55
Russia does not have the goal to establish a monopoly in oil transportation in the Caspian
region. It is neither against the notion of the existence of various pipelines in the area. She
realizes that over a period of time there will be a need for a new pipeline infrastructure following a rise in the oil yield. (Bluth 2014:48)
By 2010 however Putin begins to strengthen Russian domestic power and government control over energy resources. The attainment of Russian oil and gas contracts
by foreign energy firms was becoming more and more limited (Svyatets 2016:38).
Christoph Bluth argues that it was clear that Russia’s Caspian Policy under Putin
was more pragmatic and less planted in geopolitical principles. Rather than looking
to perpetuate a stranglehold over energy resources in the Caspian, Russia began to
accept foreign investment and alternative transit routes to the south in order to
increase its robustness. However, at the same time, Russia’s efforts to minimize
Caspian energy production and export by forcing regional states to use its infrastructure had given Russian oil companies active control over the volume and price
of Caspian energy exports, motivating the US government to support the idea of a
major energy transit project which would bypass Russia (Bluth 2014:50). Russia
has blocked Central Asian states from entering the European natural gas market by
resisting the construction of the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline project which
aimed to transport Turkmen gas to the European market (Shaffer 2009:126). Russia’s
policy on the legal status of the Caspian Sea also changed in the Putin era, which,
unlike the Yeltsin policy, differed from simply blocking any progress on the issue by
elevating it to a pillar of Russian Foreign Policy Concept in June 2000 (www.belfercenter.org 2017).
Russia will make effort to elaborate such a status of the Caspian Sea as this could
enable the coastal states to establish cooperation’s that provide benefits to both parties with respect to utilizing the region’s resources fairly by taking into consideration the rightful benefits of each state.
Russia has announced aggressive plans to increase the total capacity of its pipeline network around the Caspian Sea in order to shore up its position. Firstly, the
CPC pipeline’s capacity has boosted from an initial capacity of 560,000 bpd to 1.35
mbp in 2009. Secondly, Russian companies have invested in several energy projects
in the region from their own coffers in order to compete with Western counterparts,
increasing the internal pipeline capacity to transit Kazakh oil through the country’s
Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) to the Russian Primorsk terminal. Thirdly, Russia has
launched plans for an entirely new route drawing the resources of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, and moving them westward to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk
(Babali 2006:92).
Russia also aims to be a strong player in the Asian energy market, exporting oil
and gas from the East Siberian oil and gas fields, the country is constructing oil and
gas pipeline systems from its eastern region to deliver to China, Japan, and other
consumers. In 2010, Russia begin to export oil and gas from Sakhalin Island’s oil
and gas fields to the Asian market. According to Russia’s National Energy Strategy,
Moscow needs to increase its oil exports from the current level of 3–30% in Asia
and aims to increase its presence to cover 15% of the market in total in the near
future (Wenger et al. 2009:118).
Russia
Russia does not have the goal to establish a monopoly in oil transportation in the Caspian
region. It is neither against the notion of the existence of various pipelines in the area. She
realizes that over a period of time there will be a need for a new pipeline infrastructure following a rise in the oil yield. (Bluth 2014:48)
By 2010 however Putin begins to strengthen Russian domestic power and government control over energy resources. The attainment of Russian oil and gas contracts
by foreign energy firms was becoming more and more limited (Svyatets 2016:38).
Christoph Bluth argues that it was clear that Russia’s Caspian Policy under Putin
was more pragmatic and less planted in geopolitical principles. Rather than looking
to perpetuate a stranglehold over energy resources in the Caspian, Russia began to
accept foreign investment and alternative transit routes to the south in order to
increase its robustness. However, at the same time, Russia’s efforts to minimize
Caspian energy production and export by forcing regional states to use its infrastructure had given Russian oil companies active control over the volume and price
of Caspian energy exports, motivating the US government to support the idea of a
major energy transit project which would bypass Russia (Bluth 2014:50). Russia
has blocked Central Asian states from entering the European natural gas market by
resisting the construction of the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline project which
aimed to transport Turkmen gas to the European market (Shaffer 2009:126). Russia’s
policy on the legal status of the Caspian Sea also changed in the Putin era, which,
unlike the Yeltsin policy, differed from simply blocking any progress on the issue by
elevating it to a pillar of Russian Foreign Policy Concept in June 2000 (www.belfercenter.org 2017).
Russia will make effort to elaborate such a status of the Caspian Sea as this could
enable the coastal states to establish cooperation’s that provide benefits to both parties with respect to utilizing the region’s resources fairly by taking into consideration the rightful benefits of each state.
Russia has announced aggressive plans to increase the total capacity of its pipeline network around the Caspian Sea in order to shore up its position. Firstly, the
CPC pipeline’s capacity has boosted from an initial capacity of 560,000 bpd to 1.35
mbp in 2009. Secondly, Russian companies have invested in several energy projects
in the region from their own coffers in order to compete with Western counterparts,
increasing the internal pipeline capacity to transit Kazakh oil through the country’s
Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) to the Russian Primorsk terminal. Thirdly, Russia has
launched plans for an entirely new route drawing the resources of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, and moving them westward to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk
(Babali 2006:92).
Russia also aims to be a strong player in the Asian energy market, exporting oil
and gas from the East Siberian oil and gas fields, the country is constructing oil and
gas pipeline systems from its eastern region to deliver to China, Japan, and other
consumers. In 2010, Russia begin to export oil and gas from Sakhalin Island’s oil
and gas fields to the Asian market. According to Russia’s National Energy Strategy,
Moscow needs to increase its oil exports from the current level of 3–30% in Asia
and aims to increase its presence to cover 15% of the market in total in the near
future (Wenger et al. 2009:118).
Russia