53
1. Transportation of energy carriers of Central Asian countries to global consumption markets through Russian oil and gas pipelines.
2. Impeding the convergence of Central Asian countries in Western structures.
3. Use of raw materials of the countries of the region. In order to maintain its
monopoly in the European energy market, Russia buys its domestic gas from
Asian countries and simultaneously sells its gas at a higher price to Europe
(Karimi Pour et al. 2017:193).
Russia’s interest in the Caspian Sea in the first and second phases may be
described as a desire for transportation revenues from oil and gas pipelines diverting
from positional Caspian Sea production, given that the tariff to transit oil on the
CPC to Novorossiysk is about $4.00 pb, though this can rise to $5.20 pb, if Russia
abounds in its transit to raise tariffs, against the objection of the other owners of
CPC. Similarly, Russia and Azerbaijan have already signed an agreement to transport Azeri oil to move on the northern route to Novorossiysk (S. Crandall
2006:120–121).
During the country’s first phase of Caspian energy diplomacy, Russian oil and
gas companies became active in numerous exportation and transit projects from the
Caspian Sea to consumer markets. Russian oil gas interests in the Caspian Sea can
be summarized thusly:
• In Kazakhstan, onshore, LUK Arco held 5% share in the Tengiz oil field, with
LUKoil holding a 15% share in Karachaganak.
• Rosneft and KazMunaiGaz agreed to develop jointly the Kurmangazy field with
Total and Zarubezh-nefregaz.
• KazMunaigaz and LUKoil agreed to explore Khavalinskoye in Russian waters.
• LUKoil was the only oil company which developed Korchagina and
Rakushechnoye Fields in the Caspian Sea.
• LUKoil held 80% interest in the offshore Yalama field on the Azerbaijan-Russia
border of the Sea.
• In the BTC project, LUKoil sold a 10% share in the Azeri ACG Field and declined
to join the BTC pipeline consortium.
• LUKoil purchased Nelson Resources, a Canadian firm, which owned the former
Chevron Texaco share in Buzachi field.
• LUKoil has a 25% share in Iran’s Aanaran Field. (S. Crandall 2006:120–121)
Near Abroad Policy
Later the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government recognized the independence of former Soviet states throughout its periphery. Russian foreign policymakers continued to view these emerging states however as not really having gone
foreign, and thus the term “near aboard” was conjured in order to reclassify them as
being separate, just somehow still within the country’s sphere. They claimed that
the “near aboard” republics “would neither be able to bear on their own nor resist
Russia
1. Transportation of energy carriers of Central Asian countries to global consumption markets through Russian oil and gas pipelines.
2. Impeding the convergence of Central Asian countries in Western structures.
3. Use of raw materials of the countries of the region. In order to maintain its
monopoly in the European energy market, Russia buys its domestic gas from
Asian countries and simultaneously sells its gas at a higher price to Europe
(Karimi Pour et al. 2017:193).
Russia’s interest in the Caspian Sea in the first and second phases may be
described as a desire for transportation revenues from oil and gas pipelines diverting
from positional Caspian Sea production, given that the tariff to transit oil on the
CPC to Novorossiysk is about $4.00 pb, though this can rise to $5.20 pb, if Russia
abounds in its transit to raise tariffs, against the objection of the other owners of
CPC. Similarly, Russia and Azerbaijan have already signed an agreement to transport Azeri oil to move on the northern route to Novorossiysk (S. Crandall
2006:120–121).
During the country’s first phase of Caspian energy diplomacy, Russian oil and
gas companies became active in numerous exportation and transit projects from the
Caspian Sea to consumer markets. Russian oil gas interests in the Caspian Sea can
be summarized thusly:
• In Kazakhstan, onshore, LUK Arco held 5% share in the Tengiz oil field, with
LUKoil holding a 15% share in Karachaganak.
• Rosneft and KazMunaiGaz agreed to develop jointly the Kurmangazy field with
Total and Zarubezh-nefregaz.
• KazMunaigaz and LUKoil agreed to explore Khavalinskoye in Russian waters.
• LUKoil was the only oil company which developed Korchagina and
Rakushechnoye Fields in the Caspian Sea.
• LUKoil held 80% interest in the offshore Yalama field on the Azerbaijan-Russia
border of the Sea.
• In the BTC project, LUKoil sold a 10% share in the Azeri ACG Field and declined
to join the BTC pipeline consortium.
• LUKoil purchased Nelson Resources, a Canadian firm, which owned the former
Chevron Texaco share in Buzachi field.
• LUKoil has a 25% share in Iran’s Aanaran Field. (S. Crandall 2006:120–121)
Near Abroad Policy
Later the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government recognized the independence of former Soviet states throughout its periphery. Russian foreign policymakers continued to view these emerging states however as not really having gone
foreign, and thus the term “near aboard” was conjured in order to reclassify them as
being separate, just somehow still within the country’s sphere. They claimed that
the “near aboard” republics “would neither be able to bear on their own nor resist
Russia