165
US support for the Baku-Ceyhan line, completed in 2005, became a key reflection of its role in the region. However, much was left to Western ally Turkey to deal
with in its considered role as a regional model and a bridge across the region. Since
the fall of the Soviet Union, President Clinton had described Turkey as a “Democratic,
secular and stable Western ally” that the US sought to bolster western influence in
the region. It was around this time in which, in lieu of human rights criticisms, the
US offered messages of support to democratic development packages and relations
warmed. The importance of energy and Caspian supplies in the minds of Clinton
Administration officials cannot be separated from this bolstering of ties. Yet moving
into the Bush era, these efforts were institutionalized in the name of energy security,
and furthermore, national security—which he saw as inextricably linked thus causing most analysts to view the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq following the
September 11 attacks as being grounded in energy concerns (Author’s interview
with David Goldwyn 2017).
Bush’s Foreign Secretary Colin Powell sealed the government’s ramped up
approach with the creation of the role of US “Special Advisor to the President and
the Secretary of State for Caspian.” It was in this role that Clinton strategists such as
Richard Morningstar, John Wolf, and Elizabeth Jones could play a more enhanced
role in the region. One aspect of Bush’s energy concerns being founded on the fact
of depleting world oil reserves, consideration was also paid to the fact that these
reserves would find most avid customers in the rising Asian nations. In other words,
the West could not claim to be the sole benefactor to energy or bankroller in investment. Gulf reserves were ultimately the priority of the administration with the
Caspian considered a back-up reserve.
In this sense, the Obama Administration’s policy toward the Caspian Sea and its
energy resources lay to some extent in its continuity with that of the Bush administration (Bluth 2014:193). As David Goldwyn states however there were a number of
specific changes in circumstances on the ground which sealed the general shift in
administration’s focus. One was that Turkmenistan was not much interested in
offering additional onshore supplies, with Eastward and Northward connections
looking far more practical—not to mention that within easier geographical reach lay
a line being built by the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, who were already looking
to begin Phase 2 of their project at this time. At the same time, there were a number
of hold-ups affecting the Kazak Tengiz and Kashagan projects in Kazakhstan. What
now remained was only Azerbaijan’s gas projects (Author’s interview with David
Goldwyn 2017).
US Biggest Mistakes in Caspian Energy Diplomacy
According to a former US Ambassador charged with overseeing a resolution over
Nagorno-Karabakh, John Maresca, a great opportunity was missed in not aiming to
find a resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of NagornoKarabakh. With careful use of pressure and encouragement, he claims, the US could
Continuity Between Bush and Obama
US support for the Baku-Ceyhan line, completed in 2005, became a key reflection of its role in the region. However, much was left to Western ally Turkey to deal
with in its considered role as a regional model and a bridge across the region. Since
the fall of the Soviet Union, President Clinton had described Turkey as a “Democratic,
secular and stable Western ally” that the US sought to bolster western influence in
the region. It was around this time in which, in lieu of human rights criticisms, the
US offered messages of support to democratic development packages and relations
warmed. The importance of energy and Caspian supplies in the minds of Clinton
Administration officials cannot be separated from this bolstering of ties. Yet moving
into the Bush era, these efforts were institutionalized in the name of energy security,
and furthermore, national security—which he saw as inextricably linked thus causing most analysts to view the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq following the
September 11 attacks as being grounded in energy concerns (Author’s interview
with David Goldwyn 2017).
Bush’s Foreign Secretary Colin Powell sealed the government’s ramped up
approach with the creation of the role of US “Special Advisor to the President and
the Secretary of State for Caspian.” It was in this role that Clinton strategists such as
Richard Morningstar, John Wolf, and Elizabeth Jones could play a more enhanced
role in the region. One aspect of Bush’s energy concerns being founded on the fact
of depleting world oil reserves, consideration was also paid to the fact that these
reserves would find most avid customers in the rising Asian nations. In other words,
the West could not claim to be the sole benefactor to energy or bankroller in investment. Gulf reserves were ultimately the priority of the administration with the
Caspian considered a back-up reserve.
In this sense, the Obama Administration’s policy toward the Caspian Sea and its
energy resources lay to some extent in its continuity with that of the Bush administration (Bluth 2014:193). As David Goldwyn states however there were a number of
specific changes in circumstances on the ground which sealed the general shift in
administration’s focus. One was that Turkmenistan was not much interested in
offering additional onshore supplies, with Eastward and Northward connections
looking far more practical—not to mention that within easier geographical reach lay
a line being built by the Chinese Petroleum Corporation, who were already looking
to begin Phase 2 of their project at this time. At the same time, there were a number
of hold-ups affecting the Kazak Tengiz and Kashagan projects in Kazakhstan. What
now remained was only Azerbaijan’s gas projects (Author’s interview with David
Goldwyn 2017).
US Biggest Mistakes in Caspian Energy Diplomacy
According to a former US Ambassador charged with overseeing a resolution over
Nagorno-Karabakh, John Maresca, a great opportunity was missed in not aiming to
find a resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of NagornoKarabakh. With careful use of pressure and encouragement, he claims, the US could
Continuity Between Bush and Obama