80 F. KOPPENBORG
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. First, it introduces
the NRA as an independent regulatory agency. Second, it outlines the
nuclear safety standards the NRA introduced and studies how they are
implemented as part of the safety review process. The third part looks at
how the nuclear industry and the Japanese public responded to the new
safety agency’s work.
The NRA
Reform Process. The March 2011 nuclear accident exposed flaws in the
administrative system governing nuclear safety regulation and emergency
response in three ways: the NRA’s predecessor, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), failed to prevent the accident (The New York
Times 2011), to gauge its severity correctly (IAEA 2011a, b, c), and to
play its assigned role in crisis management. As a result, Prime Minister Kan
Naoto questioned the competencies of the safety agency and perceived it
to be under the influence of METI (Kan 2012), the ministry most actively
promoting nuclear power. The Kan government initiated a reform of the
nuclear safety administration that aimed to separate nuclear safety regulators from those promoting nuclear power. Concretely, the Kan Cabinet
decided to create a regulatory body which would have autonomy from
METI in order to achieve regulatory independence (Cabinet Secretariat
2011). Accordingly, the idea of establishing an independent agency played
a crucial role throughout the legislative reform process.
Legal Framework and Purpose of the NRA. Debates about the appropriate legal status for the new nuclear safety agency to achieve regulatory
independence were at the heart of the legislative process. They boiled
down to two choices, Articles 3 and 8 of the National Government
Organisation Act. Most bodies in the Japanese government are established based on one of the two. Whereas Article 3 serves to establish
ministries and other comparatively autonomous entities, Article 8 is used
to set up divisions or agencies within Article 3 organisations. One major
difference pertains to the staff and budget of an administrative body.
While Article 3 organisations hold staff and budget rights, meaning they
control human resource policies and formulate their own budget requests,
Article 8 organisations are dependent on a superordinate organisation for
both. Eventually, a decision was made in favour of an Article 3 independent regulatory commission that is loosely affiliated with the Ministry of
Environment.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. First, it introduces
the NRA as an independent regulatory agency. Second, it outlines the
nuclear safety standards the NRA introduced and studies how they are
implemented as part of the safety review process. The third part looks at
how the nuclear industry and the Japanese public responded to the new
safety agency’s work.
The NRA
Reform Process. The March 2011 nuclear accident exposed flaws in the
administrative system governing nuclear safety regulation and emergency
response in three ways: the NRA’s predecessor, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), failed to prevent the accident (The New York
Times 2011), to gauge its severity correctly (IAEA 2011a, b, c), and to
play its assigned role in crisis management. As a result, Prime Minister Kan
Naoto questioned the competencies of the safety agency and perceived it
to be under the influence of METI (Kan 2012), the ministry most actively
promoting nuclear power. The Kan government initiated a reform of the
nuclear safety administration that aimed to separate nuclear safety regulators from those promoting nuclear power. Concretely, the Kan Cabinet
decided to create a regulatory body which would have autonomy from
METI in order to achieve regulatory independence (Cabinet Secretariat
2011). Accordingly, the idea of establishing an independent agency played
a crucial role throughout the legislative reform process.
Legal Framework and Purpose of the NRA. Debates about the appropriate legal status for the new nuclear safety agency to achieve regulatory
independence were at the heart of the legislative process. They boiled
down to two choices, Articles 3 and 8 of the National Government
Organisation Act. Most bodies in the Japanese government are established based on one of the two. Whereas Article 3 serves to establish
ministries and other comparatively autonomous entities, Article 8 is used
to set up divisions or agencies within Article 3 organisations. One major
difference pertains to the staff and budget of an administrative body.
While Article 3 organisations hold staff and budget rights, meaning they
control human resource policies and formulate their own budget requests,
Article 8 organisations are dependent on a superordinate organisation for
both. Eventually, a decision was made in favour of an Article 3 independent regulatory commission that is loosely affiliated with the Ministry of
Environment.