246
to imports, which could see the US act more in the interests of securing buyers than
securing supplies in the coming era. This will be interesting to observe in the
Trump era.
Shale Gas Revolution and US Foreign Policy
In the last decade, technology has advanced to such a degree as to allow the US to
become self-reliant on energy through shale gas extraction, allowing the US to even
surpass Russia as the world’s largest gas producer. This state of affairs will only
continue for as long as stocks remain however and a further shift to natural and LNG
is likely to rock the markets once again in the future. Natural gas production in the
US has decreased the price of domestic natural gas, with a knock-on effect on the
price of LNG in Europe and Asia too. After the shale gas revolution, the overall
prices of gas decreased likewise, to the detriment of some.
The shale revolution in the United States is not merely a positive business development however and its geopolitical consequences can be felt all over. The global
energy trade map is shaking with continued decline while US energy exporters are
poised to seek new markets. For example, most of Africa’s oil needs have diverted
to Asia instead of the United States, and as US production continues to increase, this
has reduced global oil and gas prices, reducing the geopolitical clout of those nations
depending on large resource revenues. Most energy-producing countries that do not
have diverse economies—such as Russia and the Gulf states—will suffer from this,
but the benefit will be felt in large consumer nations such as China, India, and other
Asian countries.
Greater self-reliance has allowed the US to overcome the economic disadvantages of depending on competing economies and relying on expensive military ventures. In other words, in the new order brought about by shale, the United States
may consider even dominating the Gulf energy resources it was once tethered to,
while going further and being influential in controlling prices to further increase the
robustness of its capabilities. Having occurred mainly during the Obama administration, the US shale gas revolution is having a significant impact on US energy
policy and energy diplomacy and foreign policy. The precise ways in which shale
over the long term will have influence have yet to be seen, as global energy oversupply and the stalling of America’s new phase of energy development have affected
matters in the meantime.
However, while much is made in some quarters about new US energy independence and the implications of decreased reliance on the Middle East, the fact
remains however that the overall world economy on which America’s economy and
well-being very much depend is still deeply dependent upon imported energy, of
which the major Middle Eastern producers are and will remain the main market setters. In the meantime, the Caspian States and Central Asia can be considered to have
shifted far beyond the focus of US policymakers, as they slowly begin to adapt to
the new realities of America’s new energy profile, and the various challenges of a
truly more multipolar world.
7 Conclusion
to imports, which could see the US act more in the interests of securing buyers than
securing supplies in the coming era. This will be interesting to observe in the
Trump era.
Shale Gas Revolution and US Foreign Policy
In the last decade, technology has advanced to such a degree as to allow the US to
become self-reliant on energy through shale gas extraction, allowing the US to even
surpass Russia as the world’s largest gas producer. This state of affairs will only
continue for as long as stocks remain however and a further shift to natural and LNG
is likely to rock the markets once again in the future. Natural gas production in the
US has decreased the price of domestic natural gas, with a knock-on effect on the
price of LNG in Europe and Asia too. After the shale gas revolution, the overall
prices of gas decreased likewise, to the detriment of some.
The shale revolution in the United States is not merely a positive business development however and its geopolitical consequences can be felt all over. The global
energy trade map is shaking with continued decline while US energy exporters are
poised to seek new markets. For example, most of Africa’s oil needs have diverted
to Asia instead of the United States, and as US production continues to increase, this
has reduced global oil and gas prices, reducing the geopolitical clout of those nations
depending on large resource revenues. Most energy-producing countries that do not
have diverse economies—such as Russia and the Gulf states—will suffer from this,
but the benefit will be felt in large consumer nations such as China, India, and other
Asian countries.
Greater self-reliance has allowed the US to overcome the economic disadvantages of depending on competing economies and relying on expensive military ventures. In other words, in the new order brought about by shale, the United States
may consider even dominating the Gulf energy resources it was once tethered to,
while going further and being influential in controlling prices to further increase the
robustness of its capabilities. Having occurred mainly during the Obama administration, the US shale gas revolution is having a significant impact on US energy
policy and energy diplomacy and foreign policy. The precise ways in which shale
over the long term will have influence have yet to be seen, as global energy oversupply and the stalling of America’s new phase of energy development have affected
matters in the meantime.
However, while much is made in some quarters about new US energy independence and the implications of decreased reliance on the Middle East, the fact
remains however that the overall world economy on which America’s economy and
well-being very much depend is still deeply dependent upon imported energy, of
which the major Middle Eastern producers are and will remain the main market setters. In the meantime, the Caspian States and Central Asia can be considered to have
shifted far beyond the focus of US policymakers, as they slowly begin to adapt to
the new realities of America’s new energy profile, and the various challenges of a
truly more multipolar world.
7 Conclusion