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South Stream
The South Stream natural gas pipeline project faced no obstructions from the beginning. The project aimed to transport Russian natural gas to Europe through the
Black Sea and Bulgaria and was awarded to Russian Gazprom (50%), Italian ENI
(20%), French EDF (15%), and Wintershall (15%). German-based BASF decided to
finance the 900 km lines underwater construction along the bottom of the Black
Sea. Gazprom president Alekseyi Miller claimed that the agreement meant “the
beginning of the South Stream project.” It was estimated that the cost of the pipeline
would reach 16 billion euros, linking the Russian city of Anapa to the port of Varna
in Bulgaria. From here, natural gas would extend overland to Serbia, Hungary,
Slovenia, Italy, Austria, and Greece (www.dw.com 2016). Construction was hoped
to be completed by 2015, shipping 63 billion cubic meters of natural gas westwards.
The South Stream was formulated as a Russian competitor to Nabucco (www.
dw.com 2016).
However, by 2014, with Nabucco already dead in the water, it was decided however that the South Stream project did not adhere to EU laws governing competition
and energy. Brussels, it seemed, was anxious about the prospect of a monopoly—
especially ones which could control both energy and the pipelines which carry it
(www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Gazprom to launch a pipeline project
to deliver gas to Turkey via an underwater Black Sea pipeline at the end of 2012, at
which point feasibility projects were begun concluding that construction could
begin the following year, with the first deliveries expected to be made in 2015
(www.bbc.com 2017a, b, c). Turkish former Energy Minister Taner Yıldız signed
Turkey’s acceptance of the project in line with the country’s stated aims of constituting a European energy hub, while for Russia the pipeline provided an opportunity
to circumvent Ukraine (www.bbc.com 2017a, b, c). However, Putin expressed hope
that Ukraine could remain a Russian partner, alluding to a recognition that diversity
of delivery routes could open options for Russian energy diplomacy. With tension
between the two countries having increased in the years since however Northern
Stream plans to transit energy through the Baltic have captured the imagination of
many Russian policymakers similar to the Sothern Stream plans (www.bbc.com
2017a, b, c). Regarding the latter, a consortium was formed incorporating Italy’s
ENI, Germany’s Wintershall, and France’s EDF to work on the pipeline connecting
Russia to Turkey and on to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria (www.bbc.com
2017a, b, c).
However, plans for the Russian Southern Stream project were put to bed by the
EU on the basis of the plans contravening existing legal commitments on the part of
states, with the result that Turkey continues to procure Russian gas via Ukraine
(www.tr.sputniknews.com 2017).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
South Stream
The South Stream natural gas pipeline project faced no obstructions from the beginning. The project aimed to transport Russian natural gas to Europe through the
Black Sea and Bulgaria and was awarded to Russian Gazprom (50%), Italian ENI
(20%), French EDF (15%), and Wintershall (15%). German-based BASF decided to
finance the 900 km lines underwater construction along the bottom of the Black
Sea. Gazprom president Alekseyi Miller claimed that the agreement meant “the
beginning of the South Stream project.” It was estimated that the cost of the pipeline
would reach 16 billion euros, linking the Russian city of Anapa to the port of Varna
in Bulgaria. From here, natural gas would extend overland to Serbia, Hungary,
Slovenia, Italy, Austria, and Greece (www.dw.com 2016). Construction was hoped
to be completed by 2015, shipping 63 billion cubic meters of natural gas westwards.
The South Stream was formulated as a Russian competitor to Nabucco (www.
dw.com 2016).
However, by 2014, with Nabucco already dead in the water, it was decided however that the South Stream project did not adhere to EU laws governing competition
and energy. Brussels, it seemed, was anxious about the prospect of a monopoly—
especially ones which could control both energy and the pipelines which carry it
(www.foreignpolicy.com 2016a, b).
Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered Gazprom to launch a pipeline project
to deliver gas to Turkey via an underwater Black Sea pipeline at the end of 2012, at
which point feasibility projects were begun concluding that construction could
begin the following year, with the first deliveries expected to be made in 2015
(www.bbc.com 2017a, b, c). Turkish former Energy Minister Taner Yıldız signed
Turkey’s acceptance of the project in line with the country’s stated aims of constituting a European energy hub, while for Russia the pipeline provided an opportunity
to circumvent Ukraine (www.bbc.com 2017a, b, c). However, Putin expressed hope
that Ukraine could remain a Russian partner, alluding to a recognition that diversity
of delivery routes could open options for Russian energy diplomacy. With tension
between the two countries having increased in the years since however Northern
Stream plans to transit energy through the Baltic have captured the imagination of
many Russian policymakers similar to the Sothern Stream plans (www.bbc.com
2017a, b, c). Regarding the latter, a consortium was formed incorporating Italy’s
ENI, Germany’s Wintershall, and France’s EDF to work on the pipeline connecting
Russia to Turkey and on to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria (www.bbc.com
2017a, b, c).
However, plans for the Russian Southern Stream project were put to bed by the
EU on the basis of the plans contravening existing legal commitments on the part of
states, with the result that Turkey continues to procure Russian gas via Ukraine
(www.tr.sputniknews.com 2017).
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region