressed
expanding renewable energy sources (METI 2014). Thus, the 2014
Strategic Energy Plan added “S” for safety to the existing three “3Es” in
order to enable the continued use of nuclear power. An energy mix with
numerical targets was published one year later in Japan’s 2015 Long-term
Energy Supply and Demand Outlook. It envisioned a share of 20–22% for
nuclear power and 22–24% for renewable energy (METI 2015). These
targets were confirmed once again in the most recent Strategic Energy
Plan published in 2018 (METI 2018).
Powerful pro-nuclear actors were pushing for swift restarts to achieve
the share of 20–22% as soon as possible. For example, Prime Minister Abe
Shinz¯ o called for a restart of all reactors within three years in his first New
Year’s address in 2013 (Cabinet Office Japan 2013). However, despite
pressure for a swift return to nuclear power as an important “baseload”
power source and a means to lower Japan’s greenhouse gas emission, in
2016, nuclear power accounted for only 2% of Japan’s electricity supply
(ANRE 2018). Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly clear that nuclear
power will provide, at the most, 15% of the electricity generated by 2030
(Koppenborg 2016), and perhaps as little as 10% (Izadi-Najafabadi 2015).