92
limited to Iran, with China beyond feasibility (Pleines 2015:110). Only after the full
lifting of sanctions will Iran be a desirable destination through which Caspian
nations may wish to transit oil and gas to the world market. In addition to Russia’s
security, economy, and energy policies directed toward the Middle East, the policies
in the areas of culture and identity contributed to Russia’s strengthening power in
the countries in the Middle East. Russia made important campaigns toward ensuring
that the language and culture of the ethnic Russian communities in these countries
are presented in the same way as those of the communities that were in the process
of forming a nation. Formerly, the Russian language did not have a special status in
many of the republics, but later it was accepted as the official language in most of
the Middle East republics, and this was a significant development for Russia to
strengthen her hegemony (Ozkan and Demirtepe 2013:9).
Onur Cobali suggests that the US initiated the pipeline game in the second half
of the 1990s by encouraging the development of an offshore pipeline system around
the Caspian Sea (Cobanli 2014:349). Due to the extensive production capacities of
Central Asia and the countries of the Caspian Sea region, there is no natural cause
to encourage interaction between China and the West, despite the absence of a strategic rivalry. The Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline does not have a strategic
impact on westbound pipeline options (Cobanli 2014:349).
The United States has its own political and energy objective in the region.
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, US Eurasian Energy Envoy, laid out three specifically, in a January 2010 speech at the Center for American Progress; namely “to
help to develop new oil and natural gas deposits; to support European energy security by diversifying EU energy sources; and to promote Caucasus and Central Asian
economic development by expanding markets for their hydrocarbon exports.” In the
same speech, Morningstar lauded the southern corridor idea as a means of transporting natural gas to Europe, mentioning the possibilities held by the Nabucco pipeline
and TAP specifically (www.harvard.edu 2016).
Meanwhile, India’s involvement in the region has been described by some, such
as Alexander Cooley, as overstated. The country’s diplomatic success in its
“Northern Strategy” has largely been distorted by the nationalism of Indian Media.
India’s ability to represent another actor in Central Asia however could have a
knock-on effect in the region. The inclusion of India and Pakistan will no doubt
expand the spotlight beyond the China–Russia relationship, for one (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). India’s relationship with Caspian Sea states and
Central Asia states can be described as a strategic partnership, and India has desired
to make sure plays a key role in the region.
China’s increasing investments in Central Asia have provided the main impetus
for greater Indian involvement. Many regional states are interested in expanding
trade ties with India as they see business trade and political relations as an opportunity to become a transit corridor for Indian goods to Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). However,
it is unlikely that India will be in a position to compete with China’s influence in the
region, as many, such as Karen Smith Stegen and Julia Kusznir, have suggested, the
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region
limited to Iran, with China beyond feasibility (Pleines 2015:110). Only after the full
lifting of sanctions will Iran be a desirable destination through which Caspian
nations may wish to transit oil and gas to the world market. In addition to Russia’s
security, economy, and energy policies directed toward the Middle East, the policies
in the areas of culture and identity contributed to Russia’s strengthening power in
the countries in the Middle East. Russia made important campaigns toward ensuring
that the language and culture of the ethnic Russian communities in these countries
are presented in the same way as those of the communities that were in the process
of forming a nation. Formerly, the Russian language did not have a special status in
many of the republics, but later it was accepted as the official language in most of
the Middle East republics, and this was a significant development for Russia to
strengthen her hegemony (Ozkan and Demirtepe 2013:9).
Onur Cobali suggests that the US initiated the pipeline game in the second half
of the 1990s by encouraging the development of an offshore pipeline system around
the Caspian Sea (Cobanli 2014:349). Due to the extensive production capacities of
Central Asia and the countries of the Caspian Sea region, there is no natural cause
to encourage interaction between China and the West, despite the absence of a strategic rivalry. The Turkmenistan-China natural gas pipeline does not have a strategic
impact on westbound pipeline options (Cobanli 2014:349).
The United States has its own political and energy objective in the region.
Ambassador Richard Morningstar, US Eurasian Energy Envoy, laid out three specifically, in a January 2010 speech at the Center for American Progress; namely “to
help to develop new oil and natural gas deposits; to support European energy security by diversifying EU energy sources; and to promote Caucasus and Central Asian
economic development by expanding markets for their hydrocarbon exports.” In the
same speech, Morningstar lauded the southern corridor idea as a means of transporting natural gas to Europe, mentioning the possibilities held by the Nabucco pipeline
and TAP specifically (www.harvard.edu 2016).
Meanwhile, India’s involvement in the region has been described by some, such
as Alexander Cooley, as overstated. The country’s diplomatic success in its
“Northern Strategy” has largely been distorted by the nationalism of Indian Media.
India’s ability to represent another actor in Central Asia however could have a
knock-on effect in the region. The inclusion of India and Pakistan will no doubt
expand the spotlight beyond the China–Russia relationship, for one (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). India’s relationship with Caspian Sea states and
Central Asia states can be described as a strategic partnership, and India has desired
to make sure plays a key role in the region.
China’s increasing investments in Central Asia have provided the main impetus
for greater Indian involvement. Many regional states are interested in expanding
trade ties with India as they see business trade and political relations as an opportunity to become a transit corridor for Indian goods to Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (www.thediplomat.com 2016a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i). However,
it is unlikely that India will be in a position to compete with China’s influence in the
region, as many, such as Karen Smith Stegen and Julia Kusznir, have suggested, the
3 International Context of the New Era and the Caspian Sea Region