54
the gravitational pull of Russia’s economic and military influence,” to the extent that
some Russian officials saw little demand in attempting to court them (Denoon
2015:175).
Energy Superpower
Between 2006 and 2009 Russian rose to become an “Energy Superpower.” Such a
term could justly be applied to a country holding some of the world’s largest reserves
of natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium, as well as renewable energy facilities and thus
the potential to represent a major energy exporter affecting pricing and trading.
Considering the current levels of energy demand around the world, a country with
such power undoubtedly represents key players in the global market and world economy able to defend its interests unchallenged (Taheri and Farahmand 2014:162).
Russia’s main goal is to recover its power in the international system, and the application of its energy resources as a tool of foreign policy is a major component of
achieving this aim. Therefore, Putin has been clear that Russia’s aims concern global
energy leadership. According to his vision, Russia’s main intention behind the production and exporting of natural gas is to help this country to increase influence via
dependence on its energy resources. This policy can be seen as in line with Russia’s
policies to most CIS countries, which have benefitted from sweetheart deals on
energy resources in return for remaining under Moscow’s sphere of influence. Any
attempt by these countries to increase ties with the US and NATO will have consequences in their energy costs. It is in this sense which Russia uses energy as a weapon
has weaponized energy against regional states (Taheri and Farahmand 2014:162).
Russia’s Caspian Sea Policy has been transformed since a meeting about Caspian
Policy was chaired by Putin at the Kremlin’s Security Council, attended by both
ministers and business representatives of the oil and gas industry. The main aim of
this meeting was to put forth an agenda for using Russian economic influence in
order to make gains for the country’s own economy (Bluth 2014:48). The official
statement released by the Security Council after the meeting stated that “the scale of
Russia’s interests in the Caspian determines the necessity of its [the Russia
Federation’s] presence in the region and needs to pursue a more vigorous policy
there.” The Security Council proposed measures to improve coordination among
government officials, heads of big businesses, and military leaders based on a specific list of policy objectives. A Special Envoy of Caspian Affairs was appointed,
Viktor Kalyuzhny—a former “Fuel and Energy Minister” familiar with the region
(Bluth 2014:48). The immediate result was a furor of high-level diplomatic activity.
Russia’s main policy shift here was to officially endorse the principle of multiple
routes and discard its opposition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, which
granted Russian firms the right to participate. By December 2001, Viktor Kalyuzhny,
stated of Russia’s new policy:
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
the gravitational pull of Russia’s economic and military influence,” to the extent that
some Russian officials saw little demand in attempting to court them (Denoon
2015:175).
Energy Superpower
Between 2006 and 2009 Russian rose to become an “Energy Superpower.” Such a
term could justly be applied to a country holding some of the world’s largest reserves
of natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium, as well as renewable energy facilities and thus
the potential to represent a major energy exporter affecting pricing and trading.
Considering the current levels of energy demand around the world, a country with
such power undoubtedly represents key players in the global market and world economy able to defend its interests unchallenged (Taheri and Farahmand 2014:162).
Russia’s main goal is to recover its power in the international system, and the application of its energy resources as a tool of foreign policy is a major component of
achieving this aim. Therefore, Putin has been clear that Russia’s aims concern global
energy leadership. According to his vision, Russia’s main intention behind the production and exporting of natural gas is to help this country to increase influence via
dependence on its energy resources. This policy can be seen as in line with Russia’s
policies to most CIS countries, which have benefitted from sweetheart deals on
energy resources in return for remaining under Moscow’s sphere of influence. Any
attempt by these countries to increase ties with the US and NATO will have consequences in their energy costs. It is in this sense which Russia uses energy as a weapon
has weaponized energy against regional states (Taheri and Farahmand 2014:162).
Russia’s Caspian Sea Policy has been transformed since a meeting about Caspian
Policy was chaired by Putin at the Kremlin’s Security Council, attended by both
ministers and business representatives of the oil and gas industry. The main aim of
this meeting was to put forth an agenda for using Russian economic influence in
order to make gains for the country’s own economy (Bluth 2014:48). The official
statement released by the Security Council after the meeting stated that “the scale of
Russia’s interests in the Caspian determines the necessity of its [the Russia
Federation’s] presence in the region and needs to pursue a more vigorous policy
there.” The Security Council proposed measures to improve coordination among
government officials, heads of big businesses, and military leaders based on a specific list of policy objectives. A Special Envoy of Caspian Affairs was appointed,
Viktor Kalyuzhny—a former “Fuel and Energy Minister” familiar with the region
(Bluth 2014:48). The immediate result was a furor of high-level diplomatic activity.
Russia’s main policy shift here was to officially endorse the principle of multiple
routes and discard its opposition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) project, which
granted Russian firms the right to participate. By December 2001, Viktor Kalyuzhny,
stated of Russia’s new policy:
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region