168
financed, as well as their commercial environment. Predictably, Western commercial entities acted regardless of what their governments did, and were unresponsive
to diplomatic efforts which seemed unfeasible when faced with the cold logic of
financial concerns (Author’s interview with David Goldwyn 2017). In any case, for
as much as US disengagement as an importer may reduce the country’s dependency
on foreign producing nations, it has also reduced its influence in the region from a
political and strategic point of view (Author’s interview with Professor Jalil
Roshandel 2017). This is a view reflected by a number of academics, with the country’s natural shift into producer status manifesting itself in a subsequent shift in
concerns.
I don’t think enough was done to help the former Soviet Union countries move to democratic and market-based systems soon enough and to a big enough extent following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Something like a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe might
have delivered better outcomes by now for the people of the region and therefore also in the
longer term for the rest for the world. (Author’s interview with Professor. Peter R. Hartley
2017)
Early after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was nicknamed a “Chevron
company”—so heavy was the company’s presence there. Turkmenistan was open to
Western companies as well. However, expecting those two countries to suddenly
evolve into market economies and democracies with pro-Western regimes was an
unreasonable assumption, despite diplomatic efforts on the part of Turkey which
ultimately only resulted in a number a trade links a number of trade agreements and
joint programs with the West. In turn, the regimes entrenched themselves with
Western overtures regarding human rights, pro-democracy, and market issues taken
as an unwarranted intervention into domestic affairs. Russia and China, on the other
hand, did not care much about those issues, and so were welcomed with greater
ease. According to Sohber Karbuz;
Their no-strings attached policy gained importance, and hence Turkish, US and European
influence in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan diminished. In Azerbaijan, things were rather
different and more delicate. The pro-Western attitude demonstrated by Azerbaijan played
an important role. Moreover, the push for and the influence of Turkey and the US in
Azerbaijan on the one hand, and the policy of Azerbaijan to distance itself from Russia on
the other hand was key for bringing Azerbaijan close to the Western block. The EU’s eastern
partnership policy and other EC projects were successful in brining Azerbaijan closer to the
European front. It is perhaps speculative to say but if Iranian sanctions were not in place and
if Iran was not considered as an axis of evil, the situation or progress in Caspian legal status
and legal framework could be different. Resolving those issues would make trans-Caspian
oil and gas pipelines more of a reality which, in turn would allow exporting Kazakh oil and
Turkmen gas to Western markets. Making Kazakhs and Turkmen gas economically more
dependent on western markets could perhaps reduce Russian influence and Chinese presence less likely. (Author’s interview with Dr. Sohber Karbuz 2016)
Meanwhile, according to another diplomat:
This question presumes that the US should be involved in the Caspian region. My own take
is that the region may not justify strong US involvement, especially if its energy reserves are
less than predicted. Time is better spend investing in nondepletable energy systems such as
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration
financed, as well as their commercial environment. Predictably, Western commercial entities acted regardless of what their governments did, and were unresponsive
to diplomatic efforts which seemed unfeasible when faced with the cold logic of
financial concerns (Author’s interview with David Goldwyn 2017). In any case, for
as much as US disengagement as an importer may reduce the country’s dependency
on foreign producing nations, it has also reduced its influence in the region from a
political and strategic point of view (Author’s interview with Professor Jalil
Roshandel 2017). This is a view reflected by a number of academics, with the country’s natural shift into producer status manifesting itself in a subsequent shift in
concerns.
I don’t think enough was done to help the former Soviet Union countries move to democratic and market-based systems soon enough and to a big enough extent following the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Something like a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe might
have delivered better outcomes by now for the people of the region and therefore also in the
longer term for the rest for the world. (Author’s interview with Professor. Peter R. Hartley
2017)
Early after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was nicknamed a “Chevron
company”—so heavy was the company’s presence there. Turkmenistan was open to
Western companies as well. However, expecting those two countries to suddenly
evolve into market economies and democracies with pro-Western regimes was an
unreasonable assumption, despite diplomatic efforts on the part of Turkey which
ultimately only resulted in a number a trade links a number of trade agreements and
joint programs with the West. In turn, the regimes entrenched themselves with
Western overtures regarding human rights, pro-democracy, and market issues taken
as an unwarranted intervention into domestic affairs. Russia and China, on the other
hand, did not care much about those issues, and so were welcomed with greater
ease. According to Sohber Karbuz;
Their no-strings attached policy gained importance, and hence Turkish, US and European
influence in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan diminished. In Azerbaijan, things were rather
different and more delicate. The pro-Western attitude demonstrated by Azerbaijan played
an important role. Moreover, the push for and the influence of Turkey and the US in
Azerbaijan on the one hand, and the policy of Azerbaijan to distance itself from Russia on
the other hand was key for bringing Azerbaijan close to the Western block. The EU’s eastern
partnership policy and other EC projects were successful in brining Azerbaijan closer to the
European front. It is perhaps speculative to say but if Iranian sanctions were not in place and
if Iran was not considered as an axis of evil, the situation or progress in Caspian legal status
and legal framework could be different. Resolving those issues would make trans-Caspian
oil and gas pipelines more of a reality which, in turn would allow exporting Kazakh oil and
Turkmen gas to Western markets. Making Kazakhs and Turkmen gas economically more
dependent on western markets could perhaps reduce Russian influence and Chinese presence less likely. (Author’s interview with Dr. Sohber Karbuz 2016)
Meanwhile, according to another diplomat:
This question presumes that the US should be involved in the Caspian region. My own take
is that the region may not justify strong US involvement, especially if its energy reserves are
less than predicted. Time is better spend investing in nondepletable energy systems such as
5 US Energy Diplomacy Under the Obama Administration