117
gas pipeline is much more complicated, and thus requires creditworthy off-takers to
come forward before construction can begin and is a harder sell, diplomatically
speaking. In its first phase, US diplomacy focused on supporting states by creating
intergovernmental agreements and transit agreements and striking reasonable deals
in terms of the financing of projects. For oil, this works a lot more smoothly, as one
can build a pipeline first, and look for consumers later; but for gas pipelines, the
consumer is required to play a role. The second phase has been even more challenging and complicated than phase one, with the roots of the Southern Gas corridor
uncertain, and more companies than European countries pushing for the project,
perhaps due to the issue of inadequacy of supply. Politics seems to have maintained
the driving force in negotiations, however.
Michael Klara argues that President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were
encouraging the EU to increase their supply of Caspian oil and gas in order to
decrease their reliance on Russian oil and gas. Hence, Cheney was a natural supporter of the Nabucco proposal. At the same time, the Bush administration also
provided substantial military assistance to the Caspian states and sought to bring
Georgia into NATO. Under Obama, these efforts seemed to enjoy less priority, especially in that the US was now able to ship its own gas to Europe in the form of LNG
(Author’s interview with Michael Klare 2016). Enthusiasm for Nabucco thus began
to quietly subside and the decision was reached by the Shah Deniz Consortium to
opt for the TAP project (Author’s interview with Douglas C. Hengel 2016).
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline
Turkmenistan has accelerated projects to feed the demands of growing South Asian
economies. Foremost of these is the 1800 km-long TAPI, or TurkmenistanAfghanistan- Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline the foundations of which were laid
in December 2015. It is projected the line will carry 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas, with the first delivery being made by 2019 (www.enerjienstitusu.com 2017).
The project will cost an estimated $7.6 billion and was hailed by Turkmenistan’s
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow as an important symbol of stability. The
president was among many who hailed the plan as a marking step “not just for suppliers but for transit nations”—with more than a nod to Afghanistan (www.enerjienstitusu.com 2017).
Despite uncertainty around the future of Afghanistan, Indian–Pakistan relations,
and the global energy market, the project was launched by leaders of the four nations
with an official ceremony in Turkmenistan. However, the fact that the project has
remained in discussion among diplomats and academics for so long has raised suspicions that the project may prove to serve as a vehicle for lip service over regional
cooperation (www.ekonomi.gov.tr 2015). Despite being discussed since 1995, the
pipeline was only officially agreed upon by India in 2008, which marked its incorporation into the Obama Administration’s grand New Silk Road vision of higher
connectivity for the region (www.ekonomi.gov.tr 2015).
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects
gas pipeline is much more complicated, and thus requires creditworthy off-takers to
come forward before construction can begin and is a harder sell, diplomatically
speaking. In its first phase, US diplomacy focused on supporting states by creating
intergovernmental agreements and transit agreements and striking reasonable deals
in terms of the financing of projects. For oil, this works a lot more smoothly, as one
can build a pipeline first, and look for consumers later; but for gas pipelines, the
consumer is required to play a role. The second phase has been even more challenging and complicated than phase one, with the roots of the Southern Gas corridor
uncertain, and more companies than European countries pushing for the project,
perhaps due to the issue of inadequacy of supply. Politics seems to have maintained
the driving force in negotiations, however.
Michael Klara argues that President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were
encouraging the EU to increase their supply of Caspian oil and gas in order to
decrease their reliance on Russian oil and gas. Hence, Cheney was a natural supporter of the Nabucco proposal. At the same time, the Bush administration also
provided substantial military assistance to the Caspian states and sought to bring
Georgia into NATO. Under Obama, these efforts seemed to enjoy less priority, especially in that the US was now able to ship its own gas to Europe in the form of LNG
(Author’s interview with Michael Klare 2016). Enthusiasm for Nabucco thus began
to quietly subside and the decision was reached by the Shah Deniz Consortium to
opt for the TAP project (Author’s interview with Douglas C. Hengel 2016).
The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline
Turkmenistan has accelerated projects to feed the demands of growing South Asian
economies. Foremost of these is the 1800 km-long TAPI, or TurkmenistanAfghanistan- Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline the foundations of which were laid
in December 2015. It is projected the line will carry 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas, with the first delivery being made by 2019 (www.enerjienstitusu.com 2017).
The project will cost an estimated $7.6 billion and was hailed by Turkmenistan’s
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow as an important symbol of stability. The
president was among many who hailed the plan as a marking step “not just for suppliers but for transit nations”—with more than a nod to Afghanistan (www.enerjienstitusu.com 2017).
Despite uncertainty around the future of Afghanistan, Indian–Pakistan relations,
and the global energy market, the project was launched by leaders of the four nations
with an official ceremony in Turkmenistan. However, the fact that the project has
remained in discussion among diplomats and academics for so long has raised suspicions that the project may prove to serve as a vehicle for lip service over regional
cooperation (www.ekonomi.gov.tr 2015). Despite being discussed since 1995, the
pipeline was only officially agreed upon by India in 2008, which marked its incorporation into the Obama Administration’s grand New Silk Road vision of higher
connectivity for the region (www.ekonomi.gov.tr 2015).
Regional Security and Economic Organization and Projects