166
have forced a solution to the issue about 20 years ago, but because of hesitations
over Russian reactions and domestic Armenian lobbying, the US chose not to do
anything, and the result is ongoing instability, a long annual list of human casualties,
and huge numbers of permanent refugees living in misery:
Settlement of the war would have made it possible for the entire region to prosper, for
energy to be exported at much lower prices, and for a degree of peace and stability that is
currently unknown in the area. It is still not too late but will now take much more political
courage to bring about a peaceful settlement. (Author’s interview with Ambassador John
Maresca 2016)
Reluctance to interfere in difficult regional issues may not have had a limiting
effect on US power in the region, but it aligns with a broader current of opinion
among observers that the US’ biggest mistake was viewing the success of the BTC
oil pipeline (and by extension, pipeline politics in general) as the sole blueprint for
forging a corresponding gas pipeline and gathering momentum for greater in-roads
to be made into the region. Such efforts became redundant due to a failure to grasp
the seriousness of regional issues of which outstanding conflicts represented merely
one issue—yet one which prevented the fostering of an investment environment
(Author’s interview with Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich 2017). This is echoed by
another high-profile diplomat, Ross Wilson, who retains that the US’ power was not
however without limitations, stating that:
Better and more effective cooperation with the European Union on energy in general, and
the Caspian specifically, might have mitigated some of the challenges that exist today.
Unfortunately, the nature of the EU (and its dysfunctionality in many areas) made this
impossible. Cooperation with major EU member states interested in energy and in the
region—the United Kingdom’s is the only government effectively engaged on these matters—could not compensate. (Author’s interview with Ambassador Ross Wilson 2016)
Edward Chow too reflects on the role US allies played in limiting the US’ resolve
in the region and the feasibility of its projects, saying
Erdogan’s Turkey is different from Demirel’s Turkey. Demirel did not have any interest in
the region, but Erdogan does. Turkey is playing with Russia, which we are not interest in…
Now Turkey has own dynamic in the region. Turks thinks that Nabucco will work due to US
support, as with the BTC. (Author’s interview with Dr. Ed Chow 2016)
Robert Culter believes that the biggest mistake which the US made in Caspian
energy diplomacy was simply to “lose interest in the region” (Author’s interview
with Dr. Robert Cutler 2016). The US could have done a better diplomatic job on
trans-Caspian gas and oil pipelines, he believes however American diplomats
focused so intently on these lines that Kazakh and Turkmen leaders got the impression that these pipelines were more important to the US than shoring up relations
with the Caspian states more broadly. Hence, by the time Russia was back on its feet
politically (circa 2006), there were no direct, non-Russian pipelines in place, and
Caspian transportation diversification was at once limited again. According to this
view, the debacles of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts sealed the fate of Caspian
policy, with the US’ push for NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine putting it
(Author’s interview with Steve Levine 2017).
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
have forced a solution to the issue about 20 years ago, but because of hesitations
over Russian reactions and domestic Armenian lobbying, the US chose not to do
anything, and the result is ongoing instability, a long annual list of human casualties,
and huge numbers of permanent refugees living in misery:
Settlement of the war would have made it possible for the entire region to prosper, for
energy to be exported at much lower prices, and for a degree of peace and stability that is
currently unknown in the area. It is still not too late but will now take much more political
courage to bring about a peaceful settlement. (Author’s interview with Ambassador John
Maresca 2016)
Reluctance to interfere in difficult regional issues may not have had a limiting
effect on US power in the region, but it aligns with a broader current of opinion
among observers that the US’ biggest mistake was viewing the success of the BTC
oil pipeline (and by extension, pipeline politics in general) as the sole blueprint for
forging a corresponding gas pipeline and gathering momentum for greater in-roads
to be made into the region. Such efforts became redundant due to a failure to grasp
the seriousness of regional issues of which outstanding conflicts represented merely
one issue—yet one which prevented the fostering of an investment environment
(Author’s interview with Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich 2017). This is echoed by
another high-profile diplomat, Ross Wilson, who retains that the US’ power was not
however without limitations, stating that:
Better and more effective cooperation with the European Union on energy in general, and
the Caspian specifically, might have mitigated some of the challenges that exist today.
Unfortunately, the nature of the EU (and its dysfunctionality in many areas) made this
impossible. Cooperation with major EU member states interested in energy and in the
region—the United Kingdom’s is the only government effectively engaged on these matters—could not compensate. (Author’s interview with Ambassador Ross Wilson 2016)
Edward Chow too reflects on the role US allies played in limiting the US’ resolve
in the region and the feasibility of its projects, saying
Erdogan’s Turkey is different from Demirel’s Turkey. Demirel did not have any interest in
the region, but Erdogan does. Turkey is playing with Russia, which we are not interest in…
Now Turkey has own dynamic in the region. Turks thinks that Nabucco will work due to US
support, as with the BTC. (Author’s interview with Dr. Ed Chow 2016)
Robert Culter believes that the biggest mistake which the US made in Caspian
energy diplomacy was simply to “lose interest in the region” (Author’s interview
with Dr. Robert Cutler 2016). The US could have done a better diplomatic job on
trans-Caspian gas and oil pipelines, he believes however American diplomats
focused so intently on these lines that Kazakh and Turkmen leaders got the impression that these pipelines were more important to the US than shoring up relations
with the Caspian states more broadly. Hence, by the time Russia was back on its feet
politically (circa 2006), there were no direct, non-Russian pipelines in place, and
Caspian transportation diversification was at once limited again. According to this
view, the debacles of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts sealed the fate of Caspian
policy, with the US’ push for NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine putting it
(Author’s interview with Steve Levine 2017).
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration