167
With such a policy leaving these countries in the lurch politically and suffering
economically, the conditions were ripe for China’s entry (Author’s interview with
Dr. Tatina Mitrova 2017). Indeed, the obstacles put forth by allies compound with
greater geopolitical concerns in which, as many academics point out, Russia and
China are far better placed to take advantage of. Beyond the region, it has been
lodged that Iranian sanctions, rather than allowing for clear, unrivaled access to the
Caspian by private energy firms only allowed Iran to increase its domestic technological capacity’ to reduce waste thereby enhancing its resilience. Given how positively the removal of sanctions has been viewed by Western energy firms, this has
shown a lot of potential progress has been delayed. Secondly, the US strategy to
Balkanize Syria and put in place a compliant Kurdish petro-state collapsed with the
failure of the Turkish coup which intended to replace a nationalist president with a
more compliant administration (Author’s interview with Dr. Chis Cook 2017).
To the extent that over the past decade the export of oil and gas producing countries to Europe has increased, US diplomacy cannot be seen as a total failure.
However, the consensus among observers is that given the efforts made, neither can
it be considered a huge success, and this has been attributed to lack of consideration
of the traditional political, economic, social, and even religious relationships
between states in the region, outstanding political tensions, logistical difficulties,
and—above all—the relative disappointment countries in Central Asia and Caucuses
experienced when attempting to conduct business with Western companies after the
USSR collapsed due to their highly benefit-seeking work methodology. It seems
that the US had to be more realistic toward the region in its foreign policy by considering the abovementioned parameters (Author’s interview with Javad AminMansour 2016).
With this in mind, Michael Klare’s view that the US “over-sold” its capacity to
incorporate the Caspian states into the Western political-economic order is perhaps
pertinent. Many promises were made about a “New Silk Road” and a new Caspian
linked to the West. But these promises could never be fulfilled for all kinds of reasons mentioned above which came to the fore in the time coinciding with Obama’s
coming-into-power. Although the Caspian states built some strong ties to Western
energy companies, they have also discovered that it is almost impossible to free
themselves from their historic economic and logistical ties to Moscow, and in the
meantime, they have become increasingly linked to China, which has often shown
itself able to make investments faster and on a larger scale than the Western powers
(Author’s interview with Michael Klare 2016).
This is seen as an inevitability by some, not least Robert S. Ross, he claims that
it would have been better for the US to ignore the region altogether. In his words,
“the prospect for secure US access regional energy resources was always minimal”
(Author’s interview with Professor. Robert S. Ross 2017).
The major challenge faced by US energy diplomats on the ground was the excessive focus on Nabucco and other gas export projects, without considering the technical and commercial conditions required for them to work. In terms of technical
considerations, the lack of foresight was serious and involved ignoring the huge
difference between oil and gas pipelines in terms of how they are organized and
Continuity Between Bush and Obama
With such a policy leaving these countries in the lurch politically and suffering
economically, the conditions were ripe for China’s entry (Author’s interview with
Dr. Tatina Mitrova 2017). Indeed, the obstacles put forth by allies compound with
greater geopolitical concerns in which, as many academics point out, Russia and
China are far better placed to take advantage of. Beyond the region, it has been
lodged that Iranian sanctions, rather than allowing for clear, unrivaled access to the
Caspian by private energy firms only allowed Iran to increase its domestic technological capacity’ to reduce waste thereby enhancing its resilience. Given how positively the removal of sanctions has been viewed by Western energy firms, this has
shown a lot of potential progress has been delayed. Secondly, the US strategy to
Balkanize Syria and put in place a compliant Kurdish petro-state collapsed with the
failure of the Turkish coup which intended to replace a nationalist president with a
more compliant administration (Author’s interview with Dr. Chis Cook 2017).
To the extent that over the past decade the export of oil and gas producing countries to Europe has increased, US diplomacy cannot be seen as a total failure.
However, the consensus among observers is that given the efforts made, neither can
it be considered a huge success, and this has been attributed to lack of consideration
of the traditional political, economic, social, and even religious relationships
between states in the region, outstanding political tensions, logistical difficulties,
and—above all—the relative disappointment countries in Central Asia and Caucuses
experienced when attempting to conduct business with Western companies after the
USSR collapsed due to their highly benefit-seeking work methodology. It seems
that the US had to be more realistic toward the region in its foreign policy by considering the abovementioned parameters (Author’s interview with Javad AminMansour 2016).
With this in mind, Michael Klare’s view that the US “over-sold” its capacity to
incorporate the Caspian states into the Western political-economic order is perhaps
pertinent. Many promises were made about a “New Silk Road” and a new Caspian
linked to the West. But these promises could never be fulfilled for all kinds of reasons mentioned above which came to the fore in the time coinciding with Obama’s
coming-into-power. Although the Caspian states built some strong ties to Western
energy companies, they have also discovered that it is almost impossible to free
themselves from their historic economic and logistical ties to Moscow, and in the
meantime, they have become increasingly linked to China, which has often shown
itself able to make investments faster and on a larger scale than the Western powers
(Author’s interview with Michael Klare 2016).
This is seen as an inevitability by some, not least Robert S. Ross, he claims that
it would have been better for the US to ignore the region altogether. In his words,
“the prospect for secure US access regional energy resources was always minimal”
(Author’s interview with Professor. Robert S. Ross 2017).
The major challenge faced by US energy diplomats on the ground was the excessive focus on Nabucco and other gas export projects, without considering the technical and commercial conditions required for them to work. In terms of technical
considerations, the lack of foresight was serious and involved ignoring the huge
difference between oil and gas pipelines in terms of how they are organized and
Continuity Between Bush and Obama